Durand Line is the bottom-line
Shamsa Ishfaq

A FEW from across the border are challenging the very existence of the notion of the Durand line that marks the present day border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Afghan government claims that the Durand line treaty worked by the British was signed in 1893 and was to stay in force for one hundred years. On the basis of these assertions, the Afghans have demanded United States to renegotiate the border and some Afghan officials even have issued a new map that shows some major Pakistani Cities such as Peshawar and Quetta included in Afghanistan. Islamabad, however, has already rejected this demand saying the line is a settled issue, which it has no desire to reopen.
As a matter of fact, the demarcation of Durand line was carried out in fulfilment of the Anglo-Afghan agreement of November 12, 1893 between Amir Abdul Rehman Khan of Afghanistan and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. After signing the agreement Amir of Afghanistan while addressing its people told them that, “It was for the first time that Afghanistan had a definite frontier which would prevent future misunderstandings...” Moreover clause VI of the Agreement clearly states that the agreement is regarded by both the parties as a full, final and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them. The agreement has been reaffirmed by successive Afghan rulers.
Para 2 of the 1905 Treaty with Amir Habibullah Khan continuing the Agreements which had existed between the British Government and Amir Abdul Rehman Khan states” I also have acted, am acting and will act upon the same agreement and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise”. Article V of the Treaty of Peace between the British Government and the independent Afghan Government concluded at Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919 states that “The Afghan government accepts the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir”.
On November 22, 1921, Great Britain while signing the Treaty of friendly and commercial relations with Afghanistan at Kabul reaffirmed the Article V of the treaty concluded at Rawalpindi on August 8, -1919. On May 6, 1930, while exchanging notes General Shah Wali Khan and Mr. Arthur Henderson agreed that the Treaty of Kabul 1921 continued to have full force and effect. On June 13, 1948, Shah Wali Khan, the Afghan envoy to Pakistan declared, “Our King has already stated, and I, as the representative of Afghanistan, declare that Afghanistan has no claims on frontier territory and even if there were any, they have been given up in favour of Pakistan. Anything contrary to this which may have appeared in the press in the past or may appear in the future should not be given credence at all and should be considered just a canard”. The above mentioned facts are a proof that Pak-Afghan border has solid technical and legal foundation. According to international law, treaties of the extinct state concerning boundary lines remain valid and all rights and duties arising from such treaties devolve on the absorbing state.
There are some circles who continue to spread disinformation that the agreement was singed under duress and has a validity of 100 years. Unfortunately, the propaganda emanates from Pakistan’s neighbouring country. It is an open secret that for several decades, Afghanistan, with active help from the former Soviet Union and India, supported separatist groups in Balochistan who were fighting a guerrilla war against the federation. They also supported political groups in NWFP demanding secession from Pakistan.
The Durand Line issue became dead when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and occupied the country. However in 2001, after the defeat of the Taliban forces and return of the Northern Alliance, the long dead issue resurrected. Worth mentioning is the fact that, northern alliance would always have cordial relations with India and would remain thankless towards Pakistan. With the establishment of new government in Afghanistan in 2001, many analysts expressed the fear of revival of Durand Line dispute under the domination of Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. A senior Pakistani diplomat even said that “We will not be surprised if Durand Line and Pashtunistan reappears as an issue again”. Further a senior Western diplomat’s remarks that “With an increase in Russian and Indian influence in Afghanistan, we fear that Islamabad’s relations with Kabul will further deteriorate”, endorsed the reality of Indian foul plays in Pak-Afghan relations.
Interestingly India, at one hand, denies these charges and blames Pakistan for dragging New Delhi into a dispute it has nothing to do with and on the other hand describes the Durand Land as an issue left unsettled by the British when they left the subcontinent in 1947 and supports the Afghan position. It is widely accepted reality that India views Pakistan as her arch rival and for that matter have fought three wars since independence in 1947. Russia holds Pakistan responsible for the insurgency in the 1980s that led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and therefore not very supportive of good Pak-Afghan relations.
There is a need to bring it on record that it has been complained earlier too that India is using its influence on the Northern Alliance, which dominates the present government in Kabul and has close ties with New Delhi, to revive an old and settled issue. They have been using such tactics for quite long years to create differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Durand Line and Pashtunistan are the issues created as a reaction to the partition of sub-continent and Afghanistan is merely a pawn in the game. In 1947 and beyond, the followers of Bacha Khan continued to speak of Gandhi’s mind that the Pathans should have had the choice among Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The Muslim League had correctly argued that the British had no right to utter such; since they did not ask Nagaland if it wanted to join Burma, nor did they ask Tamil Nadu if it wished to join Sri Lanka.
If Durand line is artificial then how valid are the boundaries between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran or all other Middle East countries who were created by former European colonialists such as British, French and Russians. Therefore beating the drum of Durand Line by Afghan rulers is pointless. By the same token, all boundaries of Afghanistan are questionable. Why should only Pashtun areas of Pakistan be merged into Afghanistan? Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country like Pakistan. Should Tajikistan make claim over Tajik lands of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan to Uzbek region and Turkmenistan to Turkmen territory in Afghanistan?
Further more, any international agreement once finally concluded can be revoked only bilaterally and not unilaterally. International law does not lay down the maximum life period of 100 years for an internationally concluded border agreement between the two states, when fixed border validity has not been mentioned in its text. Thus it goes beyond saying that the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a settled matter and is globally accepted. It is supported by international law and the treaty of 1983 has been ratified several times by successive Afghan governments and that’s the bottom line.



Attack on Indian Parliament & limits of Indian coercion
Momin Iftikhar


Attack on Indian Parliament on 13 Dec 200 1 was a defining moment in the conduct of Indo-Pak bilateral relations. Barely weeks earlier, the US response to 9/11 had transformed the geo-political environments in which launching of pre-emptive strikes to pulverize the source of threat had acquired legitimacy. As a demonstration Afghanistan was shuddering under- the impact of the’ Daisy Cutters’ and Iraq was bracing itself for the inevitable aggression. In this milieu, India found it expedient to join the anti terrorism band wagon and decided to embark on a course of brinksmanship with Pakistan by facing it with the threat on an imminent aggression. The attack on Indian Parliament, to many a shady affair reeking of a fake encounter, provided India with the excuse to launch a full scale mobilization against Pakistan in the third week of December. The tense stand off lasted till October 2002. The armies of the two countries were in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation and virtually a shot away from’ setting off a conflagration. With the threat of an imminent war hanging over the subcontinent, Indians went ahead with the coercive diplomacy to force Pakistan into making political concessions that they had tried to accrue over decades. That they failed to make Pakistan buckle to their dictates, emerged as a cause of satisfaction and reflective of Pakistan’s fundamental strengths. It should be instructive to look back and view the limitation of Indian policy of military coercion that led to thwarting of their hostile ambitions vis-a-vis Pakistan.
First, the efficacy and validity of the nuclear deterrent manifested itself in a most eloquent fashion. Threatening Pakistan with the full power of their military instrument, Indians executed the largest ever mobilization against Pakistan, pushing the two countries to the brink of war in January and later after the Kaluchak attack, in May 02. Indian military planners soon realized that their untenable concept of a limited war in Kashmir alone, failed to make an impression across the border. Pakistan made it clear that it would resort to an all out war in case the Indian Army resorted to ‘limited strikes’ across the LOC. Munir Akram, Pakistan’s Ambassador to UN unequivocally articulated his nation’s stance, “Pakistan has to rely on the means it possessed to deter Indian aggression... and wouldn’t neutralize that deterrence by any doctrine of ‘no-first-use”’. The presumptuous Indian strategic thinking of a limited war was well exposed by Lt Gen V. R. Raghavan. “Once war breaks out” he observed, “the military dynamics of obtaining a favourable outcome inevitably takes control. The spiral of politico - military escalation that begins to unfold has a momentum of its own, which even experienced statesmen find difficult to control”. Military deployment having become unnecessarily long drawn and economically hard to sustain, and with no tangible gains in sight, the Indian army called it a day on 16 October 02. Pakistan’s maintenance of a nuclear deterrence to maintain a balance of strategic deterrence had paid off well.
Second, reliance on military means alone, to the exclusion of diplomatic channels indicated to lack of appreciation of the essentials of coercive diplomacy by the Indians. A crisis situation demanded the availability of diplomatic channels by way of maintaining a dialogue channel. Though the Indians wanted to bulldoze their will over Pakistan, they didn’t make it known as to what pound of flesh would satisfy them. If Indians demand was for an end to “cross border terrorism”, they failed to buildup on the offers made by the President of Pakistan during his historic speech on 12 Jan 02. “No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir. We condemn the terrorist acts of September 11, October 1 and December 13. Anyone found involved in any terrorist act would be dealt with sternly. Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organization found involved in terrorism within or outside the country”. He reaffirmed this once again in May 2002.” Give the assurance that no infiltration is taking place across the Line of Control. Pakistan is doing nothing across the Line of Control and Pakistan will never allow the export of terrorism anywhere in the world form within Pakistan...”
Pakistan thus provided an opening for starting the dialogue process particularly for creating a verifiable mechanism, like placing of UNMOGIP observers on both sides of the LOC. By steadfastly refusing to come to table for negotiations, the Indians themselves irretrievably damaged the credibility of their ‘bilateral approach’ application to the solution of Kashmir Issue. Thirdly, Indians very unrealistically read the environment surrounding the US global war on terrorism which, as per Indian assessment, being the self claimed victims of terrorism allowed them the liberty of action to emulate US in launching pre emptive strikes. Despite the ceaseless Indian mantra of “cross border terrorism”, the international pressure steadily mounted oil India to start the negotiating process with Pakistan to defuse tension and avert the possible threat of a nuclear conflagration. In this context a rejoinder by Collin Powel, deflating the Indian claim for a right to pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan had a much sobering effect. The Secretary of State publicly contested an Indian argument when he said that it was wrong for India to compare Pakistan/Kashmir with Iraq. Lack of enthusiasm by the global community in endorsing Indian offensive designs against Pakistan proved instrumental in deflating the Indian sails.





Changing into civilian clothes
Lan Xinzhen

WITHOUT a transformation 42 years ago, would there be a brand named “Changhong” in the world? It might be impossible to answer this question. When people use Changhong electric appliances, they might only be aware that these products are from a large international company located in Sichuan Province, southwest China. Many people, including young Changhong employees, know nothing about the transformation of the company four decades ago.
In 1958, the state-run Sichuan Radio Factory was established on the site of today’s Changhong Group. As a military industrial factory, it mainly produced airborne fire control radar. Employees had to accept strict security checks upon entry and exit. In 1965, however, the factory began to produce products for civilian use and its name was changed to the Changhong Machine Factory. Eight years later, the factory developed its first TV set and registered its trademark. Now, Sichuan Changhong Electric Co. Ltd., a listed company solely initiated and held by Changhong Machine Factory, has become a comprehensive multinational integrating research and development, production, sales and service of TV sets, air conditioners, refrigerators, information technology, telecommunications devices, digital receivers, chips, commercial electronics and components. Gradually, Changhong has become an internationally competitive brand and service supplier of computer, communications and consumer electronics. In 2005, Changhong was named one of the world’s top 500 brands and in early 2007, its brand value was estimated at 58.33 billion yuan ($7.88 billion).
In the past few decades, “switching from military to civilian” has promoted the birth of many large competitive companies in China. 100 billion yuan of output Yu Liegui, Vice Minister of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (CSTIND), says that the core aim of “switching from military to civilian” is to serve the national economy through utilizing the military technologies and capabilities that have been developed over the years. At a press conference held in Sichuan on November 19, Hu Yafeng, Deputy Secretary General of the CSTIND, said that more than 30,000 advanced military technologies have been adapted for civilian use, creating an output of nearly 100 billion yuan ($13.51 billion). Since many military industrial enterprises are located in Sichuan, it has experienced the brunt of “switching from military to civilian.” Breakthroughs have been made in such industries as nuclear, aviation, photoelectric information and specialty chemical technologies, greatly improving local economic development. According to Hu, the massive production switchover from military to civilian occurred after the late 1970s. As an important part of the state development strategy, the Chinese Government incorporated the transformation into national economic and social development planning. The CSTIND became responsible for directing the transformation.

(The Daily Mail-Beijing Review Articles Exchange Item)