After the troika meeting
By Najmuddin A. Shaikh

MUCH has been written about the Musharraf visit to the United States and the UK and much has been said about the book which the tour was designed to promote. It was perhaps inevitable that laudatory or critical comment on the book tended to overshadow the substance of the discussions that the president had with his American counterpart, separately as well as at a trilateral dinner that included Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai.

At another time I will probably put in my tuppence worth on the merits of the book, on the effect the disclosures in the book, and in Musharraf’s media appearances had on the credibility of the president and other Pakistani spokespersons, and the advisability of such an extended book tour. For the moment, suffice it to say that even though the president received a standing ovation at the prestigious Council of Foreign Relations — dubbed sarcastically as “Musharraf’s fan club” by a Wall Street Journal columnist — and even though this set the trend for most of his public appearances, his words and views were not accepted by serious analysts and policymakers as accurately reflecting the true version of past events or the current situation in South Asia.

I will also not dwell on the undoubted success of the meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Havana or on his other bilateral meetings or on the speech at the UN — or even on the mudslinging in which the president, with total lack of restraint, and President Karzai, with somewhat greater diplomatic finesse, indulged in the deluge of public appearances and official statements. I will focus instead on the discussions and the agreements reached by the Bush-Musharraf-Karzai triumvirate on the pursuit of the global war on terrorism, the elimination or at least reduction of the Taliban threat in Afghanistan and the elimination or reduction of extremism in Pakistan.

What are the prospects for the implementation of these agreements given the current situation on the ground? The number of suicide bombings and roadside booby-trap blasts in Afghanistan has soared by 600 per cent in nine months, rising from 11 in 2005 to 67 by September 28, 2006. It is feared that this is not merely a textbook emulation of the Iraqi insurgency’s tactics but a reflection of the ties that have been created through an Al-Qaeda intermediary between the trainers of the Iraqi suicide bombers and the Taliban leadership wherever it is based.

UN officials in Afghanistan may maintain that there is no evidence of such a nexus and that suicide-bomber tactics may have been picked up by the Taliban from extremist web sites, but there are reports that Afghans have received training in Iraq and that Arab trainers have been to Afghanistan. Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah has claimed that he has, in addition to 12,000 fighters, some 500 suicide bombers who are eager to seek martyrdom.

The leaked National Intelligence Estimate has emphasised the “centrality” of the US invasion of Iraq, and the insurgency that has followed, as the leading inspiration for new Islamic extremist networks and cells that are united by little more than an anti-western agenda. In Afghanistan I have no doubt that the three-fold effect of the war in Iraq was the diverting of American attention and resources, the consequent resurgence of the Taliban and the development of ties between Sunni extremists in Iraq and the Taliban.

The one silver lining seems to be that the Taliban realise that suicide bombings in which the victims are civilians alienate the local population. In areas like Helmand, they have distributed pamphlets attributing the suicide attacks to “foreign Taliban”. The Afghans of course maintain that “foreign” means not Arabs but Pakistanis emerging from the madressahs that continue to dot the landscape in the border region and elsewhere in Pakistan.

Four weeks after the conclusion of the Pakistan government’s deal with the tribal leaders in Waziristan, a peace of sorts has continued to hold in the tribal areas. On the other side of the border, American military spokesmen have claimed that the number of Taliban attacks in the eastern provinces bordering Waziristan has tripled since the agreement.

In Miramshah, a local man was executed by militants who left behind a note describing the man as a spy for America and warning the locals against such informants. The Taliban opened an office in Miramshah and asked people to report the whereabouts of masked men who were disturbing the peace so that the Taliban could take care of them. The office has now been closed but the Taliban, while overtly promising to honour the agreement reached with the government by tribal leaders, clearly believe that they should be responsible for the security of the region.

The UNHCR has announced that this year’s programme for repatriating Afghan refugees from Pakistan has come to an end with 130,000 refugees having travelled home instead of the planned 400,000. The next UN-assisted repatriation will have to wait upon the conclusion of a new tripartite agreement and will not commence until March 2007. Some 2.5 million refugees continue to be on Pakistani soil. There is no indication that the Pakistan government is urging the UNHCR to do more to lift this burden.

On the contrary, there is evidence that refugees continue to pour into the country and that the Pakistan government does little to check this influx. It is estimated that some thirty to forty thousand persons cross the border at Chaman every day with no documents beyond the red Rs100 note that they proffer to willing immigration officials. The border is more fantasy than reality at Chaman, as is the case at most other so-called official crossing points on the 1,400-mile long border.

Un-contradicted reports in the press indicate that the Karzai government’s ministry of tribal affairs has resumed the practice of past Afghan regimes of paying a subsidy to tribal leaders on Pakistan’s side of the border, particularly in the Waziristan area. One can assume that the Pakistan government is doing likewise on the Afghan side.

This year Afghanistan will harvest some 6,100 tons of opium, much of it in the provinces bordering Pakistan. The Americans and the Nato forces contend that this opium is grown with Taliban encouragement and is financing the Taliban war effort. My own view is that the major encouragement is provided by Afghan officials and warlords sitting in the Afghan Wolesi Jirga who use the money to pay their private militias and to build garishly opulent houses on dubiously acquired government land in Kabul and other cities. Lists are apparently available of the warlords and officials involved, but the Karzai administration is not able to dismiss or apprehend them despite pressure form the UN.

We in Pakistan should note that the European market will, at most, take the equivalent of 1,700 tons of opium, converted into heroin in laboratories which have sprung up once again on both sides of the border. The rest will be consumed by addicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, countries where the number of addicts and users is growing. It should also be noted that Nato forces will not seek to eliminate opium cultivation and will leave this task to the Afghan forces, which have yet to prove their mettle though there is now talk of enormous improvements having been brought about in their training programmes and of the provision of suitable weaponry and transport.

Nato forces in southern Afghanistan claim to have killed some 800 militants in the pitched battles that they have fought against large Taliban formations. They concede that, as a result, they have been able to do little reconstruction work and have further alienated the local population which has suffered the most from these battles and the consequent “collateral damage”. Nato has not been able to get the commitments of additional troops that local commanders have sought after facing unexpectedly tough resistance. They have, according to press reports, taken the wise step of reaching an agreement with the Taliban on vacating areas in Helmand province, provided the Taliban do likewise, and leaving administration to the local populace.

In eastern Afghanistan, American forces have killed some 300 Taliban in the latest operation but have also managed to start work on some 120 construction projects — government offices, schools hospitals and roads — for which $43 million has been allocated. What will actually happen on the ground is open to question. The Americans too may have to start looking at compromise solutions such as the British are accepting in the south if their reconstruction is to proceed and provide some relief to the suffering locals.

Agreement has been reached on Nato being given operational control of all of Afghanistan by March 2007. Twelve thousand of the roughly 20,000 American troops now in Afghanistan will come under Nato command while the balance will continue, under American command, to search for and eliminate Al Qaeda and Taliban. While plans for a partial American withdrawal from Afghanistan appear to have been shelved for the time being, it is likely that a brigade — some 3,000 troops — will be withdrawn once Nato takes command in southern Afghanistan. When this happens, the durability of America’s commitment to Afghan stability will be called into question, wrongly I feel, by Afghan leaders and the public. It will be seen as a victory by the Taliban and their supporters in Pakistan and elsewhere.

While there is no doubt that the Taliban are deriving some revenues from the opium trade, there is also no doubt that they are receiving foreign funding and foreign fighters. They are said to pay their volunteers $100 per month as against the $70 that an Afghan soldier gets. The Americans, despite their best efforts, have not been able to stem the flow of such funds or the influx of non-Afghan recruits to the Taliban cause.

Pakistan continues to publicly express concern about the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan. Islamabad claims to have evidence that Indian officials posted in Afghanistan are using this vantage point to foment trouble in Pakistani Balochistan and to promote anti-Pakistan sentiment in the country.

Many but not all Pakistanis realise that unless the Taliban are eliminated, extremism is bound to grow in Pakistan and that it will be impossible to prevent the spread of Talibanisation from the tribal areas to the settled districts. ‘Enlightened moderation’ will then be seen as no more than a joke. The government’s resolve is perceived as being weak with the fiascos of the blasphemy law amendment, the extra column in the passport and, most recently, the amendment of the Hudood laws being cited as examples of the government’s surrender of positions of principle in the face of pressure from the religious parties.

It is against this backdrop that I will analyse, in the next part of this article, the agreements reached in Washington, and in particular the decision to hold Loya Jirgas. These councils could make effective the compromise agreement with the tribals in Waziristan as well as the understanding that the British have reached in Helmand and which may be replicated by the Americans in Khost and Paktika.
 

Peace-Time Role of Pak Armed Forces
Robina Ali Zaidi

After the creation of Pakistan, geo-political compulsions and peculiar security environment warranted military an important role in nation-building and safeguarding the territorial frontiers of nascent state as India did not accept Pakistan’s existence wholeheartedly. The initial civil governments in Pakistan were so preoccupied with the gigantic problems of the day that they had to involve the military forces in the development of the country. Hence it was the beginning of a harmonious working relationship between civil and military in the country.
The interplay between civil and military bureaucracies offered the much-needed help at this critical juncture of Pakistan history. Both institutions had a federal outlook and were well fitted to take on nation-building tasks. Thus the concept of Pakistani nationalism owes much to the compatible interplay between civil and military organization right from the initial days of independence. Military being the most disciplined and responsible institution of Pakistan had to contribute towards national security which it did. Besides defending the national borders and helping people and the civil administration at the hours of crises at the first call, it has not reneged from contributing towards restructuring of various institutions and departments. It can be safely said that military has set very positive and healthy trends in Pakistan’s society by going beyond the call of their duty. It will not be irrelevant to review the socio-economic contributions of Military in Pakistan’s civil sector.
Apart from strengthening the defence of the country, these defenders perform multifarious duties during calamities with efficiency and promptitude. Vital role as the first responders played by the troops in aid to civil administration deserves a special mention in the field of natural calamities such as floods, earthquakes, epidemics etc. Pakistan Army, starting with safe transportation of refugees at the time of partition, has been frequently called upon to assist the nation in rescue and relief operations. In addition to lending a helping hand in rehabilitation work, it assists in the maintenance of law and order which is one of the pre-requisites and corollary of economic well-being of the country. Pakistan Army has had to put its reputation at stake in order to restore the normalcy whenever law and order situation arises, may it be sectarian, linguistic or ethnic strife. Army’s efforts in maintaining peace in rural and urban Sindh is indeed an undeniable fact.
Pakistan Armed Forces’ medical teams have been the reliable source of promoting health facilities both in normal and emergency-like situations within and outside the country. The Armed Forces have some of the best medical facilities and institutions across the country such as Cardiology Centre, Bone Marrow Transplant Centre, Army Burn Centre and Armed Forces Institute of Rehabilitation. They are running and organizing military hospitals and mobile dental units, which are also open to civil population across the country. Moreover, medical teams of Army are providing free medical services in the remote areas of the country such as Northern Areas and FATA. The Army Medical Corps has always actively responded to whenever called by the nation to help in the face of calamities like floods and earthquakes. Every year about 30 doctors and 200 paramedics are sent on Hajj Medical mission to cater for the medical needs of entire Pakistani Hajj contingent at Mekkah, Madina and Jeddah. In addition to Pakistanis, a number of Hujjaj from other countries also benefit from Pakistan’s medical facilities. Commendable services have been rendered in Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, Eastern Slovenia, Kuwait and Haiti by Army Medical Corps while on the United Nations Missions.
While putting their trust in its integrity and impartiality, successive governments entrusted Pak Army thrice with the task of holding free, fair and transparent elections in 1993, 1997 and 2001. Under devolution of power plan, the Army is successfully supervising all phases of current Local Bodies elections in the areas which are dubbed sensitive from law and order point and view. Last time, the Army was also assigned the task of supporting the census department in conducting a correct demographic census in the country. Pakistan is an agricultural country, as a service to farmers Pakistan Army almost every year assists civil administration in canals desilting work. This is a major contribution of Army towards agriculture and irrigational development.
During last year’s devastating earthquake, Pakistan Armed Forces especially Army rendered commendable services in Azad Kashmir and Hazara division of the NWFP. Pakistan Army along with NGOs first led the rescue operation and then it has remained engaged proactively in the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. Pakistan Army by establishing camps across the affected areas played a vital role in the relief work. It did an exemplary job by opening reads and repairing bridges in order to have an access to the affected mountainous terrain. The selflessness and dedication of all officers, men, engineers, doctors and aviation pilots during that hour of trial were highly appreciated the world over.
Likewise, a large number of personnel of Pakistan Army, Navy, Coast Guards and Frontier Constabulary participated in the rescue and relief operations last year when floods played havoc with the country especially in upper NWFP and Punjab and southern Balochistan. In Pasni, southern Balochistan where over 20,000 people living in small scattered villages in the area got trapped as the result of a dam burst, Pakistan Armed Forces personnel managed to save them through supply and rescue operations by the means of helicopters.
At all these emergency points, the Pakistan Armed Forces in their unique capacity of the first responders came forward and efficiently discharged their services to the nation. What is extraordinarily impressive is that no matter what caste, creed or community they belonged to, they worked as a team and as loyal and faithful Pakistanis, oblivious of racial, ethnic, provincial and religious profiling.
Pakistan Armed Forces have served the nation in every ordeal. They have safeguarded the frontiers, preserved the integrity and independence of their motherland and upheld the honour and esteem of the nation. Possessing, retaining and respecting diversity is their greatest strength. Their morale is always high; nothing deters their resolve and conviction to serve their motherland selflessly. This rare breed rises above and beyond the call of duty when it senses danger and never hesitates to offer supreme sacrifice. Their deeds of gallantry, valor and the fearless spirit of self-sacrifice, is a source of inspiration for the nation and future generations. They manifest a strict sense of discipline, physical endurance, team-spirit, self-sacrifice, selfless devotion and unmatched courage when it comes to holding aloft the banner of their country.

INDIA’s POLICY TOWARDS CHINA
Muhammad Asad

US-India Nuclear Cooperation Bill in the House of Representatives has been passed. Manmohan’s left allies want the bill to be discussed in Indian parliament. To pacify its leftist allies, Manmohan has told the legislators that Indian government will remain non-committal until the final text of the bill is received. And India will not accept any unreasonable conditions on its nuclear programme (July 27, 2006).
The underlying reason for quick clearance of the bill is the China factor_Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defence Review singles out China as the country with the “greatest potential” to compete militarily with the US and put “regional military balances at risk” (S Rajagopalan, “US sees ally in India, rival in China”, HindustanTimes.com, Washington, February 4, 2006). The document observes: (a) China could “field disruptive military technologies” that could over time offset traditional US military advantages, (b) India is “an emerging great power and a key strategic partner” in the global security environment in the 21st century. The Indo-US nuke deal embodies resolve of the two countries to “transform the US-India relationship into a global partnership that will provide leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest”. “Shared values by long-standing, multi-ethnic democracies provide the foundation for continued and increased strategic cooperation and represent an important opportunity for our two countries”.
India is aware of US policy makers’ affinity. However, they do not want to alarm China. As such, the hallmark of India's current foreign policy towards China is equivocation.
India's China policy is ostensibly based on Panchsheel principles that are mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference and peaceful existence. But, it is actually based on Chanakya's Mandal principle, which states 'all neighbouring countries are actual or potential enemies'.
The duality of India's foreign policy towards China is obvious_ During his visit to China, the A. B. Vajpayee (former Indian prime minister) admitted China's suzerainty over Tibet. Even in his written statement before the Lok Sabha, he said, 'On Tibet, I would like to assure this House that there is no change in our decades old policy. We have never doubted that the Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of the territory of the People's Republic of China". But, in a subsequent press conference, he clarified that there was no cataclysmic change in the status quo and India's views on disputes with China.
After the visit, the Indian delegation told newsmen that 'the Chinese draft wanted India to use the word "inalienable" for both Tibet and Taiwan being part of its territory, but India did not go the whole hog with this phraseology. Frontline dated July 18, 2003 reported, 'Indian officials were at pains to point out that they had used the term "People's Republic of China", and not China- the PRC being an entity that came into existence in 1949'.
“What was the status quo? Kiran Kumar Thaplyal and Shiva Nandan Misra in - Select Battles in Indian History: From Earliest Times to 2000 A.D, (Volume II, page 632), point out 'India gave major concession to China by giving up military, communications, and postal right she also withdrew military detachments from Yatung and Gyantse. By this treaty (1954) India indirectly recognized Chinese sovereignty (as against suzerainty) over Tibet referring to the latter as Tibet region of China'.
India's intrusions into the Chinese territory are a stark contradiction of her status quo concerning the Chinese territory adjoining her so-called state of ‘Arunachal Pradesh’. The aftermath of the India-China War, also, was acceptance of Chinese point of view by India.
The vicissitudes of India - China Relations (1950 - 1962) reflect that India unquestioningly accepted China's control of Tibet. India's policy on Tibet during the British rule was to secure Tibet as a buffer state between India and China (fear of red China and the USSR).
Yet, to China's chagrin, India spurred Tibetans to expel the Chinese mission from Lhasa in the middle of 1949. This event forced the Republic of China in January 1950 to claim Tibet as part of China. Induction of Chinese army into that region in October 1950 vapourised the Englishman-conceived buffer between India and China.
India made muffled protests and then, according to military historians, 'meekly acquiesced' to China's forward policy. In November 1950, when EI Salvador requested that Tibetans plea be heard by the United Nation, the Indian delegate did not support it. United States and Britain could not exploit the issue, as India, China's immediate neighbour, did not vote for Salvadorian proposal.
India acquiesced to construction of strategic roads, linking China with Tibet, during Nehru's 'Hindi-Cheeni Bhai Bhai' era. The Chinese had constructed two roads for taking heavy load across Tibet to areas close to the so-called McMahon line. Simultaneously they surveyed the entire Aksai Chin.
In 1956, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin area from hills near Yarkand to Gartok. Johnson line had earlier shown this area as part of Kashmir, but India made no protest. In 1950, the Chinese rushed supplies through this very route to Western Tibet.
In 1958, China claimed Aksai Chin" as part of China. Later, India woke up from Rip Von Winkle's slumber and made a counter-claim to possession of Aksai Chin. The Indian claim was untenable under principles of international law, which favoured the party in prior occupation. India had no case as it had never surveyed the area or sent her patrols into that area. As such, India did not invoke jurisdiction of International Court of Justice.
China never accepted the Indian point of view that 'the McMahon line was legalised by Simla convention. As such, 'the boundary claimed by India both in the Western and the Eastern Sectors was based on geography, tradition as well as specific international agreement between India and China'. India however stuck to her schizophrenic contention on the boundary line in the eastern sector and her claim 'to territory between McMahon line and the foot-hills'. As for Aksai Chin, the Chinese maps published in 1958 showed this area as part of their territory.
Unlike the Indians, the Chinese are straightforward people. In talks with India, they promised to admit India’s suzerainty over Sikkim. And fulfilled this promise by amending their official maps. During his recent visit to India, the Chinese delegation showed amended maps to Indian diplomats.
Duplicity in India's foreign policy is the greatest obstruction to peaceful resolution of her disputes with her neighbours. She never tangibly objected to Chinese control of Tibet or construction of communication links in the area. Never invoked intervention by UNO on this matter. Yet, she sheltered Dalai Lama, and sent patrols into Chinese territory, leading to India-China War.
It is high time India says no to her childish behaviour, and behaves like an adult. How long will India cling to the Barbie doll of animosity towards her neighbours? It is not Chanakya's MandaI principle, but reason, which India should follow (Mandal doctrine states that ‘all neighbouring countries are actual or potential enemies’). India should not allow itself to be used as a pawn in the great powers’ game.