Another Emergency in Pakistan

FROM what little slipped out of Islamabad before the government jammed all information outflow and gathered to employ its politically correct spin on the rationale behind the emergency imposition, it was more or less clear that the move was undertaken to protect the president’s personal position in light of what seemed an unfavourable supreme court verdict regarding his re-election. Initial reports indicated the clampdown was meant to target the media and the judiciary, the most sticking thorns in the Musharraf regime’s side as it went about twisting the system to ensure continuity of command. Therefore, the argument citing the deteriorating security situation and expansion of suicide bombings and militia violence from the untamed tribal frontier to calmer areas is not likely to sell as per government plans. The event marks perhaps the most unfortunate turn in Pakistan’s largely troubled political history. Struggling right from the beginning, surviving the eastern wing amputation and undergoing numerous bouts with autocratic military dictatorship, it seemed the return to democracy was finally imminent. And again, General Musharraf’s decision goes to show how one man’s personal concerns take precedence over an entire nation’s interests in a dictatorship that runs on one precept — survival. Technically and legally, the situation is difficult to describe. It cannot be accepted, despite government claims, as imposition of emergency, since that would be a constitutional provision and the ’73 constitution already stands suspended. It is also not a regulation Martial Law because the centre claims all governments will continue to function. The only aspect of the scenario that cannot be doubted is that Nov 3, ’07 will stand out as one of the most unfortunate days in Pakistan’s history.
Perhaps the only positive feature of the day was the eight member supreme court bench’s decision to dismiss the new Provisional Court Order (PCO) which replaces the constitution. While it means that a painful army-judiciary tussle is in the offing, the move does dismiss concerns that the judiciary’s newfound autonomy was circumstantial at best. Islamabad is advised to let saner counsel prevail despite the damage that has already been done. Resorting to Martial Law and emergency is not, in any way, the correct manner of dealing with Pakistan’s worsening security situation. If anything, the government will cut an even sorrier figure should the downtrend continue, which is likely, since it has been effectively established that suicide attacks cannot be countered with force, they need logic. The emergency measures might prolong and further strengthen General Musharraf’s stint at the top. But it will deal a painful blow to Pakistan’s political system’s soft underbelly, which is passing through a very crucial stage at present. General Musharraf has done Pakistan no favours by Saturday’s unfortunate decision.

After Thamilselvan

THE death of Tamil Tiger political leader S.P. Thamilselvan in an air raid Friday is not in fact the triumph the Sri Lankan government would like us to believe. This is the first time in the Tamil separatist campaign that one of its top men has been killed while the rebels have frequently struck senior politicians and government officials with deadly accuracy. But in the final analysis, however, the death of Thamilselvan is likely to deepen the conflict rather than bring it any closer to an end. The plus side for the government in Colombo is that the Sri Lankan military has proved that, despite the devastating rebel attack last month on a major air base which apparently destroyed all the country’s intelligence-gathering drones, it is still capable of mounting a devastating air attack. It is also unclear how the air force knew where Thamilselvan and five other senior rebel leaders were meeting. Do they still have aerial intelligence capability? Is some other power providing them with it instead? Or did they receive information from within the ranks of the Tamil Tigers themselves? Sri Lankan security forces have also been making progress in flushing Tamil rebels out of territory but the fighting has been bloody and the casualties high. Since the 2002 peace deal collapsed early last year, 5,000 more have been added to the toll of more than 70,000 since the rebellion began in 1983.
The debit side includes the certainty that the Tamils will not let Thamilselvan’s death go unavenged. The authorities are bracing themselves for a Tiger spectacular, very probably aimed at a top government figure. The security to guard against such an assault is already disrupting normal life. Yesterday motorists trying to drive into the capital had to wait for several hours while vehicles were searched at police roadblocks. A further problem is that Thamilselvan was the key negotiator with the Norwegian mediators. The loss of his experience may not be as serious as it seems at first glance; the reason is that his successor, the Tigers’ “police chief” P. Nadesan, was alongside him during much of the unfortunately abortive negotiations. It is perhaps just possible that the killing of this top rebel leader may shock his colleagues into some new appreciation of the sacrifices they are asking others to make. Certainly the Tiger’s leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, has always appreciated the danger and so hardly ever appears in public. But it is more likely that Thamilselvan will be turned into a martyr and used to stiffen the resolve of the Tigers. This will further obscure the truth that this is a conflict in which neither side can win militarily. The only way to end the violence is by a negotiated compromise. It was the Tigers who balked at the degree of autonomy on offer from Colombo after the 2002 cease-fire and walked away from the talks. This may have given the Sri Lankan government the moral high ground but wars are not won from such positions. There must be talk and dialogue. Shutting the mouth of the Tigers’ main negotiator may not have been the best idea.


—Arab News