Another peace summit
Henry Kissinger

SECRETARY of State Condoleezza Rice has clearly spelled out how the Bush administration expects the Palestinian peace process now under way to unfold. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert are to hold preparatory meetings to define major elements of a settlement.
The draft outline is then to be submitted to an international conference to be assembled in Annapolis, Maryland, at the end of November with a membership yet to be chosen.
The secretary of state has shown determination and ingenuity to bring matters to this point. Her next challenge will be to steer the process so as to avoid the risk of what happened at Camp David in 2000, when Israeli and PLO leaders sought an agreement only to see it blow up into a new crisis that continues to this day.
At the beginning of most negotiations, each side is clearer about its own position than about the ultimate outcome. What is unique about the Annapolis conference is that the outcome is to be agreed in advance. What remains uncertain is the ability to implement it.
For most of its history, Israel has rejected the notion of a Palestinian state, insisted on an undivided Jerusalem as its capital and refused to permit a return of Palestinian refugees. The Arab side has matched Israeli refusals by refusing to recognise Israel in any borders; later insisting on the 1967 borders that were never recognised when they were in existence; and demanding an unrestricted right of refugees to return to Palestine with the demographic consequence of overwhelming the Jewish population of the Jewish state.
The process is being driven by the assumption that the parties can be led to accept by the end of November — or have already tacitly accepted — the so-called Taba Plan of 2000, developed in the wake of the abortive Camp David meeting by technically non-official negotiators. It provides for Israeli withdrawal to essentially the 1967 borders (with minor rectifications), retaining only the settlements around Jerusalem but narrowing the corridor between two principal Israeli cities, Haifa and Tel Aviv, to about 20 miles. The to-be-created Palestinian state would be compensated by some equivalent Israeli territory, probably in the underpopulated Negev. Israel seems prepared to agree to an unrestricted return of refugees to the Palestinian state but adamantly refuses any return to Israel. Plausible reports have the Israeli government willing to cede the Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem (as yet undefined) as the capital of a Palestinian state.
If matters are indeed brought to this point, it would reflect a revolutionary change of perceptions on both sides.
The intifada and the global momentum of radical Islamism have brought home to the Israeli public and leadership that their state is threatened by four new and growing dangers: first, an altered security environment in which the principal threat is not so much the conventional wars of the past as terrorist attacks from groups with no defined geography and operating from small, mobile bases; second, the demographic challenge because the alternative to a two-state solution could become a single state in which the Jewish population turns into a minority; third, the existential threat of nuclear proliferation, especially from Iran; and finally, an international environment in which Israel finds itself increasingly isolated because of the growing perception in Western Europe and in small but influential circles in the United States that Israel’s alleged intransigence is the cause of Arab hostility to the West.
At the same time, the emerging fear of Iran has caused a reordering of priorities in the Arab world. For the moderate Sunni states, the danger of a dominant Iran has emerged as their principal preoccupation. The confluence of American, Arab, Israeli and European concerns encourages the hope that an agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours would ease, or even eliminate, their common fears.
Will diplomacy be able to deliver on these expectations? Is the optimism for the proposed schedule justified? And what are the implications of a deadlock? For as soon as the issue of implementation is reached, a host of seemingly technical but, in their essence, profoundly divisive issues will emerge.
As a general diplomatic rule, it is expected that the parties to an agreement assume the principal responsibility for carrying out its terms and are able to deliver. In the proposed diplomacy, the interlocutors on both sides have extremely shaky domestic positions. The governing coalition in Israel has collapsed, and the approval ratings of the cabinet are at a historic low. The removal of settlements from the West Bank, which is bound to involve tens of thousands of settlers, will be a traumatic experience for Israel. This is all the more true because Israeli concessions — withdrawal and removal of settlements — are concrete, immediate and permanent, while the Arab concessions — recognition of Israel and normalisation of relations — are abstract and revocable.
The definition of a Palestinian partner has so far proved elusive. Gaza is governed by Hamas, which is unwilling to recognise the legitimacy of Israel, not to speak of the specific terms under negotiation. Who then takes responsibility for Gaza? And it is unclear how much of the West Bank population Abbas can speak for.
The speeded-up process may also sacrifice short-term convenience to long-term crisis. Would it not be better to draw Israeli cessions of territory from areas with a predominantly Muslim population than from the essentially vacant south? This would improve the demographic balance of both states and reduce the danger of a new intifada later on.
Several Arab states have declared their willingness to recognise Israel once it returns to the 1967 borders. But recognition of the existence of a state has historically been treated as a factual, not a policy, matter. It is how sovereign states conduct international relations — even when they clash on policy issues. A key question, therefore, becomes exactly what is meant by “recognition.’’ Will the moderate Arab states place pressure on Hamas to accept the premises of the peace process? Or will the fashionable pressure for “engagement’’ with Hamas turn into an alibi for evading that necessity?

is far from uniform. At least three points of view are identifiable: a small, dedicated but not very vocal group genuinely believing in co-existence with Israel; a much larger group seeking to destroy Israel by permanent confrontation; an offshoot willing to negotiate with Israel but justifying negotiations domestically as means to destroy the Jewish state in stages. Are the moderate Arab states prepared to expand and strengthen the group committed to genuine co-existence? Will recognition of Israel bring an end to the unrelenting media, governmental and educational campaign in Arab countries that presents Israel as an illegitimate, imperialist, almost criminal interloper in the region?
Several moderate Arab states have been extraordinarily reluctant to come to Annapolis. If they appear, will they treat their presence as their principal contribution for which one-sided pressure in Israel is deemed the appropriate concession?
Even more portentous will be the profound implications for the balance of forces within the Arab world. Moderates there will be less praised for their achievement than accused of having betrayed the Arab cause. The statement of the supreme leader of Iran attacking the Palestinian peace process and warning Arab states not to participate in it is likely to be the beginning of a systematic campaign. The US will be able to sustain the proposed course only if it is prepared to extend long-term support to its Arab partners against the foreseeable onslaught.
The peace process will therefore merge with the generic conflicts of the Middle East. The Annapolis conference cannot be the end of a process; rather, it should lay the groundwork of a new, potentially hopeful phase that will continue into future administrations. But it should not be driven by the US political calendar. If either America’s Arab or Israeli friends are asked to take on more than they are able to withstand, there’s the risk of another even larger blow-up. A preparatory “solution’’ that tears the body politic of the parties apart will prevent ultimate progress. Breaking the psychological back of the US’s Israeli ally would only embolden the radicals and thereby destabilise the entire region — whatever contrary arguments conventional wisdom advances.
The secretary of state is surely right in insisting that the Olmert-Abbas talks avoid the ritualistic adjectives of previous efforts still awaiting definition after decades, such as the “just’’ and “lasting’’ peace within “secure’’ and “recognised’’ borders of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the appeal to a “just, fair and realistic’’ solution of the refugee problem called for by the roadmap. Specific agreements regarding enforcement and guarantees are also essential — an especially delicate matter when demilitarisation and resistance to terrorism are imposed on an emerging sovereign entity.
American leadership on realistic parameters with Israel and moderate Arab countries is an essential precondition to success in Annapolis. In its absence, deadlock and American isolation beckon. The strength of the forces of moderation depends on the standing of America in the region and not only with respect to Palestine. No more in Palestine than in Iraq can American influence be fostered by an image of retreat. All the peoples of the region, friend or foe, will be judging the sum total of America’s purposes and its steadfastness in pursuit of them.

—Khaleej Times

A Chinese Odyssey
Franz Hegmann

LIKE a modern version of the Klondike and California goldrush days, the lure of “Golden Week” holiday travel during the Spring Festival, May Day and October’s National Day in China is irresistible to millions of adventure-starved people, Chinese and foreigners alike. From the very beginning, this “quest for gold” involves a seemingly inexhaustible stream of human bodies straining the capacity of a multifaceted transportation network to its limits.
According to official statistics, during the 2007 May Day holiday an estimated 150 million travelers spent approximately 320 billion yuan (about $43 billion), unquestionably a truly golden week for the Chinese economy. The first time I traveled in China by train during the Spring Festival provided for a totally unexpected experience. Upon our arrival at the train station, first impressions seemed perfectly normal, with only a few people around waiting. Suddenly the door from the waiting hall above us were flung open to release what appeared to be an endless cascade of human bodies rushing down toward us threatening everything in their way at the exact time the train approached.
Even before the train had come to a stop, the massive onslaught of bodies engulfed us from all sides, mercilessly pushing and shoving, screaming and trying to scale windows like a steep mountainside, with an assortment of baggage flying about like errant projectiles. Once on the train, totally exhausted from the “struggle for survival,” I had to alternate standing on one leg at a time like a red crowned crane in the narrow hallway, with everyone around me being packed like sardines. I am quite certain that comparable scenes are unlikely to occur when boarding one of China’s ultramodern trains, like the world’s highest altitude train (4,000 meters above) that travels from Qinghai to Lhasa, but our train apparently occupied a low rank within the Chinese railway system, optimally designed for mass transportation, a function it served extremely well. Air travel in China during a “Golden Week” is marginally more comfortable but the number of air passengers, especially Chinese, on the major routes to the most frequented tourist destinations, is steadily increasing, often leading to deteriorating conditions at airport as well as onboard overcrowding. A situation during air travel that I really dislike often occurs when passengers are taken by bus to the plane parked on the tarmac and must board via the portable staircase. Many Chinese people do not like to queue and set off in a mad rush, pushing furiously to board the plane for no apparent reason, as they have reserved seats marked on their boarding passes.
Interestingly enough, the first time I traveled by plane in China was during the Spring Festival “Golden Week” in 2003. I clearly remember that the flights between major points of destination as well as short distance connecting flights, were half empty, and I was the only foreigner on board. Now the planes are filled to capacity, with a majority of Chinese, reflecting the improved living standards over the past four years as a result of economic development the country is experiencing. At the points of destination the constantly self-regenerating chains of human bodies move mostly non-stop in an ever-quickening pace and an apparent state of communal hysteria. Various organized tourists groups are constantly bombarded with ear-deafening, multidirectional megaphone announcements and converge on each other like herds of sheep, while following their tour leader holding high a brightly colored, triangular-shaped flag like a magic wand.
In their relentless “Quest for Gold,” the pilgrims dutifully amble along new pathways of discovery in a kind of mechanical rhythm of movement. And this is my dilemma! I feel extremely uncomfortable being immersed in large crowds and have a very low sociophobic threshold. Perhaps I also have outdated ideas about travel in that I need personal space, prefer to travel in style and comfort, relax and take it easy. Most Chinese as well as foreigners don’t seem to mind the existing travel milieu or perhaps have resolved to accept it in a rational way as a fait d’accompli, with their overriding concern being to enjoy the change from everyday routines and duties and to appreciate the chance and privilege to explore new vistas in their lives.
But what chance is there for me to travel in China in an all-pervasive atmosphere of mass tourism? Perhaps it is an illusion, but my next travel will be by plane to west China, going hiking and camping in the wide-open plains of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province, hoping to find some solitude in the kingdom of the Tibetan antelope.

(The Daily Mail-Beijing Review Articles Exchange Item)






Returning to an inferno
Eric Margolis

ON THURSDAY morning, former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto arrived in Karachi, as she told me she would two weeks ago in London. Huge crowds in the Bhutto family’s traditional power base received her with rapture and adulation. Her enemies greeted her with two horrific bombs that killed more than 130 and wounded hundreds more, underlining the growing violence now consuming Pakistan.
While Washington and even the First Lady Laura Bush have been blasting Burma’s military junta for brutal repression, Pakistan’s US-backed military junta, which receives $1 billion monthly in covert US payments, is waging war against its own restive people, thousands of whom have been killed by the armed forces. Shooting and beating rebellious Buddhist monks is evil; shooting and beating rebellious Muslim religious leaders is anti-terrorism.’ I wished Benazir a bon voyage just before she left Dubai for her historic return home, and cautioned her that my extensive reader mail from Pakistan was running very much against her because of the deal she had made with military ruler General Pervez Musharraf to allow her return.
The widespread view among Pakistanis is that Benazir’s return and impending political power-sharing with Musharraf was engineered by Washington to add a veneer of legitimacy of democracy to his discredited military regime. Unless Bhutto can quickly and decisively distance herself from Musharraf and his Bush Administration sponsors, and show she is really in charge as prime minister, she and her cause may be gravely tarnished. As reported in my recent columns, the US has filled all senior positions in Pakistan’s powerful military and intelligence service, ISI, with pro-American generals approved by the Pentagon and CIA. Even if Musharraf is ousted or blown up, the US believes it can retain firm control over Pakistan and use its armed forces to wage war there and in Afghanistan against nationalist and Islamist forces battling western influence.
The military rules Pakistan. Musharraf and his American patrons run Pakistan’s military. So what is left for future prime minister Bhutto? If Pakistanis conclude she is being cynically used, her political career could founder. If she can somehow push Musharraf and his generals back to their barracks, she will emerge triumphant. Given the dizzying current political confusion between Musharraf, Bhutto, the supreme court, and exiled former PM Nawaz Sharif, it’s impossible to predict what will happen next. But one thing is certain: recent polls show a majority of Pakistanis believe America under President George Bush has launched a war against Islam, and that Musharraf is America’s agent in Islamabad. These disturbing beliefs could easily lead to increasing violence, even full-scale civil war. Even if Musharraf and Bhutto eventually agree on some form of power-sharing, they will find themselves riding a tiger. America’s 2001 invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, and Washington’s ongoing efforts to control Pakistan’s government, have ignited a spreading regional insurrection against western influence.
If the simmering civil war in nuclear-armed Pakistan blows into a wider conflict, the result will be an exceptionally dangerous world crisis in which nuclear-armed India could quickly become involved. The growing threat of a US attack on Iran will only deepen and spread the danger. An explosion in Pakistan would also isolate US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s most important national institution, the armed forces, has failed its duty to the nation. Instead of allowing itself to be rented like the sepoys in the mercenary armies of Britain’s 19th century Imperial Indian Raj, Pakistan’s military should be assuring its commanders serve the interest of the nation, rather than foreign powers. $1 billion a month rents a lot of cooperation, it is true. But Pakistan’s once proud soldiers have sold their honour cheap.

—Khaleej Times