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Back to the barracks
CONSCIOUS of the imperative to retrieve and refurbish the image of Pak
Army, the General Headquarters seems to be shedding its civilian
orientation, a development rightly attributed to the new army chief,
General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani. The latest move in this direction is the
ISPR clarification that the task of conducting elections is the sole
responsibility of the Election Commission and that the army would stay
away from the electoral process. A few days earlier, the new chief had
written to all in-service personnel not to get involved in political
affairs and shun meeting political leaders. In line with this policy,
the military personnel are also being recalled from the civilian
autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations they had been assigned to
for various reasons over some time. These moves have received wide
public approbation, because over the time, particularly since the flawed
parliamentary elections of 2002, impression was gaining ground that the
armed forces manipulated political process for the material good of the
top brass. There was resentment against this also for the growing
perception that the military tends to undermine its professionalism when
its officers get involved in civilian affairs. The strongest objection
to civilian role for the army, however, stemmed from the country’s
political opposition which had made it a question of life and death to
get President General Pervez Musharraf out of his uniform. The move to
pull the forces out of the elections is also timely, in that even with
conditional participation in the February 18 parliamentary polls, the
opposition would not hesitate in blaming the army for its debacle. With
the army out of elections exercise, except for its constitutional role
to help the civilian administration in maintaining law and order, the
Election Commission of Pakistan has been clearly marked for its
responsibility to hold free and fair elections, free of pre-and
post-polls rigging. How well equipped is the ECP for such an onerous
duty only time will tell. But the exercise to de-hyphenate the armed
forces from politics, should not end at this. Of course, for the
Military Intelligence (MI) which works directly under the GHQ, there
would be no problem in living up to the new directive of shunning
political mindset. In fact, there is no such thing as its involvement in
civilian affairs. But the problem is with the role of the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) directorate which has a queer organisational
structure.
It is supposed to be under the civilian Chief Executive but it is manned
by the uniformed officers from the three services. Over the years
because of its nose-poking in political affairs - thanks to this
additional role bestowed upon it by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the name of
strengthening internal security - the ISI is cast in the image of a
godfather ensuring the ‘correctness’ of national politics. Therefore,
much of the murkiness of electoral politics, rightly or wrongly, is
attributed to the ISI, which then finds way to the GHQ as the outfit is
headed by military officers. It would be, therefore, fair to expect that
the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate would jettison its political
wing and revert to its mandated role of gathering inter-services
intelligence. That General Kiyani, in one of his first orders, declared
2008 ‘Year of the Soldier’ amply reflects his concern over the dwindling
popularity of the armed forces over the years. Not that those earlier
stints of military rule were popular; the one ushered in by General
Pervez Musharraf has the uniqueness of being the most destructive. Now
that the ‘golden era’ of his good governance is drawing to a close one
witnesses in the country a comprehensively devastated place akin to a
tornado-hit town.
We thought America did not
torture!
US ATTORNEY-General Michael
Mukasey’s defence of controversial CIA interrogation techniques that
came to the fore after 9/11 is yet another testimony to the low regard
the Bush administration accords to overwhelming international and
domestic opinion. Actually, the Bush White House’s failure to come to
terms with reality, the inability to meet set targets despite two terms
in office, goes to show just why Washington has been so unsuccessful in
the so-called war against terrorism. Just when the world was beginning
to notice signs that Washington might be diverting a little from its
high handed brute-force approach that has typified its post 9/11 policy,
the president himself in the state of the union address and the AG
before Congress have proved that little has changed in the official
position. Ideological and long-term as this war is, most observing and
engaged in it have embraced the realisation that dealing with the
militant-terrorism menace would require more than war. It entails going
back to its roots, displaying a thorough understanding of its growth,
and then halting further spread before moving to pluck it out
altogether. It requires a parallel battle of minds, but not one fought
with armies. Unfortunately, even though tanks, bombs and torture
techniques have only distanced Washington from its goal, it is as if the
Bush administration does not even notice how far it has drifted from the
original objective, still expressing confidence in its methods. The
occupiers’ prison abuses that made headlines, and CIA torture techniques
that the world got to know of later received widespread condemnation not
only because they were inhuman, but because as flag-bearer of the free
world, the US was expected to do better.
Close to bowing out, President Bush’s team was expected to do a
de-briefing where ‘hits and misses’ would be scrutinised. From the looks
of it, it has sidestepped such subtleties. If it had taken the trouble,
it would have noticed how in reacting to extremism, its approach became
pretty extreme itself. And rather than accept blame and make
post-election transition easier, the administration has come out
strongly in favour of its defeated policies. Few expected them to admit
the Iraq occupation was off the mark. But in defending their policies
since the insurgency, they have tried to justify the prison excesses,
extreme torture techniques, the secret bases outside the US, especially
Gitmo, and suppressing rights of anybody not of their liking. It is
little surprise the AG has ruled out appointing an independent counsel
to investigate destruction of CIA interrogation tapes. Judging from the
manner of the cover up, it seems hard to presume anything other than the
line that what was erased had sanction from very high offices.
—Khaleej Times
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