Undue diplomatic pressure

POLITICAL observers are intrigued by the flurry of calls the Western diplomats have made on the newly elected political leadership. Functioning as eyes and ears of their governments in Pakistan, their interest in the evolving situation, particularly in the context of government formation, is understandable, but what brings this activity under suspicion is its intensity. Some of the ambassadors met with the two principal leaders of the winning parties, Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, more than once - the envoys’ second calls following the broad agreement between the two to form coalition governments. Meanwhile, the United States leaders have raised the tempo of their pronouncements not to abandon President Pervez Musharraf in the lurch. Not only President Bush made a telephonic contact with his Pakistani counterpart soon after learning of his allies’ electoral debacle, the State Department’s point man in the region, Richard Boucher insisted that President remains important to Washington. “We look forward to working with whoever emerges as prime minister, we look forward to working with President Musharraf in his new role”, the official said during his trip to Brussels. What that new role would be is not yet clear, but given the main objective of the US-inspired parleys between the late PPP Chairperson Benazir Bhutto and President Musharraf it would not be wide off the mark to say that the Americans would like the presidency to remain at the centre of the new set-up, both by protecting Musharraf’s disputed constitutional position and his political relevance under the rapidly changing circumstances. But that is no more acceptable to the coalition leaders, in that they owe their electoral victory to their struggle and commitment to restoration of the constitution and so refuse validation of the PCO that protects some highly undemocratic acts of President Musharraf.
Somehow the Western governments think that President Musharraf remains their best bet in the war on terror that rages along the Pak-Afghan border even when he is no more the head of Pak Army. Their approach towards terrorism and extremism in this region may need to be modified, more so now as Pakistan tends to be moving out of the weapon-oriented groove to a multidimensional strategy - something which is likely to become more popular now that a liberal-secular political party is going to head the government in the NWFP. In tandem with diplomatic efforts, the Establishment seems busy trying to isolate the anti-Musharraf hard-liners both in the PPP and PML (N) camps, mainly by increasing the strength of softies, who flaunting their ‘worldly wisdom’, advise co-existence with the president. Hamid Nasir Chattha and Manzoor Wattoo, whose connections with the Establishment are well-known, have called on Asif Ali Zardari in the name of offering condolences on the death of Benazir Bhutto some two months after the incident. Schemers, as they are generally alleged to be, they would not hesitate in trying their hands at building an anti-Sharifs power centre in Lahore. Anwer Saifullah from the NWFP is also waiting in the wings to offer a viable alternative to the Asfandyar Wali-led coalition government after joining the PPP. The scenario being projected by the ‘worldly-wise’ softies depicts Nawaz Sharif as a revenge-driven person who would risk everything to settle scores with President Musharraf. Such games had succeeded in the past and are being tried again. But this time the consequences of that would be disastrous, mainly because on February 18 the voter looked beyond the ordinary issues and voted to effect a change which should restore constitutionalism and rule of law. Keeping Musharraf in power by hook or crook is too small an objective in the face of the mandate the people delivered on February 18.



Kosovo’s path

GIVEN that just a few days ago Kosovo issued a unilateral declaration of independence, it is not surprising that Palestine is thinking of doing the same thing. A senior Palestinian official is saying the Palestinians ought to unilaterally declare a state if peace talks with Israel do not succeed. With the Annapolis process going nowhere, the Kosovo precedent might indeed offer the Palestinian leadership a golden opportunity to seize the initiative, reset the agenda and restore its tarnished reputation in the eyes of its own people. If this leadership truly believes, despite all evidence to the contrary, that a decent two-state solution is still possible, now is an ideal moment to reaffirm the legal existence (albeit under continuing belligerent occupation) of the state of Palestine, and to call on all those countries that did not extend diplomatic recognition to Palestine in 1988 to do so now. The problem is that when Yasser Arafat declared a Palestinian state in 1988 there was no international recognition forthcoming, and there is no guarantee that 20 years later, things have changed. For the US and the EU, Palestinian independence, if it is to be recognized and effective at all, must be directly negotiated on a wildly unequal bilateral basis between the occupying power and the occupied people with emphasis laid on attaining the final agreement of the occupying power.
In American and EU eyes, a Kosovar declaration of independence from Serbian sovereignty should be recognized, even if Serbia does not agree. However, their attitude was radically different when Palestine declared independence from Israeli occupation on Nov. 15, 1988. Then the US and EU countries were conspicuously absent as over 100 countries recognized the new state. The West’s nonrecognition made this declaration of independence symbolic. The Palestinian leadership would make clear that if the US and the EU, having just recognized a second Albanian state on the sovereign territory of a UN member state, will not now recognize a Palestinian state on a tiny portion of occupied Palestinian homeland, then the Palestinians would be free and just in seeking other options to liberate themselves and their rightful homeland. As was expected, Kosovo issued its unilateral declaration of independence. And as everybody predicted, the United States and most European Union countries with which this declaration was coordinated, rushed to extend diplomatic recognition to this new country. However, Palestine is not Kosovo. Palestine is under Israeli occupation and for independence it needs to acquire independence. Declaring a state is no problem; what matters is international recognition. International recognition is not the end all and be all of statehood but it is a vital aspect. In the case of Kosovo, it has secured international recognition, beginning with the US. Can the Palestinians guarantee they will receive the same recognition, especially from the same source?

—Arab News