Relations with today’s Russia

WHEN offered the opportunity last month of travelling to Moscow, I most eagerly accepted it. Having spent a year at the prestigious Moscow State University and then undertaken two long diplomatic assignments in this historic capital, Russia still holds tremendous fascination for me.

Of course, Moscow was then the capital of a superpower, vying for global influence. Though having suffered staggering losses in the Second World War, the country showed grit and resilience to transform itself into a most credible rival of the United States. Winston Churchill had described the country as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”. But it was also then a safe, peaceful and well-organised capital, where though consumer goods were in short supply, the simplicity, warmth and friendship of the Russians more than made up for material shortcomings.

Since coming to power in March 2000, President Vladimir Putin has set the country on the road to economic recovery and political consolidation. Moscow’s earlier efforts were directed at trying to reestablish itself as the dominant player in the former Soviet republics, many of which are still learning to adjust to their independence. But in recent times, Russia is coming more into its own and as it does so, the US is no longer as considerate of Russia’s ambitions as in the earlier years.

In fact, there has been not too subtle an effort by the US to encourage some of these republics (e.g. Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) to overthrow the existing political order on the plea that they need to institute democratic reforms. Nevertheless, Russia is still the region’s dominant power and its economic linkages to the former republics give it tremendous leverage. Moscow also has the added advantage that comes from the presence of large numbers of ethnic Russians in key positions in much of Central Asia.

While the Russians appear to be enjoying their newfound freedom and improved living conditions, many of those belonging to the urban elite allude to the demise of the USSR as a catastrophe for the Russian people. But moderate Russians recognise that there is no going back, especially as they are not willing to see their country pay the tremendous price that it had to in its endeavour to be one of the world’s two superpowers. Therefore, Russia is pursuing an increasingly pragmatic foreign policy, designed to take advantage of opportunities that come its way. On the strategic plane, President Putin has taken the decision to maintain cordial relations with the US, cooperate on issues such as the war on terror and to avoid irritants but to take a firm line when it comes to the protection of Russia’s core interests. The new leadership wishes to promote a multi-polar world and to this end, it strives where possible to reduce, even if marginally, the geo-political domination of the world by the US.

But Russia is not likely to become a rival of the US, and will continue to build “alliances of convenience” with the major powers, such as China, India, Japan, the EU, South Africa, Brazil and even Venezuela. This will be done in order to build credible relationships to shore up its global influence, without damaging its domestic and international standing. It is this philosophy that underpins Moscow’s policies towards them.

Admittedly, China’s impressive growth rate and its tremendous energy requirements pose a potential threat to Moscow. Russia has, therefore, followed a skilful policy of reinforcing its ties with Beijing, while also strengthening relations with China’s major neighbours. But there is recognition that Central Asia’s strategic location and its massive resources pose both a challenge and an opportunity. In fact, the decision to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation serves two important and complementary purposes: to work together on issues concerning Central Asia and to keep the major outside powers, primarily the US, out of the region.

Russia also recognises that Japan, currently the world’s second largest economy, is also dependent on huge imports of natural resources. This is likely to lead to fierce competition between China and Japan for the natural resources of Central Asia. This represents a dilemma for Moscow which would want to retain strong ties with Tokyo primarily to contain Chinese influence and to keep Japan from aligning itself too closely with the US, to the detriment of Russia. Currently, Moscow perceives China as a partner and a friend, but if China emerges as a possible threat, given its increasing need for natural resources, advanced technology and growing ambitions, Russia will attempt to seek partners in the region to check Beijing’s influence.

Russian policymakers are also supportive of the EU’s efforts to emerge as a major power centre, in line with Moscow’s support for a multipolar world. Apart from their strong mutual economic interests, the two also have common concerns in that their populations are decreasing. As they look around for new workforces, worryingly for both, the regions with surplus labour are southeastern Europe, Turkey and the Middle East. This would really amount to encouraging Muslim immigration. Neither the EU nor Russia is likely to regard this option favourably, especially as Muslims already constitute large numbers in some EU member-states, as well as in the southern districts of Russia.

The issue of energy is, however, becoming a major bone of contention between Russia and the EU, especially as the EU currently imports 25 per cent of its gas from Russia. By 2030, this figure is predicted to rise to 60 per cent. Europe’s vulnerability to Kremlin’s control over the pipeline network bringing gas from the Caspian states was starkly illustrated this year when the Russian energy giant Gazprom temporarily cut supply to Ukraine in a dispute over pricing. This drew a rebuke from US Vice President Dick Cheney, who accused Russia of using energy as a tool of “intimidation and blackmail”.

Russian analysts told me that instead of seeking to dominate the world as the Soviets had done; Russia can extract greater advantage from the many opportunities likely to come its way in the coming years. The fact that Russia will remain a great power cannot be denied, primarily because its vast natural resources enable it to affect the policies of many fast-growing economies.

Moreover, its military research and development will ensure that it remains a major supplier of military hardware. In fact, Russia is increasing arms sales to developing countries, while agreeing to write off some Soviet era debts. Apart from traditional buyers of Russian arms such as India and Iran, Moscow has also been seeking a breakthrough with Latin America, primarily through Venezuela, with which it has signed an arms contract worth more than three billion dollars. In defending this policy, Putin recently remarked that “in terms of its significance and scope, the global weapons market is comparable with such segments of the global economy as energy and food”.

Russia has lost much of its earlier influence in the Middle East, but its policy has become more pragmatic. While courting strong and more stable regimes, it remains a supporter of the weaker ones, in order to remain a player at the international negotiating table. According to Russian observers, Moscow will allow Washington to take initiatives, such as lobbying for democratisation, but then step in as an ally, or even as a possible competitor should Washington’s mistakes offer it the opportunity.

On the domestic front, Putin, like other strongmen, has come up with his own version of democracy. He calls it “sovereign democracy”, which conveys two messages: first Russia’s regime is democratic and, second, that this claim must be accepted, with no attempt at verification. During Putin’s presidency, fundamental elements of democracy such as the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, the rule of law and press freedom have been undermined. Over the past 18 months, the Kremlin has also conducted electoral reforms aimed at consolidating the dominance of the pro-Kremlin party, United Russia. The average Russian, however, sees Putin not as a dictator, but as someone under whom the per capita GDP has gone up from $600 to $4,500 and the poverty rolls have fallen from 42 million to 26 million. No wonder Putin enjoys a 75 per cent approval rating.

This summer’s G-8 summit held in Moscow was celebrated as Putin’s triumphant entry into the world’s most exclusive club. Soaring energy prices have given Putin’s gas-rich country a genuine claim to sit alongside the mature economies of North America, Europe and Japan. But Russia’s growing power has been accompanied by differences with the West, which accuses the Kremlin of using its position as a key energy supplier to bully neighbours. Other issues, such as Putin’s human rights record and Moscow’s policy towards Iran, are irritants as well, but given the overwhelming body of opinion which believes that the fate of Eurasia’s vast gas and oil fields will dictate international politics in the next half century, the G8 participants were more than eager to sit back and enjoy Putin’s hospitality.

Pakistan’s relations with Russia have always been problematic. The historical baggage continues to inhibit the establishment of trust and confidence between the two, notwithstanding tentative initiatives taken by them. But with the end of the Cold War and America pursuing unilateralist policies, with little consideration for international commitments and even less for promoting multilateral institutions, it is imperative that we accord greater time and attention to identifying areas where we could work with Russia.

It was pointed out to me in Moscow, with justification, that notwithstanding a history of tension in Pakistan-Soviet relations, Moscow’s contribution to Pakistan’s economic development has not been insignificant. In difficult times, Soviet diplomacy played a helpful role, even on Indo-Pakistan issues. While Moscow’s role in Tashkent is well known, not many people are aware of the quiet but helpful role played by the Soviet leadership in the days after the breakup of Pakistan. At Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s request, made during his visit in March 1972, Moscow agreed to use its influence with both Delhi and Dhaka on the issue of Pakistani POWs.

Russia’s technology, both in the civilian and defence sectors could be more suitable to our needs than what we are trying to acquire from the West. Moreover, given Russia’s tremendous experience and expertise in the field of power and energy, Islamabad should chalk out a comprehensive programme that would include extending Moscow incentives similar to those we are proposing for China. Economic linkages would create a degree of confidence that could facilitate cooperation in the defence field as well. This would give Pakistan’s diplomacy greater strength and credibility.

—By Tariq Fatemi
 

A broken constitution
By Sanford Levinson

THE United States constitution may be the most revered text in the nation. It is our foundational document, which our presidents pledge to preserve and protect and which our judges continue to interpret and reinterpret Talmudically more than 200 years after it was written. It is the symbol of the American democracy that we often insist is the greatest in the world.

Yet in reality, the constitution is so far from perfect that it threatens our ability to resolve the daunting problems facing our society. It has created a political order that suffers from a “democratic deficit,” a term often applied to the European Union but, alas, ever more accurate with regard to our own society.

This is not a mere theoretical failing. At the moment, for instance, more than half the country strongly disapproves of Congress and the president. Almost three-quarters of those polled believe that the United States is headed in the wrong direction. These are not the responses of an electorate that is fundamentally satisfied with the status quo.

One might argue that this is transitory, a matter of momentary antipathy toward today’s incumbents — and that a turnover in next month’s elections will bring renewed joy to the discontented. But that would be a mistake. It is a grim reality that our constitution itself ensures that the results will be of far less significance than one might hope.

Begin with the fact that, whatever happens, George W. Bush will continue to occupy the White House until Jan. 20, 2009, despite the fact that about 60 per cent of Americans disapprove of the job he’s doing. Most political systems around the world have mechanisms by which leaders who lose the public’s confidence can be removed.

A model in this regard is Britain, where the Tories unceremoniously dispatched Margaret Thatcher when she was no longer found suitable as their leader, and where the Labour Party is in the process of doing the same with Tony Blair. Under our Constitution, although criminals can be removed, mere incompetents are protected. One need not adopt a parliamentary system in order to construct a system by which Congress could declare “no confidence” in the president and force a replacement.

For now, then, Bush retains his powers including the power to veto legislation. This is another extraordinarily undemocratic element of the US system. It allows one man to override the wishes of strong majorities and, in effect, become an independent third house of an already cumbersome legislative process. This “three-house” aspect of our legislative process is one explanation for the difficulty often, the impossibility of passing innovative legislation and having it signed into law.

Californians have a particularly overwhelming reason to disrespect the Constitution: Although 35 million people live within its borders, it has the same vote in the US Senate as does Wyoming, which has roughly 500,000 people.

How can you defend a system under which Barbara Boxer was returned to the Senate in 2004 with about 6.5 million votes at the same time that Alaska’s Lisa Murkowski won the exact same job and power with about 150,000 votes? No greater deviation can be imagined from what we like to believe is a national commitment to “one person/one vote.”

Again, this is not merely a theoretical problem. Research has demonstrated that the control of 25 per cent of the Senate’s votes by states with only five per cent of the national population has led to a remarkable flow of federal dollars from highly populated states such as California and New York to thinly populated but politically advantaged states. Alaska’s infamous “bridge to nowhere” is all too emblematic of this reality.

In a real sense, California has even less power in the Senate than do small states, given the way that effective power is distributed. The Democrats, for example, draw their leadership almost exclusively from small states. Over the last 30 years, that party’s leadership has come from Montana (Mike Mansfield), West Virginia (Robert Byrd), Maine (George Mitchell), South Dakota (Tom Daschle) and Nevada (Harry Reid). In the same period, Republican leaders came from Tennessee (Howard Baker and Bill Frist), Kansas (Bob Dole) and Mississippi (Trent Lott).

Nor does California benefit as much as one might believe from its having by far the largest number of electoral votes in the country. The reasons are simple: First, small states, guaranteed at least three electoral votes, have disproportionate voting power in the electoral college. Second, the structure of the electoral college has created a system whereby presidential candidates focus only on “battleground states” in which the electorate is closely divided.

California has not been such a battleground for many years. Thus, no candidate seeking to put together a winning coalition in the electoral college will pay much attention to California. One candidate (the Democrat) takes California for granted; the other often disdains the state. Were the United States a modern democracy in which the president was elected by a popular majority, Californians would be wooed instead of sidelined while candidates pander to ironworkers in Ohio and Cuban Americans in Miami.

These are just some of the problems with our Constitution. There’s also the fact that the electoral college has put five men in the White House since World War II Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush who did not win a majority (and in at least one case, not even a plurality) of the popular vote. Nor are we well served by the extended period between election day and the inauguration more than two months later, during which repudiated lame-duck presidents — think of Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush — retain full authority to make controversial decisions.

Or by the fact that Supreme Court justices often serve for ludicrously long periods — a quarter-century has become the norm — and the appointment of youngsters such as Clarence Thomas, 42, and Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., 50, makes service of 30 or 40 years all too likely. What’s more, they are then able to time their resignations to ensure that their successors are chosen by presidents who share their political ideology.

To believe that our Constitution is perfect — or even truly adequate to the world we live in — is equivalent to believing that it is safe to continue driving a car with bad brakes and dangerously worn tires. Even if we have been able to make trips safely in the past, we are criminally negligent in believing that we can continue to do so.—Dawn/Los Angeles Times

The writer is a law professor at the University of Texas at Austin.