Afghanistan’s irony

IT IS indeed ironic that Afghanistan’s National Day celebrations, marking the ’92 mujahideen capture of Kabul from the Soviet backed government, became the scene for the latest of frequent attacks on President Hamid Karzai. It embarrassed the administration as a large presence of military, security forces, not to mention the most high-profile guest presence Kabul can host, could not prevent the Taleban from making a very serious point — that they can strike anywhere, anytime. The point of concern for the international community is much deeper. That the Taleban can not only roam but operate freely in much of the country is no longer a secret, just like it is widely known that neither the Karzai government nor the occupying forces hold much sway beyond the capital. These facts imply increasing acceptance of the Taleban among Afghanistan’s population, reflecting poorly on both Isaf’s military efforts to contain the insurgency and the lacklustre reconstruction initiatives. It is probably with good reason that the self-styled soldier-clerics chose the day of the parade for their strike. The Taleban have long seen themselves as the rightful heirs to the mujahideen who, with ISI and CIA help, bled the Soviet bear into oblivion in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan. Based on that success, and Afghanistan’s history of foiling superpower-occupation plans, the resurgent Taleban are firm in their belief that America is the next major power that will be rubbished to the dustbin of history, Afghan style.
Equally chilling for the occupiers is the realisation that there is no way of making things any better at least in the foreseeable future. The military effort has been on a downswing for years and financial aid pledges, even when honoured, are near impossible to translate into concrete projects as the occupation continues to haemorrhage men and money with no prospects of reversing the trend. Present day Afghanistan is probably one of the most hitting examples of a culture unable to escape the ravages of decades of war. George Bush’s with-us-or-without-us war against terrorism calculated its war plan right, but turned out a glaring failure when social aspects of rebuilding war torn societies and post war occupation came up. There is a lesson in the parade-attack for Kabul as well as Washington. The battle for hearts and minds, a phrase much repeated in the West in the war’s early days, has been thoroughly lost. So long as gains are not made in that department, the Taleban’s writ will only increase as the government’s failures will figure higher on people’s minds than memories of the harshness under the mullas. A major part of the money wasted on an unsuccessful military campaign would be much better spent on improving Afghanistan’s social side.



Make-believe peace

Palestine President Mahmoud Abbas’ frustration over his failure to achieve any progress in Middle East peace talks with US President Bush reflects the growing perception that an end-of-year Arab-Israeli peace accord is a long shot at best. Five months have passed since Bush announced his pet project of reaching an agreement before the end of 2008, which coincides with the end of his tenure in office. Five months is a long time for nothing to have happened, considering that only eight months are left, and especially considering that the issue being tackled is 60 years’ accumulation of problems. How on earth will a deal acceptable to both parties materialize in such a short period of time and without a strong foundation to build on is anybody’s guess, including Bush himself. Although Abbas urged the Bush administration to exert meaningful pressure on Israel in order to ensure the drafting of a final status agreement before the end of 2008, and asked Bush to push for a detailed draft agreement that would lead to a permanent settlement of the conflict as well as the creation of a viable Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, what he got instead was Bush’s hope to find a definition of a Palestinian state, when it was believed it had been defined many years ago a state on the June 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital. A new meaning will apparently be a state of much lesser size.
Bush has also failed to force Israel to implement key clauses of the Quartet-sponsored road map, from removing hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks in the West Bank to freezing Jewish settlement expansion. Israel has kept the vast bulk of its physical barriers in the West Bank and only a few roadblocks of secondary significance have been removed. Israel has embarked on a fresh spate of settlement expansion in the West Bank, especially in East Jerusalem, right before the eyes of the Bush administration which refuses to exert pressure on the Israeli government to halt settlement expansion on occupied Arab land. In such weakened circumstances, what is likely to be issued is a declaration of principles which would be meaningless in the absence of agreement on issues such as Jerusalem, the settlements and refugees. But neither Abbas, Ehud Olmert nor Bush is in a position to take far-reaching steps toward a peace agreement. Abbas is under tremendous pressure from Palestinian public opinion, not to mention Hamas, to reach a dignified peace agreement or quit. The ultraorthodox Shas Party has threatened to leave the Olmert government if the subject of Jerusalem is even broached by the Palestinians. It is vehemently opposed to ending the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem as well as allowing a significant number of Palestinian refugees to be repatriated back to their former villages in what is now Israel. The Palestinian people cannot continue to watch this game of make-believe for much longer. If the leaders concerned think that a peace agreement is not possible, they should have the courage to tell the people the truth.

—Arab News