Life on the fast train
Lan Xinzhen

AFTER 10 years of evaluation and research, the high-speed railway between Beijing and Shanghai is finally under construction, according to Liu Zhijun, Minister of Railways, in Beijing. With a total length of 1,318 km, the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway has a planned investment of 186.5 billion yuan ($24.87 billion) and is expected to complete for operation in 2011 after 52 months of construction. This realization of the high-speed railway meant to alleviate the pressure of north-south transportation in the coastal area of east China. At present, the density of railway transport between Beijing and Shanghai is four times the country’s average and is always in a state of overload that cannot satisfy demand.
Now, preliminary preparations hav been launched and some bridges, such as the Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge, are under construction. By the end of this year, construction of some key roadbeds, bridges and tunnels will commence. Independent technology
According to the Ministry of Railways (MOR), the design life of the high-speed railway between Beijing and Shanghai will be 100 years, with the maximum speed of 350 km per hour and an operating speed of 300 km per hour. Adopting a wheel/rail approach, the technology for the railway will be largely dependent on Chinese technology. Lines, bridges, tunnels and culverts will be constructed with completely independent technology standards and intellectual property developed by China. Since the early 1990s, when China first proposed to build this high-speed railway, the international community has paid close attention to its development. Japan, France and Germany have been embroiled in intensive competition over construction contracts for the railway. Leaders of the three countries have all tried to persuade China to adopt their technologies, and fierce debate ensued in China over whether to use the wheel/rail approach of Japan and France, or the magnetic levitation train from Germany.
“China is completely capable of building the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway on its own,” said Wang Yueming, researcher at the China Academy of Railway Sciences (CARS). According to Wang, China is capable of manufacturing locomotives with their speed surpassing 350 km per hour, and there will be no problems for trains to be used in the high-speed railway. The Beijing-Shanghai train will adopt viaducts, preventing people from approaching the railway. This measure will save land and impose no influence on ground transport, ensuring the safety and the speed of the railway. On September 12, construction of the National Engineering Laboratory of High-Speed Railway Systems under the CARS was approved by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). This laboratory, focused on testing the reliability, safety, comfort, energy usage and environmental performance of high-speed railway systems, will establish testing and verification facilities for the comprehensive performance of high-speed railways, and create a support platform for relevant construction projects.
The Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway will also adopt overseas high-speed railway technologies. According to Liu Zhijun, domestic technologies will account for 70 percent, while imported components to be assembled 20 percent and imported complete sets of components 10 percent. Imported technologies will mainly be used in signal systems. Multiple financing channels
Investment of 90 billion yuan ($12 billion) has so far been approved for the project—half of what is needed for completion.
Wang Qingyun, Director of the Department of Communications of the NDRC, says that the state will establish the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Railway Co. Ltd. to actively explore market-oriented financing and absorb private and foreign capital, though Chinese investors will be the controlling shareholders.
He Huawu, Chief Engineer of the MOR, says that the enthusiasm aroused by the construction of the railway will attract diversified capital from both domestic and foreign capital markets so as to realize multiple investors, financing channels and financing methods.
That financing has already begun. In April this year, Taikang Asset Management Corp. was entrusted to issue 10 billion yuan ($1.33 billion) of three-year bonds used for construction of the railway with the MOR as the issuer. Twelve insurance companies purchased all of these bonds. Established in May 2006 in Beijing, Taikang Asset Management Corp. is a state-owned insurance assets management corporation. During the construction period, insurance companies will invest in the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway with debt investment. After the project is completed, the debt may be changed into shares for the railway operating company. Sources of capital
The money invested in the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway will mainly be used for creation of fixed and mobile facilities and the electronic control system. Of the three major investment fields, investment in fixed facilities will account for over 40 percent, while that in mobile facilities and electronic control systems will make up more than 50 percent. Since fixed facilities involve construction of bridges, railway beds, tunnels and railway stations, suppliers of related construction materials such as cement, stone materials, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and plastics, as well as equipment like tracklayers and grabs, will benefit greatly from the undertaking. Mobile facilities, including trains and components, will bring large orders to the manufacturing industry and companies engaged in locomotive production. Iron and steel processing and related component processing will see abundant profits.
Construction of electronic control systems involves utilization of computer hardware and software technologies, high-end telecommunications equipment and a large amount of cables and fiber optics. Suppliers in these industries will also benefit. In March this year, Klaus Kleinfeld, former chief executive officer of Siemens, disclosed that his company had secured a contract to supply signal technologies to the railway with a total value of several hundred million euros. Suzhou Dafang Special Purpose Vehicle Manufacturing Co. Ltd., a private company in Jiangsu Province, also obtained a large order of over 10 million yuan to supply dual-use transporters (road and railway) for the project. Positive impacts
The high-speed railway between Beijing and Shanghai, running through the municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai and the four provinces of Hebei, Shandong, Anhui and Jiangsu, connects two large economic areas of China: the Bohai rim economic sphere and the Yangtze River economic zone. As growing economic bases with rapid development, these areas are not only the driving force for China’s economic development, but are also at the forefront of China’s opening-up and participation in international economic competition. When completed, the high-speed railway, to be devoted to passenger transport, will ease the traffic pressure between Beijing and Shanghai. The existing Beijing-Shanghai Railway will be converted to freight transport. After going into operation, the high-speed trains between the two cities are expected to transport more than 80 million passengers each year. According to He Huawu, the high-speed railway will greatly enhance the handling capacity of the present Beijing-Shanghai Railway, allowing it to transport over 130 million tons of freight annually. After completion, traveling time between Beijing and Shanghai will be shortened from nine hours to five hours. During the early period of operation, the interval between trains is set at four minutes, and it will be shortened to three minutes at the peak time. Each train will be able to carry 1,000-2,000 passengers, and there will be 110-120 round trains running each day. This development may create a threat to air carriers between the two cities, since train tickets are much cheaper than airfare. Plus, considering the time it takes to get to the airport and check in, traveling by air doesn’t save much more time than a high-speed train.

(The Daily Mail-Beijing Review Articles Exchange Item)

Collusive deal won’t democratise Pakistan
Praful Bidwai

BENAZIR Bhutto has reportedly struck a deal with Pervez Musharraf, under which corruption cases filed against her between 1985 and October 1999 will be dropped, and she in turn will tacitly support his election as Pakistan’s president.
Although details aren’t available at the time of writing, the understanding seems to have all the makings of a parochial and collusive agreement which promotes the narrow self-interest of two individuals, but does nothing to limit the role of the military in public life, or remove the power of the president to sack elected governments and even parliament.
Nothing now stands between Musharraf and the presidency barring Pakistan’s supreme court, which is hearing petitions challenging his candidature. If it acts like it did on September 28 by dismissing similar petitions, it will let down many democratically-minded Pakistanis who came to place faith in it after it reinstated Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and affirmed the right of exiled former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to return home. Yet, its verdict can go either way.
The Court’s earlier judgment upheld the Election Commission’s flagrant manipulation of rules which forbid anyone who holds an office of profit from contesting elections for two years. This was manifestly bad in law.
Evidently, the All Parties’ Democratic Movement (APDM), led by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), put all its eggs in the court’s basket. It should have understood that its judgment in the Chaudhry case was driven less by respect for constitutional democracy than a concern to defuse the lawyers’ agitation for his reinstatement.
The Court failed to give effect to its own judgment on Sharif’s right to return, avoiding a head-on confrontation with the army.
It may not be unfair to conclude that Pakistan’s democratic institutions are too compromised by prolonged military interference to be relied upon to uphold constitutional principle. Its mainstream parties aren’t yet strong or willing to complete the process of full democratisation.
This raises what might be called a “chicken-and-egg” problem. How can Pakistan make a much-needed transition to full civilian democracy while its political and jurdicial institutions are weak? And yet, how can its institutions facilitate that transition in the face of authoritarian pressures to compromise themselves — to survive? The moral-political pressure of a mass mobilisation for democracy alone can cut this Gordian knot. At any rate, another round in the fight for democracy has been lost. But this isn’t the last round. A new one may have begun with the Benazir-Musharraf deal and the announcement that Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani will succeed Musharraf as army chief.
How the fight for democracy is now played out will be decided by four factors: the political parties’ tactics, the higher judiciary’s role, the masses’ mood, and the US’ calculations. Pakistan’s higher judiciary, with its burnished image, can assert greater independence. But this, as of now, is an open question.
Pakistani public opinion seems to have decisively turned against the army. Recent surveys say Musharraf’s approval ratings have dipped to just 34 per cent from 60 per cent in mid-2006. 58 per cent of respondents give his government “poor” or “very poor” marks; 56 per cent say they feel less safe than a year ago.
The US role could become overwhelmingly important. Washington favours the Pakistan army strongly over civilian leaders. The presence in Islamabad of senior State Department officials as Sharif was being deported showed their approval of Musharraf. Musharraf’s more recent overtures to the US, and Kiyani’s appointment, will strengthen this relationship. Newsweek says Kiyani is “smart, tough, talented-and pro-western”, and the preferred choice of western military officials.
Like Musharraf, Bhutto has been wooing Washington with offers of allowing international agencies to interrogate AQ Khan and letting US troops conduct an attack within Pakistan targeting Osama bin Laden.
By entering into a shady, opportunist deal with Musharraf, Bhutto would violate the Charter of Democracy signed with Sharif in May: “We shall not join the military regime or any military-sponsored government. No party shall solicit the support of the military to come into power ...”
If the PPP were to cut such a dishonourable deal, as seems to be happening, it could split. Worse, that would help the army entrench itself in public life just as it’s losing its credibility. This would weaken the pro-democracy momentum.
Regrettably, no external agencies or forces appear willing to restrain Musharraf. The three nations that matter the most to Pakistan-the US, China and India-seem resigned to supporting a dominant role for the Pakistan army. This tails the US view of Musharraf’s indispensability, and is deeply cynical towards the Pakistani public’s democratic aspirations.
India has a long-term stake in a democratic, stable Pakistan which can rein in the military. A democratised Pakistan is indispensable to South Asia’s future as a peaceful, prosperous and harmonious region. Democratisation will help India and Pakistan demilitarise mutual relations permanently and contain communal and sectarian forces in both countries. The Benazir-Musharraf deal may have set back that prospect — at least for some time.

—Khaleej Times



Homeward bound
Eric S. Margolis

CONSIDERING she had just flown in from New York and was about to shortly launch a political revolution in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto looked remarkably relaxed when we met.
Since we have known one another for years, the mood was informal and congenial, but politically the electricity still sizzled as Pakistan’s twice former prime minister seemed poised to become that nation’s next one.
Bhutto was cautiously optimistic. The situation in Pakistan is ugly, she said. Days earlier, many of her Pakistan People’s Party supporters had been beaten with bricks by the police and seriously injured. Pakistan is facing growing violence by Islamic militants and tribal insurgents. Last month, Pakistan’s first woman prime minister gave me a worldwide exclusive, revealing that she would return to Pakistan on October 18. At the time, she still faced serious criminal charges in Pakistan over corruption cases that have dragged on for years. Bhutto denies any guilt and insists the cases were political vendettas. None have ever been proved. Last week, Bhutto reaffirmed she would leave London on the 17th and land the next morning in Karachi, the bastion of her political support. Bhutto vowed she would go ahead even if forces of the military regime headed by President Pervez Musharraf tried to arrest her. But the next day, after weeks of what she termed “stalling” by Musharraf’s US-backed military regime, the embattled military regime announced that corruption charges against Bhutto had been lifted, opening the way for her legal return. Or so it appeared in the murky twilight of Pakistani politics. The fate of Pakistan’s other main political leader, Nawaz Sharif, who was kicked out when he tried to return recently, remains uncertain.
Musharraf’s plummeting domestic support and intensified pressure from Washington are pushing the reluctant general into a deal with old foe Bhutto, whose dislike for the general is exceeded only by her ardent desire to regain political power.
“No, not a deal,” insists Bhutto, “a constitutional arrangement.” Whatever you call it, barring potential last-minute snags, it seems the long-anticipated, American-brokered power sharing agreement between Musharraf and Bhutto is close. But late last week, Pakistan’s born-again Supreme Court further muddied the political waters by declaring Saturday’s presidential election could proceed, but it would delay ruling if Musharraf could serve as both president and military leader. “The Army would like to distance itself from the perception it is running the country,” says Bhutto. “The longer military dictatorship continues, the more we will face violence from extremist groups.” Would the army fight a national uprising against Musharraf, I asked? “No, the army is highly disciplined. The mainly Punjabi army won’t fire on its own people,” she predicted, nor would it split. This week, President Musharraf named loyal ally, military intelligence chief Gen Ashfaq Kiyani, as new armed forces commander, and appointed other loyalists to senior positions. My sources say all were vetted and approved in advance by Washington.—Khaleej Times
Musharraf may resign as armed forces commander, but he and Washington will still pull the military’s strings. Since the military is the only national institution that really works and holds respect, nameplates will change but the power will remain in the same hands as now.
Benazir Bhutto, outwardly confident and determined, believes she can take charge of turbulent Pakistan in time to ward off an internal explosion or even civil war that would shake South Asia and deprive the US of a key ally.
But during her previous two terms, she was never fully able to grasp the reins of power and constantly thwarted by her generals. This time around, her position is likely to be even weaker and her powers ill-defined and contested. Musharraf and the Bush administration hope she will provide democratic window-dressing while the military runs the show and fights Islamists and tribesmen.
But Bhutto is determined to get the army out of politics. So who will really be in charge? Will Pakistanis accept a new government hand-crafted by Washington?
“The military is the problem, not solution,” she says. “If there is a fair vote early next year, our party(PPP) and its allies will win.”
High drama awaits Pakistan on the 18th when Benzair crosses the Rubicon. Don’t underestimate this very tough lady.
As I was leaving London, Benazir Bhutto sent me a message: “Our next meeting, if not at the foothills of the Khyber Pass, then at the shores of the Arabian Sea”.

—Kahleej Times