Child soldiers

AFGHAN children are being recruited as suicide bombers, says a news agency report, citing the Executive Director of the UNICEF, Hilde F. Johnson. As for how serious is the problem of children being drawn into the Afghan conflict, the official has limited information given that 60 percent of Afghan children are beyond the reach of his outfit. “There are stories and allegations of recruitment on the different sides, but we don’t have enough documentation to say how bad it is”, he says. In a country where war, in one form or the other, has been going on for decades, children are easy targets of the recruiters. Add to this the plethora of ‘incentives’ - tribal feuds, gun-carrying cultural pride, deepening poverty and unemployment - and one gets some idea of the magnitude of this scourge. Just consider: Over 7500 Afghan child soldiers went through Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme between April 2003 and June 2006. This tragedy can be readily attributed to Afghan Taliban, originally a student militia, but the Afghan government in general and private security agencies are equally involved. Child soldiers are not entirely a present day phenomenon; it was a part of warfare in ancient days also. They are recruited to participate in combat, scouting and spying, acting as decoys, couriers, kitchen boys and even tools of sexual abuse. But their recruitment became popular in the post-World War Two era, when colonialism retreated - willingly or under force - from large chunks of Asia and Africa in many cases, leaving political instability that often degenerated into civil unrest and tribal wars. The unstable governments invited local resistance, joined by child soldiers in a number of African countries.
Some Asian countries particularly Burma, Nepal and Sri Lanka too have their child soldiers. During the Iran-Iraq war underage ‘volunteers’ were used to clear minefields. But it looks they are being put to their worst use now when these physically and mentally immature under-aged are being made into suicide bombers. Almost all suicide bombings in Pakistan have been blamed on young boys who must have been recruited at tender age and turned into zombies by their highly persuasive masters and minders. According to Human Rights Watch, there are 200,000 to 300,000 child soldiers in more than 20 countries. No doubt this crime is under sharp spotlight of concerned international public opinion, but the law banning it that is expected to banish this curse is still weak and laconic. The UN Convention forbidding recruitment of children under 18 is effectively undermined by a later-enacted Protocol which brings down the minimum recruitment age from 18 to 16, with a fig-leaf proviso that the recruits will not be deployed in battlefield. In fact, this amounts to admitting that war may not be acceptable to a mature human mind so its seed should be planted deeper in a younger, immature mind of 16-year youth. With non-conventional conflicts between states expected to become more common in future, the military requirement for child soldiers and suicide bombers possessing plastic minds is likely to multiply. That is the challenge that should receive attention and support to the forces that advocate ban on recruitment of child soldiers. Unfortunately, Muslim societies are prone to create zombies given that quite a substantial part of their youth has no access to modern schooling. They also suffer from lack of legal frameworks to eradicate this scourge. It is not only the Afghans’ problem; it is global affecting many countries that are guilty of this crime against humanity in one or the other way. There is the imperative to step up efforts to modernise educational systems and strengthen national and international legal framework to protect the rights of the child and outlaw the recruitment of child soldiers.

Russia’s troubles in Caucasus

IN 1999 the then Russian President Vladimir Putin tried to succeed where Boris Yeltsin had failed, and once again sent large troop concentrations into Chechnya to quell the independence movement. As the conflict now enters its 10th year, it would seem that Moscow has the insurgency more or less under control. But appearances may be deceptive. There are no independent foreign media permitted to travel freely in Chechnya and the few visits allowed are closely chaperoned. The Russian media meanwhile have learned to keep their noses out of contentious issues. Consequent self-censorship means little real news of the state of affairs in Chechnya reaches Russians elsewhere. The few non-governmental-organizations (NGOs) that are still managing to operate in the Chechnya — particularly in refugee camps — are increasingly being obliged to curtail their operations. There is, therefore, little clear information reaching the outside world. Nevertheless, although many of its leaders have been slain, the rebellion does continue. The Russians have conducted a classic divide and rule strategy. President Ramzan Kadyrov, who succeeded his slain father Akhmad, runs a small part of the country almost as a personal fief with his own elite military force and his own limited system of taxation. To the Kremlin’s satisfaction, he also pursues any potential local rivals. But in line with Moscow’s determination to keep Chechnya as an integral part of Russia, the real decisions are made by a few top Russian civilian administrators and to a greater extent by the Russian military. Kadyrov is largely marginalized, as evidenced by the Kremlin’s refusal to accept his claims on the local revenues of the Russian oil giant Rosneft.
Kadyrov has, however, recently made common cause with Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the new Russian-appointed president in neighboring Ingushetia, which before World War II was lumped with Chechnya into a single Soviet state. (Both populations were deported to Central Asia in 1944 for supporting the Nazi German advance into the Caucasus — returning only in the late 1950s). The Russians are facing a second insurgency in Ingushetia and Yevkurov’s replacement of the corrupt and ineffectual Murat Zyazikov must, the Kremlin hopes, give it a better chance to crush the rebels. Kadyrov’s courting of Yevkurov may, therefore, be at the Russian instigation but the Chechen leader may have other ideas. A renewed tie-up between the two small republics could provide a more plausible case for autonomy, not least since Ingushetia with a population of just 300,000 is already “semi-autonomous” while Chechnya, with 1.1 million inhabitants is simply a republic within the Russian Federation. The Kremlin will surely watch the two presidents closely but their main interest will be to continue the repression of Chechen resistance that has drawn support from Ingushetia. Despite the unexpected effects of the economic downturn, Russia currently still feels strong enough to crush the rebellion and help Kadyrov rebuild the country.

—Arab News