A War of Survival
Momin Iftikhar

The September War of 1965 is verily a bench mark in the History of Pakistan for its implications for country’s survival as an independent and sovereign state. India’s ambitious political objective for launching aggression was to establish unquestioned hegemony and force her will over Pakistan for dictating a solution in Kashmir. Its military objective was to impose a total military defeat and comprehensively degrade Pakistan’s defensive potential by cutting her main artery of communication- the Grand Trunk Road - at Gujranwala.
To achieve this design Indians planned their major offensives in two adjoining corridors defined by the Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej Rivers. Their smaller offensive was launched in area between Ravi and Sutlej Rivers and directed at the highly sensitive city of Lahore. The thrust comprised three infantry divisions and an armored Brigade; with Bridges over Ravi at Shahdara identified as final objective. Once the bulk of defending forces had been rushed to defend Lahore, Indians planned to launch their trump card of 1 (Indian) Armored Division along with three Infantry divisions in the Ravi- Chenab Corridor, skirting around Sialkot, to cut the GT Road between Gujranwala and Wazirabad. The area presented tremendous possibilities for the Indian 1 Armored Division since it was most suited for tank battles and a determined thrust from this direction could help India decide the fortunes of war as per her wishes. Indians had the element of surprise working for them and Pakistani forces were out numbered. Yet through grit and determination, duly supported by the indomitable national will, Pakistan comprehensively thwarted Indian ambitions. In due course, Lahore and Sialkot emerged as the symbols of national will around which major and bitter battles were fought.
At the Lahore Front 10 Division occupied its defenses just in time to face the Indian three pronged onslaught, which materialized on the night 5/6 September. In contrast with their grand ambitions, (General Chaudhry, the Indian C-in-C, wanted to sip champagne at the Lahore Gymkhana),Indians could only gain minor toe-holds across the BRB Canal which were effectively cut off by determined counter attacks by Pakistan Army. By 11 September the situation had stabilized along the BRB Canal on whose banks, Major Aziz Bhatti Shaheed earned his Nishan-e-Haider and everlasting fame in defending Lahore in face of desperate Indian onslaughts.
The battle for defence of Lahore was crucial but it was in Sialkot Sector that Indian ambitions and objectives- both political and military – were fully thwarted. By making fifty miles deep armoured thrust to GT Road around Gujranwala, Indians wanted to cut the lines of communications leading to Sialkot as well as Lahore Sectors and force a battle of reversed frontiers on Pakistan. Indian plans unfolded with a diversionary attack on Jassar, on 6 Sep, while the major Indian offensive in Sialkot sector materialized on 8 September. As 26 Indian Division attacked Sialkot from two directions, 1 Indian Armor Division (Fakhr-e-Hind- the pride of India) along with 6 Mountain division and 14 Division advanced on twin axes; Charwa – Badiana and Chobara – Phillora – Chawinda, to brush aside the Pakistani resistance and then race for the depth of the Pakistani heartland. For the next three days, the Indian assault was resisted by only one infantry brigade and an amour unit of the Pakistan Army. Allah’s help was evident as only a handful of these determined men and a few tanks stood in the way of the onslaught and imposed such caution on the Indian commanders that they failed to generate the full potential of their trump offensive card - the Fakhr-e-Hind Armored Division. At Chawinda the fabled armor battle was contested that conclusively defeated aggressive Indian ambitions of imposing a comprehensive military defeat on Pakistan. Indian Armor pressed hard and launched repeated attacks to achieve a breakthrough across the Pakistani defenses but miserably failed. 13 and 14 September saw hotly contested armor action, the biggest battle since World War II, but the focal points of Chawinda – Badiana remained outside the Indian grasp. By 21 September, India’s offensive had come to a total halt and she had to agree to a ceasefire. For Pakistan, the 65 War was a struggle for national survival and 6 September provides us an opportunity to reflect on its various dimensions. First, this war was fought for our very survival and the aggressive defence undertaken by our armed forces carried the day. It was Allah’s blessings, the credible force of our arms, the valor and grit of the Armed forces and the indomitable spirit of our people that enabled us to prove equal to the challenge. Here it should be interesting to browse through excerpts from Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh’s book, War Despatches, concerning conduct of war on Lahore Front; “Enemy pressure continued to increase on 9 September and it was appreciated that these badly shaken units (of 54 Indian infantry brigade advancing on Lahore on Amritsar- Wagah Axis) would not provide the required security to Amritsar along the main approach leading into this vital city.” So here is the Indian GOG-in-Chief Western Command, concerning himself with the defence of Amritsar, during an offensive in which he had set out to reach the Shahdara bridges.
Second, the September War underscored the fact that while assessing response to the military threat from India, Pakistan has to base its calculus on the Indian military capability and not on its professions of non violence vis-à-vis its neighboring countries. Any failure to do so will result into nasty surprises like the one handed down during the September War. The bottom line remains that within the parameters defined by economic constraints, only military preparedness shall deter aggression and ensure our survival as a Nation since the threat, with the passage of time, has only grown more menacing.
Third, it is the unity of its people and their resolve to stand up to aggression that makes a Nation truly invincible. September 65 united the people of Pakistan, who, transcending all differences rose as one in supporting their soldiers to face the formidable challenge. Lastly the War comprehensively highlighted the importance of safeguarding our ideological frontiers that provide a nation with its spiritual and ideological foundations that truly are the fountainhead of the national strength. In an environment when our adversary continues to strike at our Nation’s ideological moorings, the defense of this vital frontier acquires added importance.
Celebrating the Defence day of Pakistan provides us with an appropriate occasion to rejuvenate our resolve and faith in the raison d’etre of our Nation, which was created to provide an opportunity to Muslims of the subcontinent to live life as per their traditions and customs. The threat to its existence have always been there, even multiplied, since 1965. We must realize that military preparedness is the best guarantor of a sustained peace: for weakness invites aggression. As India builds up her military muscle we have to ensure that we retain a balance of conventional and nuclear deterrence to ensure our survival in years to come.
 

BABUR MISSILE HAUNTS INDIA
Shahid Saleem Afzal

The development of missiles in Pakistan cannot be viewed in isolation and is directly related to the security environment in the region. Pakistan has fewer resources than India and therefore cannot spend as much on defence. Pakistan’s policy has been to maintain adequate defences and ensure a minimum level of deterrence required to ward of threats from India.
Pakistan’s missile programme received impetus from Indian developments in the missile field. India’s effort to build a missile system dates back to the 1960’s. U.S. scientists from NASA launched the first small rocket (Nike Apache) from India in 1963. From then on the United States, Britain, France and Russia launched more than 350 small rockets over the next 12 years. Abdul Kalam, now the Indian President, was trained in the United States and visited the space centre where U.S. scout rockets were produced and launched. He returned home to build India’s first space rocket, the Satellite Launch Vehicle-SLV 3, a copy of the Scout. The U.S. also made Kalam’s task easier by supplying unclassified technical reports on the Scout’s design. India produced a medium range missile (Agni) by taking a first stage rocket from a small space launcher and combining it with guidance technology developed by the German Space Agency.
Besides the U.S. and Germany, France gave India technology for the Viking high-thrust liquid rocket motor, which was used on the European Space Agency’s Ariane satellite launcher. Liquid fuel technology helped India develop the Prithvi missile. Derived from a Soviet supplied anti-aircraft missile, the Prithvi became the second stage of Agni. Ever since, India has continued to receive Western assistance in refining her missiles.
Pakistan, inspired by Indian advances in the missile field developed her own programme. In 1961 Pakistan established the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) to oversee space research and development programmes. One year later, Pakistan launched a two stage rocket. Pakistan’s surface to surface ballistic missile programme began in early 1980s with development of Hatf-1 and Hatf-2. The outlines of an integrated missile development programme began to appear only in the 1980s. Since then Pakistan has strived to refine her missiles introducing new technologies.
Both, India and Pakistan have developed several versions of ballistic missiles. But the test firing of cruise missile ‘Babur’ by Pakistan on 11th August 2005 was a different game altogether and stunned India. Babur (Hatf-VII) is a Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) with a 500 kilometres range and is nuclear capable. The technology enables the missile to avoid radar detection and penetrate undetected through any hostile defensive system.
Once in flight the cruise missile has the major advantage that it can fly very low and evade radar thus becoming invisible. This invisibility has to do with the curvature of the earth, the surface of the earth and the fact that microwaves travel through space in straight lines. If the missile stays close to the ground, the microwaves of the radar cannot reach it, as the wave bounces off mountains and other obstacles. When the cruise missile is even further away (about 100 km), the curvature of the earth can protect it, as the straight microwaves cannot follow the shape of the globe. Detection range due to earth’s curvature is typically 13 miles for naval surface units or as close as the next hill for ground based military personnel. Cruise missiles fly low in clutter regions; have very small radar cross-section reflectivity and non-cooperative RF and IR signatures.
According to Janes Defence Weekly (JDW), Babur appears to share several basic similarities with the US BGM-109 Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, with the two being roughly the same size and shape and having a similar wing and engine intake design. According to the magazine, the project began around 1998 and was bolstered by lessons learned from Tomahawk missiles recovered in Pakistan. These US Tomahawks had failed to reach intended targets in an August 1998 strike on Afghanistan. Pakistani officials at the time acknowledged that they had recovered at least two missiles. Pakistan’s scientist Samar Mubarak Mund, who heads the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM), led the Babur programme. Babur is an indigenous cruise missile that has been developed and produced in Pakistan.
No foolproof defence against cruise missiles has been developed. India is procuring the Phalcon radar from Israel. The Phalcon is an “over the horizon system”. It is designed to scan from ground level to about 40,000 feet and all moving objects in this envelope of airspace are detectable except for objects of small radar cross section. A low flying cruise missile for example has a radar cross section of about 0.005 metre at a range of 200 km and may thus reduce the extent of early warning. The missile in all probability would evade detection by the Phalcon radar. Even if detected, that would be at very short ranges and that too if the Indian AWACS happens to be in close proximity of an approaching missile. The Indian fleet of AWACS (3 systems being acquired) would be overstretched in times of tension, as the Indian Air force will have to maintain uninterrupted vigilance by keeping her AWACS fleet airborne for extended periods on lookout of intruding aircraft. Hence surveillance against incoming Babur Cruise Missiles would be a far fetched idea and almost impossible. A Babur missile would be able to sneak in with ease once the Indian AWACS is at the end of her patrol away from the Babur firing site. As the Phalcon does not provide a credible defence against Babur, India has procured and deployed the US Patriot system. This system has its own limitations against cruise missiles.
While war between India and Pakistan may be a far fetched idea in the presence of nuclear arsenals on both sides, Pakistan’s missile development programme, especially with the advent of ‘Babur’, will keep India bogged down in a spending spree to acquire systems which may still not provide foolproof defence. As long as India continues to build up her military strength in the dream of becoming a super power, Pakistan would continue to counter such moves, which do not favour the economy of either country.



PAKISTAN’S WEAPONS OF PEACE
Saifullah Khan

Pakistan and India won independence from Britain in 1947. Since then they have harboured suspicions against each other mainly due to the disputed region of Kashmir. India continues to disregard all UN resolutions on Kashmir adopted since 1948. Consequently, both countries have gone to war thrice since independence.
In 1971, India exploited power disparity for aggression and military intervention to the detriment of Pakistan’s integrity dismembering half of the country. Neither alliances proved reliable nor the Security Council acted to fulfil the pledge in the UN Charter of collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace. Pakistan was compelled to undertake a painful reappraisal of the earlier policy of nuclear abstinence. The conclusion was unavoidable: Pakistan had to develop the capacity to deter another Indian adventure.
In 1974 India exploded the so called ‘peaceful nuclear device’ which greatly altered the dynamics of Indo-Pak security. In the absence of alternatives, acquisition of the nuclear option was conceived as a means of deterrence of aggression and prevention of war. Safeguarding peace and security of the country became the sole objective.
India’s nuclear tests on 11 May 1998 baffled Pakistan. The tests came within less than two months in office of Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister. He was leader of a Hindu nationalist party that advocated India’s need for nuclear weapons as a step toward great-power status. Speaking on the occasion, Brajesh Mishra, the Indian Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary said, “India has a proven capability for a weaponized nuclear program. The tests would help scientists design nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and for different delivery systems.”
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan blamed the West for the Indian tests, mainly the United States, for not moving after Pakistan raised an alarm in Washington in April 1998 about the nuclear plans of the Vajpayee government. “We are surprised at the naivety of the western world, and also of the United States, that they did not take the cautionary signals that we were flashing to them,” the Pakistani foreign minister said in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation.
Following the Indian tests, Indian leaders started issuing threatening statements against Pakistan. This is obvious from Mr. Harkins address to the U.S. Congress on 19 May 1988. He said, “We now see that a key Indian official, according to the news this morning, a key Indian official is warning Pakistan and making very threatening, provocative statements, about the area that we know as Jammu-Kashmir. Indian Home Minister Advani, there is a picture of him here clenching his fist, saying they were, basically, not going to have a peaceful resolution at all of the situation in Kashmir. Advani further said, Nuclear weapons tests have brought about a qualitatively new stage in Indo-Pakistan relations and signifies, even while adhering to the principle of no first strike that India is resolved to deal firmly with Pakistan’s hostile activities in Kashmir. According to the PTI news agency, Parliamentary and Tourism Minister and BJP member Madan Lal Khurana said, “If Pakistan wants to fight another war with us; they should tell us the time and place.”
In the wake of the threatening statements from India, the mood in Islamabad was bound to change. There was an atmosphere of despair and hopelessness. Pakistan had no option but to respond by carrying out nuclear tests of her own on 28 May 1998.
Time has proven that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have prevented India from embarking upon any misadventure. Both countries possessed nuclear weapons long before 1998. India first tested a nuclear bomb in 1974. Pakistan had first built a workable nuclear device in 1982 and by the end of the 1980s it was widely accepted by the international community that Islamabad had become a de facto nuclear power. But Islamabad desisted from carrying out a nuclear test till the Indian tests of May 1998.
The last full-scale war between the two countries was in 1971. While it is impossible to prove that the risk of a nuclear conflict has been the overriding factor preventing another all-out conflict, there is good reason to believe that it has been a significant constraint on policy makers in both countries. In 1987 India conducted a huge military exercise, “Operation Brass-tacks”, near its border with Pakistan. Fearing attack, Islamabad mobilised large numbers of troops and there were genuine fears that war could begin. Rajiv Gandhi was considering launching a conventional strike, when an adviser from his Ministry of Defence urged caution.
In 2002 India deployed hundreds of thousands of troops in forward positions on its border with Pakistan. India’s eventual decision to withdraw those troops can be explained by India’s fear of provoking a retaliatory nuclear strike. It is widely accepted that the nuclearisation of South Asia has restrained military and political leaders. “Nobody dares launch a conventional conflict of any consequence for fear it will escalate to nuclear levels”, according to Professor Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution in Washington.
The U.S. and the Soviet Union had adopted the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) during the cold war period. The doctrine assumes that each side has enough weaponry to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate escalation resulting in both combatants’ total and assured destruction. This MAD scenario is also referred in the context of “nuclear deterrence”. Nuclear nations either have first strike or second strike capability. A nation with first strike capability would be able to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of another nation and thus prevent any nuclear retaliation. Second strike capability indicates that a nation could promise to respond to a nuclear attack with enough force to make such a first attack highly undesirable. This doctrine thus prevents nuclear nations from using nuclear weapons.
The MAD doctrine is applicable to Pakistan and India as well. Following India’s nuclear tests on 11 May 1998 and threatening statements from Indian leaders, Pakistan had no other option but to respond to the Indian tests. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons serve the purpose of deterrence and may be termed as ‘weapons of peace’ since they have made another full scale war between the two countries almost impossible.