Pakistan’s fight against extremism
Sadaf Yunus

PAKISTAN has witnessed more than plenty of attacks against its military, security forces, government officials and the civilians. A number of unknown terror plots have been disrupted, if not derailed and raids have been conducted in many cities within the country. The emphasis on the wave of terror that has reigned in Pakistan suggests a widening conflict between the Pakistani government and the extremist forces, such as the U.S - led war in Iraq and Afghanistan, in contributing to the recent violence throughout the country.
Soon after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan occupied the center stage of the United States foreign policy concerns in South Asia. Given the country’s proximity to Afghanistan - the hub of Al-Qaeda training camps and its ideological core - the United States sought out the Pakistan’s unequivocal support in its global war on terrorism. As history shows us, Pakistan is a pivotal country in the region. Stability of Pakistan is important for the region and whatever happens here certainly would have an impact all around. First and foremost, Pakistan is fighting in its own interest, for its own development and for its own progress. But surely this also helps the world, and in that sense there is a convergence and cooperation between Pakistan, the United States and other countries to counter this phenomenon which is dangerous. It is a phenomenon that destabilizes societies, especially modern societies. It is anti-progress. Pakistan’s efforts are important for US and in that sense we are making a contribution to a worldwide effort.
Pakistan is facing a critical moment in its fight against terrorism and extremism. The core issues which led to extremism and terrorism were : poor infrastructure, education, poverty and inferiority deprivation/unemployment. Such conditions then gave way to external elements who taking advantage of the situation tended to play havoc within Pakistan. Pakistan is following a multi-pronged strategy; military, political and socio-economic development to curb terrorism and extremism. Military action and diplomacy are the key factors in the fight against the rise in Taliban extremism currently plaguing Pakistan. Talibanization is a culture that does not suit any progressive country that wants to move forward. Talibanization and extremism, however, represents a certain state of mind; and it requires more comprehensive, long term strategy where military action must be combined with a political approach and socio-economic developments.
The accusations are absolutely baseless and untrue that whatever is happening in Afghanistan is from Pakistan’s side. These accusations are being hurled against Pakistan by some vested interests, who are the enemies of Pakistan and who are trying to project Pakistan’s efforts in a bad light. The fact that religious rituals and being extremist are two different things. Islam, in its concepts, is the most moderate religion which believes in equal rights to people, it believes in human rights and it makes no difference between religion, colour or creed. Democracy is embedded in the principles of Islam.
Madrassas are traditional learning institutions, aimed at building Islamic scholars and leaders. In Pakistan, some madrassas had shifted towards extremism in the 80s, due to some external influences. This fed into a culture of violence throughout the country, in the form of national and international terrorism. Pakistan is taking steps to ensure that Madrassas are not misused by anyone. They are being brought into the mainstream and they have been asked to impart education in modern subjects in addition to religious teachings. The government has taken many steps to check extremism in the country and have banned extremist organizations. These also include creation of an anti-terrorist organization, refining the intelligence set up and by improving the law enforcement agencies.
Pakistan is one of those countries which, as people say, suffers from an image problem. Regardless of thematic, there are issues which rankle us. For example, when there is all the time a finger that is pointing at you that all the problems arise from you, they radiate from there etc; it is felt that somehow it misses out on the realization of the enormity of the challenge that Pakistan faces. The horrors of 9/11 to which the world woke up is one lesson which everybody seems to draw, that you simply cannot ignore and be indifferent to such situations in the world. One has to engage, and today Pakistan is rightfully engaged. Again, this engagement is very compex. There is no simple linear solution to it that one just simply sends the military and everything will be all right. It has to be a broad, comprehensive, which is economic, socio-economic development. It means political measures, administrative measures etc.
In Afghanistan, people say that much of the problems of Afghanistan are because of Pakistan. Actually, the truth is far from it. In fact, many of the problems of Pakistan are because of what had happened over there. The tribal regions were the staging ground for the jihad in Afghanistan and for 10 long years they served that purpose. The result: the administrative structures and the traditional structures of authority, they all fell apart.
The above discussion was to underscore the complexity of the issue, so that people should not be impatient with Pakistan. They want quick solutions and nothing can be done overnight. They will have to be more understanding and patient. Pakistan is making an effort, but the world has an interest in the success of our effort, and therefore we also have certain expectations from the world. The socio-economic development is the key to success in this so-called war against terrorism. It is the key to success in countering extremism, which is another facet of this phenomenon, that phenomenon, which we have to counter.
The international comminity acknowledges that there is no other country except Pakistan who has provided more intelligence support, committed more troops and has captured more Al-Qaeda operatives. Even the Pakistani President is quick to remind his country and the international community that we have broken the back of Al -Qaeda in Pakistan. He also noted that the military action was never a solution. Eliminating terror nteworks in the long term depended not only on the military’s prowess but on sustained development, education and economic growth.
Despite Pakistan’s Herculean efforts in the war on terror, the question is how much more can Pakistan do given its internal security threats from extremism, obscurantism and religious bigotry, and external challenges from neighbouring countries. What is clear is that Pakistan has made ‘great sacrifices’ in the war on terror. Pakistan is being maligned by the West because of the lack of understanding of the environment and that it has no other alternative but to continue counter-terrorism cooperation. The general perception is that the U.S. expectations of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism cooperation are unrealistic and America has yet to understand the various elements of extremism that poses an internal security threat to Pakistan.



Power construct and leadership demands
Nasim Zehra

ONE, the balance of power in Pakistan’s power construct has greatly shifted towards elements that constitute constitutional democracy. The elements include political legitimacy, popular vote, independent judiciary, constitutionally granted public and state authority, elected offices and independent media. The March 9, 2007 lawyers and citizens resistance marked the beginning of this shift, the results of the February 18, 2008 election exhibited the shift and the February elected parties alliance reinforced this shift. A corollary of this shift has also been the weakening of the extra-constitutional forces functioning outside of the parameters of the original constitutions.
Two, as a consequence of this shift balance of power three elements operating supra-constitutionally or with the help of supra constitutional authorities have either been considerably weakened or have retracted from the extra constitutional spaces they occupied. First the army, which has institutionally begun to retrace its steps towards its constitutional role; second the former general, now Pervez Musharraf’s political authority and his time as the all authoritative supra-constitutional figure is up and third the PML-Q created and patronised by general (retired) Pervez Musharraf and the agencies has been trounced at the polls. Also reportedly PML-Q’s elected members of the senate, national and provincial assemblies are busy forming forward blocs.
Three, the president’s vastly diminished or vanished political authority has incapacitated him administratively to take any step to challenge the authority of the elected parliament. With the legitimate political ascendance of the elected parliamentary forces, the president cannot use the constitutional powers he acquired since 1999 through ordinances and constitutional amendments. With the army’s obvious inclination to steer clear of politics retired general Musharraf, holding a controversial presidential position, has no cards with which to begin another round of power contest between the popularly elected parliamentary forces and the vice-regal forces.
Four, the joint movement of Pakistan’s major parliamentary forces towards constitutional democracy greatly reduces the ability of agencies and the GHQ to puppeteer a new anti-democracy play. At this juncture of Pakistan’s political history as genuine political forces work together according to consensus-based ‘rules of the game’ no IJI or MMA can be created. With PPP having wisely given a stake to all elected forces in a new setup and with PML-N determined to only play the democratic game, there are no politicians willing to play the B team for the presidency. Even the 93 independent parliamentarians voted into the national and provincial assemblies are looking towards the winning parties not the presidency.
Five, the emergence of lawyers-led protests organised and determined citizens’ groups, which seek accountable exercise of state and government power, and demanding restoration of the pre-November 3 judiciary is significant. It has contributed to the creation of an effective democratic deterrence against the unhindered functioning of supra constitutional forces within Pakistan’s political space. The media, popular political forces and overseas Pakistanis have been key elements in this uniquely evolving Pakistani democratic deterrence. This democratic deterrence has worked to prevent the widespread rigging planned for election day, as even conceded by Pakistan’s Attorney-general in his telephone conversation. It was this democratic deterrence that also forced general Musharraf to roll back whatever plans he had made in November for imposition of a longer term emergency, postponement of elections and squashing media freedom. Washington had no choice but to acknowledge the emergence of this democratic deterrence against extra constitutional forces and also seek an early end to emergency.
Six, Pakistan’s parliamentary forces appear relatively more capable of resisting external pressure keen to influence the country’s political future and the power scene. For example Washington’s advice to PPP to keep the “Islamist” Nawaz Sharif out of a future ruling coalition and to the elected parliamentarians on not insisting upon the restoration of the pre-November 3 judiciary, was not adhered to. Similarly Washington’s advise that the elected parties work with President Musharraf and US President’s phone call of support to president Musharraf will not greatly alter the way various political leaders view President Musharraf.
Seven, the Musharraf era is over yet his political future and exit scenario is dependant on his personal decision, on the parliament’s decisions and the street factor. Should the president not honour his own promise of respecting the public’s verdict on his political future or the thumping failure of his eight-year long political experiment and not resign, the politicians would have the option of using their parliamentary strength to weaken him. As the PPP leader Amin Faheem has already stated, if the president were to get a vote of confidence from the new assembly his party can work with him. However the likelihood of a vote of confidence seems very unlikely. Some political forces within and outside of the parliament will continue to demand Musharraf’s exit. His moral authority to stay on ended the day the people defeated his political party.
Eight, the struggle for the restoration of the pre-November 3 judiciary has greatly contributed to strengthening the struggle for rule of law in Pakistan. Whatever the public articulation of the PPP there is clear agreement between the PPP and the PML-N that restoration of the judiciary is a priority item for the two. However with various opinions on how the restoration can constitutionally take place an immediate Task Force on Restoration of the Judiciary will have to be immediately set up to give specific recommendations on what is the quickest and the most effective way forward on this. While the lawyers’ movement and the broader street strength gathered on the restoration matter will continue to exercise pressure on the parliamentarians, the elected political leadership cannot take any outside of a wisely guided consensus position evolved by a Task Force. Setting deadlines for restoration is an unwise approach but keeping the politicians on their toes through political pressure is needed.
These factors make for a clear and demanding path to a genuinely democratic Pakistan. Key issues including the president’s future and the restoration of the judges need to be resolved. Instant resolutions may not be available. Patience without detouring from the constitutional path is essential.
Pakistan is transiting from a khaki-led quasi-democracy towards a genuine constitutional democracy. Power realignments are taking place and we stand at the edge of a new democratic dawn. The democratic forces are ascendant but not quite rooted yet. The democratic process has begun but the return of constitutional authority to the elected parliament has yet to begin.
This is a hopeful yet precarious period. The challenge for Pakistan’s parliamentary forces is to convert this shift in Pakistan’s power construct into permanent ascendancy of the parliament in accordance with Pakistan’s 1973 constitution. It is time for responsible and thoughtful action not reactive behaviour. The objective of the ascendancy of the parliament, of an independent judiciary and the presence of a consensus president are largely shared by the overwhelming majority of the elected forces. All elected political leadership and energy must be geared towards achieving these objectives remaining within the discipline of the Constitutional parameters and the confines of the parliament. All eyes are on the two key parties the PPP and the PML-N and also on important regional parties including the ANP and the MQM. Only jointly can they successfully respond to the many challenges — economic, political, internal security, distributive justice and foreign policy — that confront Pakistan

—Khaleej Times






Why NATO should get out of Afghanistan
Jonathan Power

THE first law of holes is when you are in one stop digging. If the NATO nations are honest they have as much idea about what to do next in Afghanistan as the Soviet generals did in 1988 — the year in which the relatively new secretary-general of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, decided that the Red Army should cut its horrific losses and pull out and leave the Afghans to fight each other. The Afghan tribes have an uninterrupted record of success in resisting the foreign invader — Genghis Khan, the Persians, the British in Winston Churchill’s day as a subaltern, the Soviets and now NATO. Time, they know, is on their side. Their rifles, explosives and suicide bombers are a match for the most modern weapons in NATO’s armory. The only thing that could possibly subdue them would be a massive number of NATO boots on the ground, prepared to engage in close-up fighting, but to find numbers of this order would mean switching the full force of America’s military might from Iraq to Afghanistan and persuading America’s allies to beef up their contributions to levels that would triple or quadruple present deployments.
While the politicians are finding it hard to come to terms with leading a retreat, given the constant pressure form Washington, they are — as Chancellor Angela Merkel has made clear — slowly but clearly turning tail. It is no use that the so-called opinion leaders in the strategic think-tanks and newspaper editorial pages are warning of disaster if there is a pullout. They are not the ones getting killed for a hopeless cause. Moreover, even the most informed of them do not seem able to map out a convincing scenario for turning the tables on the Taleban. A few thousand more troops, a better coordinated aid program, an imposed Western czar, a beefed-up local police force — none of these will work as long as Afghanistan has its poppies and mountains and corruption continues to seep into almost every pore of society. If this were doable it would have been done by now.
The stakes, we all know, are high because the Taleban with their tribal network spanning across a ridiculously placed border dividing Afghanistan and Pakistan give refuge to Al-Qaeda. Getting rid of Al-Qaeda must be a priority on the world’s common agenda. But this is not the way to do it. And economically and socially developing Afghanistan can only be done when the populace face down their local persecutors and oppressors and demand it. So how to deal with Al-Qaeda? The mistakes date from the immediate reaction to 9/11. Afghanistan should never have been bombed. That immediately marked America and Britain as the enemy in the minds of a good proportion of the Afghans.
But that mistake was part of a larger mistake — the determination to go to war with modern military means against Al-Qaeda — a grouping of a few hundred at that time — even if it meant putting at mortal risk the populations of whole countries, Afghanistan, Iraq and, if Barack Obama continues his threat, perhaps Pakistan. The Anglo-American onslaught, accompanied in Afghanistan by a 37-nation coalition, has created more Al-Qaeda militants than it has killed. It has alienated most of the Muslim world and has provided reason for tens of thousands of preachers, hundreds of thousands of enraged young men and millions of ordinary folk to talk of hitting back. The mild majority does it by thought and word. A few thousand are now determined to do it by deed. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the situation in Pakistan deteriorate these numbers will grow geometrically. Osama bin Laden and his intimates should have been run down by careful international police work, just as the Israelis ran down so many hiding Nazi leaders and Interpol and the French successfully hunted down the (then) world´s worst terrorist, Carlos “the Jackal” aka Illich Ramirez Sanchez. The best Persian-speaking Pakistani detectives should have been drafted into a special Interpol task force manned by the best (and darkest complexioned) of the FBI and Scotland Yard.

—Arab News