Fueling the space rush
Tong Yanchun

A RUSSAIN Proton rocket blasted off from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan in early September. It was scheduled to enter the geostationary transfer orbit after seven hours of flight. But the second stage of the rocket failed 139 seconds after the launch, causing the JCSAT-11 satellite it carried to crash.
The satellite, designed to provide TV broadcast and telecommunications services, was the first Japanese commercial satellite launched atop a Proton rocket. According to the rental agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan for the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan said it would suspend Proton launches from the space launch facility until everything was resolved. Initial investigations showed that the cause of the rocket failure could have been a steering mechanism failure.
The Proton rocket that flew the mission was Proton M, an improved version of the Proton, developed by the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center. It can deliver a payload of 21 tons into the low-earth orbit at a 51.6 degree incline or a payload of 5.5 tons into the geostationary transfer orbit, or send the payload directly into the geostationary orbit with a Breeze M upper stage. The Proton, operated by the International Launch Services Inc. (ILS), is Russia’s first commercial launch vehicle. ILS was jointly founded in 1995 by the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center and Lockheed Martin Corporation of the United States. Since it hit the commercial launch market in the same year, the Proton has made 42 space flights, four of which were failures. Apart from the one in September, the other three mishaps in 1997, 2002 and 2006, respectively, were all caused by upper-stage engine failure.
Despite the problems that the Proton has encountered in recent years, Russia’s important status in the international commercial launch market is not to be questioned. Russia is one of the first countries in the world to enter this market. The Soviet Union made the Proton commercially available in 1983 in an effort to cash in on its launch vehicle production excess. However, at the time of the Cold War, Western countries led by the United States were worried that the Soviet Union might steal their sophisticated satellite technology if they commissioned it to launch satellites. As a result, Soviet Union’s plan failed to materialize.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia’s budget for the space industry dropped dramatically. In order to maintain its status as a space power, Russia readily cooperated with other countries to make the most of its space technology prowess. It has signed agreements with several Western countries to jointly market its launch vehicles since 1995, thereby carving a niche in the international commercial launch market.
The Proton made its maiden commercial flight from the Baikonur Cosmodrome on April 9, 1996, when it delivered the European broadcast satellite Astra 1F built by Hughes Network Systems LLC of the United States into the geostationary transfer orbit.
A diversified fleet
Apart from the Proton, Russia has also put the Rokot, the Soyuz, the Comos, the Start, the Zenit, the Dnepr, the Shtil and the Volna into the international commercial launch market through its own marketing channels or in collaboration with European and U.S. companies. To date, Russia has conducted 124 commercial launches, 12 of which were failures, registering a success rate of 90.3 percent. Now Russia occupies an important place in the international commercial launch market. In recent years, in particular, the number of Russia’s commercial launches has increased considerably. Russia’s commercial launches have surpassed those of the United States for two successive years, currently ranking first in the world.
Most of Russia’s commercial launch vehicles are converted from intercontinental ballistic missiles. Only a small number of them are exclusively designed to launch satellites. By turning missiles into satellite launchers, Russia has been able to cut launch costs while improving the reliability of its launch vehicles, thus placing itself in an advantageous position when competing on the international commercial launch market. Russia’s commercial launch vehicles can reach most orbits, something that has made the country even more competitive internationally.
Good record
Like the Proton, Russia’s premier commercial launch vehicle, the Soyuz, which rose to fame for sending manned spacecraft and the Zenit-3SL launched from the sea, have also registered extraordinary performance. In 1996, the European-Russian company Starsem was created to provide commercial Soyuz launch services. To date, it has completed 18 commercial flights, all of which were successful-a remarkable record that attracts customers from across the world. With continued improvements, the latest version of the Soyuz can deliver a payload of 8 tons into the low-earth orbit.
The Zenit-3SL started to undertake commercial missions in 1999 and has had 24 commercial launches to date, 22 of which were successful, giving it a success rate of 91.7 percent. The launch vehicle has been jointly developed by Ukraine, Russia, the United States and Norway and is operated by Sea Launch Company LLC. The Yuzhnoye Design Office of Ukraine is responsible for its overall design and the design and manufacturing of its first and second stages. The S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia of Russia are responsible for the design and manufacturing of its third stage. The Boeing Company of the United States is in charge of the design and manufacturing of the payload fairing and the rocket’s marketing.
Small satellite launchers Dnepr, Rokot, Start, Shtil and Volna were converted from intercontinental ballistic missiles that went out of service after the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991. The Dnepr was adapted from the SS-18 intercontinental missile. It can be launched from the three silos in the Baikonur Cosmodrome and is operated by ISC Kosmotras, an international space transportation company established jointly by Russia and Ukraine in 1997. To date, the Dnepr has had 10 launches, one of which failed, a success rate of 90 percent. The Rokot is a three-stage small satellite launcher converted from the SS-19 missile by adding a Breeze-KM upper stage. It can deliver a payload of 1.9 tons into the low-earth orbit and can send two or more satellites in one flight. The Rokot can send satellites into the orbit quickly to replace retired ones. It is popular in the burgeoning markets of small satellite and satellite constellation launching services.
The Start is converted from the SS-25 missile by adding a fourth stage to the missile’s first three stages. It is mainly used to deliver small satellites into the low-earth orbit. The Shtil and the Volna are derived from submarine-launched ballistic missiles and are used to place small payloads into the low-earth orbit. To date, the Shtil has had four commercial launches with one failure, whereas the Volna has only flown one commercial mission.
Bright prospects
In order to further reduce costs and meet clients’ different needs, Russia started to develop the Angara rocket late last century. The Angara is designed to be modular. It will be able to deliver payloads into different orbits by using different configurations of the rocket core and booster stages. Angara’s core is a two-stage rocket with a lifting capacity of 2 tons. To take on heavier payloads, one to four boosters can be strapped onto it. Each booster can increase the rocket’s lifting capacity by 2 tons. In addition, two Angara rockets can be put together to become a large launch vehicle with a lifting capacity of 20 tons. At present, the Angara is still being developed and has yet to be made commercially available. It will be marketed by ILS.
In the past dozen years, Russia has stood out in the international commercial launch market with its sophisticated technology and successful business operations. It keeps improving its launch vehicles innovatively by enhancing their reliability, applicability and lifting capacity. It also is developing a new modular launch vehicle to shorten the cycle of rocket development, production and launch. These efforts have helped ensure Russia’s leading status in space technology.
Russia’s launch vehicles are well received by customers because of their low prices. Russia has expanded the market for its satellite launchers by creating joint-stock launch vehicle operators with other countries, especially European countries and the United States. It now holds about 50 percent of the international commercial launch market.
Russian commercial space launch companies have standardized their services. Apart from launch services, they provide customers with technical and personnel support and after-sale services. These services have not only generated profits for the companies, but also accelerated their shift to joint-stock entities. As the service system continues to improve, Russia’s commercial space launch sector is poised to embrace an optimistic future.

(The Daily Mail-Beijing Review Articles Exchange Item)

A critical litmus test for Pak-Saudi ties
Dr N Janardhan

WHEN the Saudi Intelligence Chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, addressed a press conference in Islamabad last month, it appeared to raise more eyebrows in Pakistan and the Gulf than the news of former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s deportation to Saudi Arabia. Following a meeting with President General Pervez Musharraf, just ahead of Sharif’s return, Prince Muqrin — brother and special envoy of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia — and Lebanese politician Saad Hariri showed a document which mentioned that Sharif should not return from his exile for 10 years.
It is now seven years since the “deal” was struck to spare the former Pakistani premier from life imprisonment after he was overthrown in a military coup by Musharraf in 1999. Sharif spent most of these years in the kingdom, where he was forbidden from any political activity, and then moved to London, from where he plotted his comeback, which ended within a few hours with another exile on September 10.
An official Saudi statement tersely said: “Nawaz Sharif will stay in the Kingdom as a guest. The Kingdom welcomes him again after his return to Islamabad, disregarding his pledge that he will stay away from Pakistan and politics.” Analysts opine that the unprecedented support to the Pakistan government by the Saudi leadership in Sharif’s deportation has been a “major shock”. Some claim that this was “a major deviation from the Saudi government’s policy to stay away from controversial political matters especially those which relate to the internal political affairs of other countries.” In recent years, however, Saudi Arabia has used its status as an Islamic and economic powerhouse to play a proactive role in a number of domestic political crises in the Muslim world — Palestinian territories, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan and Somalia — as well as engaged in dousing the tension between Iran and the West.
All these actions could be attributed to possible benefits both for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region, and the stability of the Middle East and Muslim world at large. The kingdom’s mediatory roles in the Muslim world have, indeed, brought Saudi Arabia back into the centre of Middle East and world politics, especially with Egypt nowhere on the diplomatic radar. This was reflective in Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan Ali Awadh Asseri’s assertion that the Muslim world was confronted with unprecedented challenges and was struggling for its very survival against ever-increasing threats. “This calls for unity amongst our ranks, both intra-state as well as inter-state,” he said, adding that Riyadh had consistently strived to forge unity among all Muslims.
Riyadh’s real intention in mediating in the Pakistani political crisis could well be about stability in a country of great importance to the region and a frontline nation in the war against terror, and not about favouring any particular leader. Further, Pakistan has witnessed an upsurge of extremist activity in recent years and has the potential to further contribute to the resurgence of the Taleban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Such a situation would not only affect Pakistan and Afghanistan , but all the Gulf countries, chiefly Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. More importantly, Saudi Arabia is also concerned about the possibility of Pakistani-Afghan extremists and Al Qaeda taking advantage of any political instability to gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, putting the entire region in danger. Following a week of Saudi bashing in Pakistan, Riyadh defended the kingdom’s role by saying that his country got involved because the Sharif issue was likely to threaten Pakistan’s peace and unity. Saudi Arabia extended its help to Pakistan because it was requested to, and did so after getting complete support of all parties concerned.
“This support has been extended not as a favour to another country, but as a fulfillment of responsibility towards a friend and a brother. Pakistan’s unity, integrity and sovereignty are as important to Saudi Arabia as its own. We have always stood by the side of Pakistan whenever it has been threatened from outside. Pakistan’s strength has been our strength and Pakistan’s problems our problems,” the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan said. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia share a multi-faceted strategic relationship spanning political, defence, security, energy, religious, cultural and economic realms. Over a million Pakistanis reside and work in Saudi Arabia and another 600,000 visit the kingdom to perform the Haj and Umrah pilgrimages every year.
Bilateral trade stood at $2.83 billion in 2005, and Pakistan has benefited a great deal from the kingdom’s relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities during natural calamities, as well as remittances and investments. In the military sphere, Pakistan — the only Muslim country possessing nuclear weapons — has been special and a great source of strength to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s military has a history of performing security duties in the kingdom and training Saudi military personnel, apart from advanced negotiations for the possible first purchase of Pakistani-assembled ‘Al Khalid’ tanks by the Saudis. The intelligence agencies of the two countries have regularly exchanged information on the movements of key Al Qaeda suspects.
All these strategic considerations and relations, however, didn’t cut much ice with critics after Sharif’s deportation. “It makes one wonder whether Saudi Arabia would allow a Pakistani intelligence chief to address a press conference in Riyadh and pass judgment on an internal political issue concerning the Saudi kingdom?”One Pakistani analyst questioned Prince Muqrin’s role in the political drama. While such harsh words against Saudi Arabia are unprecedented in Pakistan, the kingdom was also accused of colluding with the United States in determining the future of Pakistani politics.
“If he (Sharif) just wanted to go to Saudi Arabia, he could have bought a ticket to Jeddah instead of Lahore, (the) deportation is in accordance with the agenda of America (and Saudi Arabia),” another Pakistani analyst vented. The United States wants a “liberal” leader in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is always at the US’s “beck and call. That the most sacred country of the Muslims should be used this way is most unfortunate.” ce of Islam’s two holiest shrines, Saudi Arabia has a special place in the Muslim world. But many in Pakistan now feel that following the Sharif deportation incident, Pakistanis are unlikely to ignore the alleged “exploitation of Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia or the uninhibited hunting sprees of Saudi princes in Pakistan,” thereby affecting bilateral relations.
Sharif’s party has indicated that the Saudi government has conveyed to Islamabad that it will have nothing to do with the former premier after Eid, especially if it may damage the reputation of Saudi Arabia among Pakistanis. Whether this happens or not isn’t as important as what is likely to happen in the years ahead. The political course is yet to crystallise in Pakistan. But, with Pakistan certain to return to full-fledged democracy sooner or later, allowing all aspiring politicians to contest in elections thereafter, Sharif’s return to the top job at some point could make the strain with Saudi Arabia manifest in one form or another.

—Khaleej Times



The Benazir Bhutto factor this time around
Nasim Zehra

AS BENAZIR Bhutto prepares to land in Pakistan after an eight-year long self-imposed exile, Pakistanis know her return qualifies as a major political event. The party her father founded almost four decades ago is still a living entity. Despite all the corruption scandals against her the party cadres, even if decreased and somewhat decrepit, are still intact. The cadres and the party supporters will no doubt put up a grand welcome for their leader provided the government does not prevent them from travelling to the airport.
Benazir carries the name that has for the longest time ruled the hearts of the largest chunk in the Pakistani electorate. Even for its detractors and the authors of guided-democracy perpetually engaged in landscaping Pakistani democracy, the Bhutto name cannot be ignored. It is an irony of fate that those very forces that led the khaki logic of 2002, which dictated that Benazir Bhutto’s electoral victory will be detrimental to Pakistan’s interests, have now concluded the opposite. In a recent television interview, General Pervez Musharraf acknowledged that despite the corruption of the PPP, it is a party that enjoys national support.
The khaki’s political re-engineering project did not succeed. Musharraf’s eight years failed to discard the Benazir and Nawaz factors. No new political leadership emerged. Instead the charisma of the old survived. Politics does not lend itself to ‘engineering.’ Instead it is the intangible charisma, among other factors, that builds the support for popular politicians. In Pakistani politics, topping the list of charismatic politicians is the Bhutto name. Despite the long list of Benazir Bhutto’s political blunders, corruption scandals and other contenders for political charisma, passed from father to daughter, the name still bears, even though markedly reduced, the charismatic hold.
Clean logic doesn’t explain charisma. The chaos of the complex, the non-elite reality, which sentiments of a large section of the society’s ‘have-nots’ calculate, the lived experiences of the marginalised that defies the dominant reason-based discourse, are the factors that comprise the context within which charisma survives. Also it is a life afflicted with tragedy and turmoil, one that lives through the pain and the anguish and still survives to play a role on the public stage, is one that becomes the stuff of charisma. Charisma-struck Bhutto supporters tend to only selectively register the flaws of their leader. Their perception is distorted by the triple tragedy of death of a father lost at the gallows, a brother bulleted and another poisoned, forced ouster from her legitimately earned prime ministerial position, and Benazir’s own years in imprisonment and for eight years remaining away from her homeland.
The other side of the Bhutto reality is what her supporters have long ignored: the corruption scandals and the intolerance and inefficiencies of her governments. The Zaradari factor too, is disregarded. Her Washington connection pales before her many positive assets. Then there is the broader power context of Pakistan which, with its many contradictions and many excesses takes away peoples’ ability to move beyond the realm of heroes and villains. The public lives the reality of the morality of the ruling classes that is constructed on shifting sands. If it’s a choice between your crook versus my crook, the public will rather opt for their own crook. The cost of the absence of a process, which helps to weed out the bad and lead in the good on the political horizon, is the rise of cultish figures. Yet whatever popular support exists for Benazir it is not merely a manifestation of blind faith. Instead it makes manifest the acceptability by the public of what they believe to be the lesser evil. Much of the middle class analysis may appear to be an Orwellian chant of the advantaged elite.
Benazir returns, to yet again, benefit from the political support that this charisma accrues to her. Her dealings with the uniformed president are unlikely to be a support-loser. Her core support will remain intact. The issues of constitutional democracy, rule of law and judicial independence have not yet become important political determinants of Pakistani politics. These issues have only captured the imagination of the urban population which also recognises that in Pakistan’s current political scenario these will remain parallel to and not integrated in Pakistani mainstream politics.
None other than the political choices that the man who was the star of the post-March movement for judicial independence, has reiterated this reality. In a recent interview Aitzaz Ahsan said he will stand by his leader and will contest on the PPP ticket. He is okay with his leader’s deal with the man he argued repeatedly must vacate the presidential position. By his political support for Benazir, Aitzaz has endorsed her position that for a smooth transition engaging with a uniformed president is okay. In the 2002 elections the PPP polled 29 per cent of the votes that were cast. The response to her post-arrival politics in the various provinces, and especially in the NWFP, will indicate Benazir’s likely electoral support in the coming elections.
Meanwhile, her public support and her charisma factor notwithstanding, her arrival in Pakistan will pose hurdles for her that she must overcome at least in her return to active electoral politics. One, the nervousness of the Musharraf government and of the ruling party as Benazir opts for active politicking. There is room for Bhutto-Musharraf tension given that there is no comprehensive political accord between the two. She entered into an only issue-specific engagement with General Musharraf. Hence once on the election trail, at the hustings her party’s traditional political positions vis-à-vis the army in politics, the PML-Q and the MQM will also be articulated. Also, Musharraf’s stated displeasure at Bhutto’s pre-election return, may mutually queer the pitch. In short, it’s not a guaranteed Musharraf-Bhutto smooth-sailing ahead. Musharraf ‘s right hand men of the PML-Q are unlikely to opt for any but a policy of political bickering with the PPP.
Two, the media trial that will be conducted on issues ranging from corruption to engaging with a military ruler and from the Washington connection to her pro-Washington position on the global war on terrorism and on extremism within Pakistan. The media has repeatedly raised the paradoxes of Benazir’s political careers. It is a media that generally is both sympathetic personally and harsh politically towards Benazir. Meanwhile armed groups in Waziristan have repeatedly issued death threats against Benazir for what they view as pro-Washington policies against terrorism.
Three, the return of the Sharifs to Pakistan could potentially cut into her vote bank; especially in the Punjab and in the country’s urban constituency. As the voice of a genuine national level opposition the Sharifs pose the biggest challenge to the Bhutto bid for power. As a party positioning itself as an anti-establishment nationalist democratic party, the PML-N is the flag bearer of 21st century radical politics of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the ruling party’s political contours, beyond being a Musharraf-mentored party, have yet to emerge.
Finally, how the Bhutto name scores in the latest round of electoral politics notwithstanding, what is relevant for Pakistan is Benazir’s ability to deliver on the crucial challenge that Pakistan’s state, society and politics faces; the challenge of being able to effectively arrest the growing violently promoted internal ideological and political discord. Her existing credentials to meet this challenge do not appear to be strong. —Khaleej Times