Power to the people
Li Li

RECENT public protests and debates in southern Xiamen City, Fujian Province, over the location of the city’s largest-ever chemical plant finally concluded with the government’s concession to move the paraxylene (PX) plant to the peninsula of a nearby city. Environmentalists in China hope that this unprecedented case of grassroots opposition forcing the government to give up on a large-scale project could set a precedent for the future.
Paraxylene is a petrochemical used to make purified terephthalic acid, a raw material for producing polyester film, and packaging resin and fabrics. The 10.8-billion-yuan ($1.5 billion) project that is expected to produce 800,000 tons of PX and generate revenues of 80 billion yuan ($10.8 billion) a year was a lure for local officials eager to strengthen the fledgling petrochemical sector of the costal city. Xiamen’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) for 2006 stood at 116.2 billion yuan ($15.7 billion).
Since the construction of the project began in November 2006, opposition from the public was ceaseless. Zhao Yufen, a chemical professor of Xiamen University and member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, sent letters proposing the relocation of the project to Party chief of Xiamen He Lifeng and Governor of Fujian Province Huang Xiaojing by the end of 2006.
In January 2007, top government officials of Xiamen invited Zhao and three other professors opposed to the PX plant to a debate about its future. The meeting ended in a deadlock with neither side convincing the other. During the annual session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2007, Zhao spearheaded a proposal recommending moving the Xiamen Haicang PX project signed by 105 CPPCC members. The project was originally located in Haicang District, 16 km from the city center.
Although the Xiamen Government announced its decision to put the chemical project on hold on May 30, 2007, the public opposition climaxed over the next few days when over 5,000 residents launched a quiet demonstration around the compound of the city government demanding relocation of the project.
According to a Xinhua report, at the government-organized hearings on December 13 and 14, of the 107 members of the public selected by lottery to represent Xiamen residents, 91 opposed the project, 15 voiced their support and one left without speaking.
It was reported by Nanfang Daily on December 19 that the Fujian Provincial Government and Xiamen Government had decided to move the multi-billion-yuan project to the Gulei Peninsular, near the city of Zhangzhou and that the Xiamen Government would compensate the Xianglu Chemical Fiber Company, the principal investor, for losses in initial construction. This arrangement is yet to be ratified by the National Development and Reform Commission.
Controversial buffer zone
In interviews with several Beijing-based media organizations in March 2007, Zhao said since PX was a dangerous petrochemical that can cause cancer and fetus abnormalities, there had not been a large enough buffer zone between the chemical plant and residential areas. She said over 100,000 people were living within a 5-km range of the plant, including two boarding middle schools, with combined residents of nearly 5,000.
“As a project with a high risk of poisonous emissions and explosions, the project should not be located close to a city. A safe distance would be at least 100 km,” Zhao told the Beijing-based newspaper China Business.
Yet Xiamen Government and the chief investor of the project, Xianglu Chemical Fiber Company, hold different opinions over buffer-zone requirements. Xie Haisheng, Director of the Xiamen Environment Protection Bureau, told a press conference in June 2007, that based on extensive research by experts organized by the city government, PX was not highly polluting, nor does it induce cancer or fetus abnormalities.
According to an open letter to the public posted on Xianglu’s website, the requirement of a 10-km safe distance for a PX plant from residential areas lacks scientific evidence and runs against practices in other cities of China and in other countries. Instead, the open letter claimed the national standard for a buffer zone between a PX project and residence should be at least 700 meters, which the company has implemented faithfully.
The local government decided to introduce a thorough environmental assessment of the city layout of Haicang to settle the argument. In July 2007, the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences was entrusted with the assessment task, which was completed at the end of November.
According to an abbreviated version of the report posted on the official website of the city government, experts concluded that the southern area of Haicang District, where the PX plant was originally to be located, was too small and inadequate for the diffusion of atmospheric pollution.
The Xiamen Government had set two contradictory development targets for the southern part of Haicang by 2020: to develop into a sub-center of the city and to create an industrial zone with petrochemistry as its pillar. The environmental assessment report advised urban planners to choose one or the other, but not both. The report revealed that pursuing both goals together would leave a buffer zone between the sub-center and the industrial zone of just 300 meters, insufficient to protect against air pollution.
Public involvement
While the environmental assessment of Haicang eventually forced the relocation of the PX plant, the project had passed an environmental impact assessment (EIA) by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) as early as July 2006.
For more than two decades, the practice of conducting EIAs in China was a subset of the nation’s larger Environmental Protection Law. In 2002, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the Environmental Impact Assessment Law, which requires that all relevant parties, including experts and the general public, evaluate the likely impacts of development projects, programs, and plans on the natural and human environments.
In the four years following the implementation, however, broad public involvement in China’s EIA process has been limited. Access to information is often insufficient or even blocked, and participation is limited and unrepresentative. Consequently, public feedback tends to be minimal and ineffective. Moreover, because EIA assessors are trained and certified by SEPA and its branches, their close association with the agency and with local officials and investors has made them vulnerable to pressure from GDP-hungry local government officials. This situation has brought the credibility of their reports into question.
In 2006 SEPA issued a regulation intended to strengthen public participation in the EIA process. The new regulation includes stipulations on openness of information; safeguarding participants’ rights; and procedures and methods for public involvement, including opinion surveys, consultations, seminars, debates, and hearings. It marks the first time that SEPA, or the Chinese Government as a whole, has opened the doors to widespread public input into national development initiatives.
As for the PX project in Xiamen, since its EIA process was completed before the 2006 regulation took effect, public access to the report is not compulsory. It was reported by magazine Life Week that its journalist’s request for the full text of PX plant’s EIA report to China Contracting and Engineering Corporation, the compiler of the report, was refused under the excuse of protecting technical secrets. The same report said Ma Tianna, head of the
city’s biggest environmental protection non-governmental organization, had tried many times to get the EIA report from Xiamen Environmental Protection Bureau, but was refused.
“The EIA scheme is poorly-implemented. One problem is that public access to the EIA report, though mandated by SEPA regulations, is still blocked in many cases. Another vital problem is that there is almost zero supervision of the implementation of these EIA reports,” said Ma Jun, founder of a Beijing-based environmental NGO dedicated to compiling and upgrading an online map highlighting all polluted rivers and polluting companies in China. He told Beijing Review that the participation of the public, as the third party besides business investors and environmental protection agencies, could be vital to boosting the effectiveness of the EIA in China. “In light of this, the significant role of civil society’s elite in the Xiamen case is groundbreaking,” Ma said.
Checks and balances
An editorial from Shanghai Daily on December 20, 2007, called the two-day hearing in Xiamen over the relocation of the PX plant “a victory not only for environmentalists but for democracy in decision making.” It said, “The Xiamen model meshes well with the spirit of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October, which called for checks and balances among the power to decide, the power to implement, and the power to supervise.” The editorial even called for the spread of the “Xiamen model” across China.
However, the comment of another Shanghai-based newspaper Oriental Morning Post was less optimistic. This editorial said that the victory of public opinion in the Xiamen case could not overshadow the fact that government decision-making remains unpredictable. “Easily as government decision could support the maximum of public interest, it could push people into the abyss of pain when they have no resorts to stop the violation of their interests.”

(The Daily Mail-Beijing Review Articles Exchange Item)


A fight for survival
Nasim Zehra

BENAZIR Bhutto’s absence can never be overcome, but the party must carry on. From what transpired at the PPP’s Central Working Committee (CWC) meeting on December 30, the party will not be plunged into a crisis after the political assassination of its leader. The Press conference addressed not only party matters, but also issues of national integration raised after Benazir’s death. Up front, Asif Zardari apologised for the angry anti-Pakistani and anti-Punjabi slogans raised at Benazir’s grave. Zardari’s unqualified apology was accompanied by a declaration of his and his party’s commitment to the brotherhood of Pakistanis and to the solidarity of Pakistan.
In a statesmanlike mode, Zardari recalled for those present that it was his Punjabi jail mates, whom he had befriended, who became Benazir’s most trusted bodyguards. He reminded them that it was our Punjabi brothers supporting Benazir who got killed in Rawalpindi. For the army, his message was clear-cut — “it is our army and we support our army”. “Our problem,” Zardari said, “was with the regime.” Hence, it is interesting to note that on December 27, when the Army Chief went to Chaklala to condole with those sitting beside the assassinated leader’s body, some party workers lashed out at generals and the killing of Benazir. When general Kayani’s wreath was placed on BB’s grave on December 30 with his name inscribed on it, there were no adverse reactions.
Zardari was every bit the non-confrontationalist as he asked the partymen gathered at the Press conference to stop attacking Musharraf and others. Yet, on the issue of his wife’s assassination, Zardari like all others was not willing to buy the government’s concocted story. He tended to go with his wife’s letter that it was a political murder. With no trust in the government initiated inquiries, Zardari intends to push for an international probe, the UN Hariri style inquiry. With Asif Zardari’s political acumen, the PPP seems to have crossed the most difficult political test since its founder’s Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s death in 1979. However, there are broader and deeper issues; the issues of the elections, of keeping the party together and the Bhutto legacy alive. Six announcements made at the Press conference are indicative of the PPP’s Central Working Committee’s ability to overcome the current
crisis. First, giving the Bhutto name to all of Benazir’s children thereby making them primarily a part of the Bhutto rather than the Zardari clan. This makes them all direct political successors, at least in the public mind, of the Bhutto-Benazir legacy. The remarkable decision is in the fitness of political correctness and it’s also a tribute to their mother. Secondly, the Bhutto name, with Bilawal as Benazir’s successor, emerges as the binding force for the party. Benazir’s lineage and personality had both helped. Her political personality evolved over time and that in fact improved in her latest round of political interactions. But what catapulted her into politics and indeed gave her political legitimacy was her lineage, the Bhutto name. Likewise, by naming Bilawal as Benazir’s successor, the party co-chairman, Asif Zardari, has helped to keep the much-needed lineage element intact. The Bhutto name has been both the glue and the political oxygen that has kept the PPP together.
Interestingly, during my December 28 trip to Naudero, dozens of workers in the Bhutto house were lamenting that with Benazir’s death, the Bhutto family will be over, their ‘hakomat’ (rule) will be over. They said all the glamour and the excitement that came to the village with Benazir’s politics would now move away to the Zardari household. They expressed pain at what they saw was the loss of the Bhutto name, the end of the dynasty. Fatima and Ghinwa they believed were there but were not part of the political legacy. Now with Zardari’s announcement that he and his children will remain with the Bhutto clan and that he himself will be buried in the Bhutto family graveyard, the Naudero Bhutto clan will be reassured. Dynastic politics is widespread in Pakistan and across the border. Take the Chaudary clan, the Sharif clan, the Wali Khan clan and even the JUI clan. They all have a second line of command but the top tier belongs largely to the first family. No doubt this must change but all transformations cannot start from the ashes of a slain leader.
Thirdly, the decision to name Bilawal as Benazir’s successor was a wise move. Bilawal would be far more the consensus figure at this moment of crisis than what Zardari would have been. Fourthly, in appointing Bilawal as the party chairman, the CWC has given the existing leadership the time and space top run the affairs of the party. Leaders like Amin Fahim, Zardari himself, Shah Mahmud Qureshi , Raza Rabbani, Sherry Rehman and others will have the time and space to lead with their wisdom and experience. Zardari’s public announcement that he’d stay away from electoral politics and certainly from the prime ministerial candidacy reduces the chances for him becoming a controversial figure yet again. At this moment, Zardari appears determined to take his wife’s legacy forward. At the hustings, the PPP is likely to put up a tough fight, keeping the cruellest punches for the PML-Q and the less feisty ones for the PML-N. In fact, with the PML-N, under Zardari-Fahim, the PPP may adopt a more cooperative attitude at the hustings. Indeed, the party, at this juncture, has moved deeper into a dynastic mode; one that Pakistanis have repeatedly argued must discontinue. But a time of crisis is not the time for reform and institutionalised politics. It is now a fight for survival. The CWC has taken steps for its survival. Now beyond the party politics, the PPP will have to clearly reiterate its stance on issues ranging from an independent judiciary to Constitutional democracy and foreign policy.

—Khaleej Times



The Iraq charade
Ramzy Baroud

IN RECENT months, we have been inundated by media reports bringing good news from Iraq, with countless testimonials to the great improvement in security enjoyed by the country in general and the Baghdad area in particular. This progress is attributed solely to the judicious ‘surge’ of US military presence, and the astute tactics enacted by occupation forces in a place that once personified despair and violence. Indeed, reports repeatedly point to the figure indicating that violence in Iraq has dwindled by 60 per cent in the past three months.
BBC reporter in Iraq, Jim Muir, is one of the leading enthusiasts of the apparent miracle. In his report, ‘Is Iraq Getting Better?’, he indulges in over-generalised estimations which just happen to be shared by the US military. “Over the past three months, there has been a sharp and sustained drop in all forms of violence. The figures for dead and wounded, military and civilian, have also greatly improved...People walk in crowded streets in the evening, when just a few months, ago they would have been huddled behind locked doors in their homes. Everybody agrees that things are much better.”
Elsewhere, Muir goes further in discussing the role played by Sunni militias in bringing peace to Baghdad. He quotes a militiaman as saying, “At the beginning, people saw it as an occupation which had to be resisted. But then they saw that the Americans were working in the interests of the people.” The BBC represents only a mild example in this charade, which is instilled mostly by the Bush administration and its allies in the military and in the mainstream media. It is mind-boggling how the latter could accept the so-called transformation from chaos to semi-order without any real questioning.
Meanwhile, there are a few sources of information regarding the violence resulting from the US invasion of Iraq. One of these is the US military itself, which keeps track of and publishes information pertinent to the violence only when it’s relevant to attacks on US installations and personnel. Confirming or denying these reports in their entirety is unattainable by any independent source. Considering the politicised nature of the US military public relation strategies, such reports should hardly attest to what is indeed unfolding in Iraq. Another source of information is the Iraq government and army. It’s no secret that those at the helm of both of these institutions are working under the command of the US military. Spokesmen for the Iraqi government coordinate their statements — with a few exceptions — to confirm those made by the latter.
It seems odd that the bulk - if not the entirety - of reports on the improvement in security are predicated principally on information released by the US military, Iraqi official sources or willing collaborates of both (conformist Shia sources, tribal Sunni leaders). The latter group reportedly receive a monthly-imbursement for helping guard their areas against Al Qaeda. Moreover, an estimated 80,000 Sunni fighters — many of whom were apparently insurgents fighting the US military — get paid US $300 each to perform various guarding duties.

—Khaleej Time