Political equality for Fata

THE unabated violence in the tribal areas of Pakistan spawned by Taliban militancy and sectarian extremism came under sharp focus at three important for. First, Prime Minister Gilani addressed the Grand Tribal Dirge at Peshawar where he asked the tribal Maalox to join hands with the government in the fight against militancy. Second, PPP co-chairman Asif Zardari met the PPP members of NWFP assembly in Islamabad and explained to them how the coalition government looks at the growing militancy in its socio-political context, that is at some variance with the military-led approach. Third, the NWFP cabinet discussed the Baitullah Mehsud ultimatum to resign and decided not to surrender to his demand. Meanwhile, clashes between the militants and security forces were reported from various parts of the troubled region. The militants appeared to be retreating from the grim battlefronts in the Hangu salient, but were holding on to their positions in Swat district, particularly in its sub-district Matta. They also blew up a few government posts. More alarmingly, however, they waylaid and killed a prominent invitee to the grand jirga, Malik Shahjehan, as he set out from his Bajaur residence to hear from the prime minister, in addition to the reported killing of two “US spies”. No doubt, Monday’s happenings are symptomatic of the government’s concern over the turmoil created by the militants, as they also bring out the enormity of that challenge. That the problem of militancy - one may call it Talibanisation - and its ramifications for the United States-led coalition campaign in Afghanistan should have come in for a closer look by the elected government, it was certainly warranted by the upcoming White House visit of the prime minister. Equally important is the hard unpalatable truth in the matter that tends to unfold in the wake of these happenings. Firstly, these events unmistakably indicate that the government is in deep confusion as how to handle the growing challenge of militancy in the tribal areas that is now spreading to the settled areas of the NWFP. At the Grand Tribal Jirga the prime minister did two things. One, he implored the tribal elders, commonly called Maalox, to ‘deal’ with militants.
“You should talk to militants to renounce insurgency. Those who lay down arms are our friends and those who challenge the government’s writ are not sincere to the country,” he told them. Two, the prime minister announced a package of incentives, including 100 new ‘lungis’ - in odd reminiscence of the colonial days when British government would identify their loyalists by putting stripped turbans on their heads and fix some stipend to be regularly paid to them. It was a tribute to the system left behind by the British and kept alive by successive governments through appointed officials called political agents. But when Prime Minister Gilani was decorating the newly discovered Maalox his party leader was telling the PPP members that lack of contact with mainstream political parties was one of major causes of the common tribal falling prey to single-dimensional ‘madressah’ schooling. He wanted the Political Parties Act to be extended to the FATA so that secular parties have the chance to compete with religious parties in the tribal areas. Of course, the ANP-led NWFP cabinet thought that dialogue with militants is the best way to deal with militancy, though suspects “hidden hands” are trying to spoil the game.

North Korean disarmament

THE words “significant” and “of no consequence” would seem to be directly opposed to each other. Yet it was in those terms that the Chinese and Americans respectively described yesterday’s six power talks in Singapore on North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. For the first time, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met and shook hands with her opposite number from Pyongyang, Pak Ui-chu at the talks. The disparity in comments actually encapsulates the markedly different ways in which Beijing and Washington have tackled the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea. On the face of it, the Chinese as North Korea’s direct neighbor have more to fear from its weaponry than the Americans. Yet the Americans have behaved as if the threat were directly against them. Post-9/11, Bush linked North Korea to Iraq and Iran as the “Axis of Evil”. The country was blacklisted as a state sponsor of terrorism. Washington stuck to this characterization of Pyongyang, even after the world saw clearly that one of the other members of the alleged axis — Iraq — had neither WMD nor was it a sponsor of Al-Qaeda. Washington may have chosen belligerence because of its treaty commitments to defend Seoul if it were again attacked from the north. Yet such an assault from a bankrupt North Korea has never looked likely unless, as in the Korean War of 1950-53, Pyongyang was again sustained by China.
The contrast between quiet and dogged Chinese diplomacy and the loud menacing noises coming from the Bush White House is striking. It seems possible that both governments will be convinced that it is their approach that has brought the North Koreans this far. The reality is more likely that the Kim regime in Pyongyang has responded by turns to both the respective stick and the carrot approaches. Some might speculate that there has been far greater correspondence over this between Beijing and Washington than has ever been apparent. In normal circumstances, it might be easy to believe that the two foreign ministries were in collaboration. The truth is, however, that nothing about the Bush administration suggests that it has either the subtlety or the wisdom to participate in such a maneuver. The only possibility is that the small but influential cadre of Sinologists in the State Department may have kept open quiet “channels” to Beijing that have enabled them to leverage their president’s blustering. The Russians, who with the Japanese and South Koreans, make up the six parties to the negotiations chaired by China, may perhaps be watching both the Chinese and American performances with interest. If Iran does actually have a nuclear weapons program, then Russia’s geographical and political position will be very similar in some ways to that of China and North Korea over the last five years. A further common denominator is likely to be a belligerent Washington seeking always to drive the process even when coaxing is more appropriate. A McCain White House is likely to be more uncompromising than an Obama one.

—Arab News