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US considered
radiological weapon
Foreign Desk Report
WASHINGTON—In one of the longest-held secrets of the Cold War, the U.S.
Army explored the potential for using radioactive poisons to assassinate
“important individuals” such as military or civilian leaders, according
to newly declassified documents.
Approved at the highest levels of the Army in 1948, the effort was a
well-hidden part of the military’s pursuit of a “new concept of warfare”
using radioactive materials from atomic bombmaking to contaminate swaths
of enemy land or to target military bases, factories or troop
formations.
Military historians who have researched the broader radiological warfare
program said in interviews that they had never before seen evidence that
it included pursuit of an assassination weapon. Targeting public figures
in such attacks is not unheard of; just last year an unknown assailant
used a tiny amount of radioactive polonium-210 to kill Kremlin critic
Alexander Litvinenko in London. No targeted individuals are mentioned in
references to the assassination weapon in the government documents
declassified in response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed
in 1995.
The decades-old records were released recently to the AP, heavily
censored by the government to remove specifics about radiological
warfare agents and other details. The censorship reflects concern that
the potential for using radioactive poisons as a weapon is more than a
historic footnote; it is believed to be sought by present-day terrorists
bent on attacking U.S. targets.
The documents give no indication whether a radiological weapon for
targeting high-ranking individuals was ever used or even developed by
the United States. They leave unclear how far the Army project went. One
memo from December 1948 outlined the project and another memo that month
indicated it was under way. The main sections of several subsequent
progress reports in 1949 were removed by censors before release.
The broader effort on offensive uses of radiological warfare apparently
died by about 1954, at least in part because of the Defense Department’s
conviction that nuclear weapons were a better bet. Whether the work
migrated to another agency such as the CIA is unclear. The project was
given final approval in November 1948 and began the following month,
just one year after the CIA’s creation in 1947.
It was a turbulent time on the international scene. In August 1949, the
Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb, and two months
later Mao Zedong’s communists triumphed in China’s civil war. As U.S.
scientists developed the atomic bomb during World War II, it was
recognized that radioactive agents used or created in the manufacturing
process had lethal potential. The government’s first public report on
the bomb project, published in 1945, noted that radioactive fission
products from a uranium-fueled reactor could be extracted and used “like
a particularly vicious form of poison gas.”
Among the documents released to the AP — an Army memo dated Dec. 16,
1948, and labeled secret — described a crash program to develop a
variety of military uses for radioactive materials. Work on a
“subversive weapon for attack of individuals or small groups” was listed
as a secondary priority, to be confined to feasibility studies and
experiments.
The top priorities listed were:
Weapons to contaminate “populated or otherwise critical areas for long
periods of time.”
Munitions combining high explosives with radioactive material “to
accomplish physical damage and radioactive contamination
simultaneously.”
Air and-or surface weapons that would spread contamination across an
area to be evacuated, thereby rendering it unusable by enemy forces.
The stated goal was to produce a prototype for the No. 1 and No. 2
priority weapons by Dec. 31, 1950. The 4th ranked priority was
“munitions for attack on individuals” using radioactive agents for which
there is “no means of therapy.” “This class of munitions is proposed for
use by secret agents or subversive units for lethal attacks against
small groups of important individuals, e.g., during meetings of civilian
or military leaders,” it said.
Assassination of foreign figures by agents of the U.S. government was
not explicitly outlawed until President Gerald R. Ford signed an
executive order in 1976 in response to revelations that the CIA had
plotted in the 1960s to kill Cuban President Fidel Castro, including by
poisoning.
The Dec. 16, 1948, memo said a lethal attack against individuals using
radiological material should be done in a way that makes it impossible
to trace the U.S. government’s involvement, a concept known as
“plausible deniability” that is central to U.S. covert actions.
“The source of the munition, the fact that an attack has been made, and
the kind of attack should not be determinable, if possible,” it said.
“The munition should be inconspicuous and readily transportable.”
Radioactive agents were thought to be ideal for this use, the document
said, because of their high toxicity and the fact that the targeted
individuals could not smell, taste or otherwise sense the attack.
“It should be possible, for example, to develop a very small munition
which could function unnoticeably and which would set up an invisible,
yet highly lethal concentration in a room, with the effects noticeable
only well after the time of attack,” it said. “The time for lethal
effects could, it is believed, be controlled within limits by the amount
of radioactive agent dispersed. The toxicities are such that should
relatively high concentrations be required for early lethal effects, on
a weight basis, even such concentrations may be found practicable.” Tom
Bielefeld, a Harvard physicist who has studied radiological weapons
issues, said that while he had never heard of this project, its
technical aims sounded feasible. Bielefeld noted that polonium, the
radioactive agent used to kill Litvinenko in November 2006, has just the
kind of features that would be suitable for the lethal mission described
in the Dec. 16 memo. |