Shift in attitude

THE arrival today of Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iraq for a visit at the invitation of Premier Nuri Al-Maliki is being widely publicized, in stark contrast to the secrecy surrounding the arrival of President Bush and senior administration members whenever they descend on the country to view their handiwork. Washington is huffing and puffing about the Iranian leader’s trip but this should not be taken at face value. Ahmadinejad’s presence in Iraq could not have happened without US agreement, if for no better reason than the Americans will — discreetly — be largely responsible for the Iranian president’s security. Therefore it has to be assumed Washington may actually welcome Ahmadinejad’s arrival. But why? Bush clearly never intended that Iran — part of the “Axis of Evil” — would be the main beneficiary of his invasion. But after the tens of thousads of Iraqi and American lives and the hundreds of billions of dollars that the invasion and occupation have cost, that is the reality. It is why there have been quiet US-Iranian contacts over the last 18 months and why the Shiite militias have been reined in. With the Sunni communities no longer under attack from Shiites, it was possible for them to turn their attention to the even more insidious threat of Al-Qaeda terrorists. It was the action by Sunnis against these fanatics that has enabled the US surge to make the headway it has.
Ahmadinejad is bringing with him a $1 billion aid package to help Iraq rebuild. If as seems likely, Al-Maliki accepts it, Iranian firms will end up with lucrative reconstruction contracts which US companies like Vice President Cheney’s old firm Halliburton, once dreamt of winning. But if wiser heads really are now prevailing in Washington, then this Iranian aid is symptomatic of that country’s willingness to play a constructive role in the region. But if the Americans have changed their attitude to Iran over Iraq, there is a second hard-line policy toward Iran’s nuclear program that has not apparently changed. With Russia now belatedly signaling its growing concern over Iran’s uranium enrichment activities and demanding they stop, the pressure would seem to be mounting on Tehran. Yet is it really possible for Washington to be quietly shaking Ahmadinejad’s hand with one arm while the other waves a big stick over his nuclear program? There surely has to be a point where the two policies meet. It should not be forgotten that the US intelligence community has clearly contradicted Bush claims that the Iranians are still trying to develop a nuclear arsenal. Could it be that the Iranians are about to comply with the demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency and give full access to the nuclear program which they insist is peaceful? Were that the case, Washington could claim a double victory, on Iran’s nuclear program and its involvement in Iraq, when in reality, the real success would be the speeding of its escape from Iraq.





Turkish gambit

TURKISH Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s call on PKK rebels to lay down arms and embrace democracy wraps up a fine initial balancing act. His position has been second only to the PKK in terms of difficulty, having to find the right mix between advance and withdrawal, caution and rashness, following parliament dictated military assault inside Iraqi territory to root out the Kurdish rebels in sanctuary there. Since then he has sounded warnings, ordered targeted air strikes and ground incursions, and pulled out just before the fighting spilled over into other areas. To top it off, he has made one final offer of truce to the rebels, indicating how the military precedent means fighting can go on as long as needed if the PKK keeps up its unruly ways. The responsibility now shifts primarily to the rebel PKK, and secondly to Iraq’s central government in Baghdad that has done little to confront an organisation dubbed terrorist not only by its peers in Washington, but also the significant European Union. For the occupying forces as well as Iraq, at stake is the delicate peace in the northern Kurdish areas even as they are no longer under the Maliki dispensation’s writ, which should prompt the centre all the more to exercise much eroded authority.
The Kurdish faction granting the sanctuary is at an important crossroads. Allowing the rebels to survive and thrive in their midst invites military wrath that Ankara has mandated Erdogan’s office with, hurting in no small manner their own designs for sovereignty. The equation ought not be so mind boggling if concerned quarters do a correct cost-benefit analysis. In near two and a half decades, the rebels’ cause has waste no less than 30,000 lives, with the objective nowhere near in sight. Turkey’s resolve, on the other hand, has only grown stronger with Ankara now also striking right cords in Baghdad in signalling how continued PKK rebellion stands to hurt both countries, especially diplomatic relations. Significantly, Erdogan has not simply issued a death knell, preferring to invite rebel Kurds to enjoy the many benefits of Turkish democracy. As recently demonstrated in the headscarf saga, Erdogan’s government is willing to stake more than just its reputation in ensuring the privilege of individuality and expression. In an era of increased conflict, especially in the troubled Middle East region where the rebels find themselves, it has been made more than clear how clashes and fighting eventually benefits nobody, sadly not even those fighting on the right side. While PKK’s credibility is far from established, there can be little doubt among stakeholders that, as pointed out amicably by Erdogan, the right path is one of reconciliation. The sooner it is turned to the better for all parties in the fray.

—Khaleej Times