SAARC and security concerns
Amjed Jaaved
Aside from the ‘regional developments’, SAARC’s performance record has
never been inspiring. Founded in 1985, it is still largely a
consultative body, which has avoided undertaking any useful
collaborative project in its 20 years of existence. Questions of
national security lie outside the SAARC charter. It is so in spite of
realisation that that almost all successful association of nations -
ASEAN, European Union, and now Organisation of African States – became
effective only when they had security as the first consideration.
India’s insistence on economic links, sans security questions, is
irrational.
Countries trade with each other when they feel secure _ Look at growth
of EU from its early beginnings when Germany and France decided to
forget their historic rivalry and felt comfortable with each other. The
Benelux alliance of Britain, Netherlands and Luxemborg failed to
progress on economic agenda alone. Even ASEAN came into being for
countering the strategic threat of China to the trading routes of the
West.
India thinks that it is poised to grow as a strong global economic
player-India’s growing relations with Israel, USA ASEAN Myanmar and
Thailand. Relations with SAARC countries, particularly Pakistan and
Bangladesh, are irrelevant because of intractable stagnation. Bangladesh
is suspicious of Indian hegemonic designs. Pakistan doubts India’s
sincerity in solving the Kashmir dispute. India is likely to be deaf to
the demilitarisation proposal. The UNCIP desired to demilitarise the J&K
State beforfe holding the plebiscite. The UNCIP representatives could
not convince India to reduce her troops to 18,000 while Pakistan agreed
to 6,000 troops limit.
So if India insists upon only economic aspects, SAARC would never take
off from its current limping pace. India’s attitude may lead to even
dissolution of the SAARC. India not only dwarfs all the other member
countries, but it is the only country that shares a border with all
other SAARC countries. The SAARC countries have a direct bearing on
India’s national security. India should view this reality in the context
of the concept of strategic security instead of territorial integrity
alone. ASEAN’s Declaration October 2003 summit (October 7, 2003 summit
at Bali) realises that security concerns could not be excluded from the
ASEAN’s agenda. The Declaration envisages to establish “an ASEAN
Community” based upon three pillars, “namely political and security
cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation...for
the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity
in the region.”
ASEAN’s leaders also discussed setting up a security community alongside
the economic one, though without any formal military alliance. The
members understood that ASEAN has governments with widely differing
views on governance and political process, including practices in areas
such as suffrage and representation. It encompasses styles of government
ranging from democracy to autocracy and economic systems from
free-market capitalist to nominally communist. Yet security cooperation
could not be ignored.
To realise its dream of emerging as a major global power in 2020, India
should think about three aspects of strategic security._ territorial
security and integrity, economic security, and energy security.
Territorial integrity in the classical sense signifies all the countries
of SAARC providing depth to India’s strategic defence.
From the points of view of territorial integrity and security as well as
economic and energy security, Bangladesh is a very important power on
India’s eastern border. Geographically it dominates India’s lines of
communication with the northeast, a valuable source of oil and other
commodity resources for the rest of India. Northeast is connected to the
rest of India by a narrow corridor, hemmed in by three nations. Of these
Bangladesh on the south is the biggest. The entire corridor is within
artillery range from any of the three countries, notably from the
northwestern salient of Bangladesh.
India’s border of most of the northeastern region lies along Bangladesh.
This part of the border is easy to cross and any meaningful border
control requires the cooperation of the two countries. Bangladesh also
suffers from this vulnerability with India dominating its entire land
border on all sides except for 197 km in remote southeast corner
bordering Myanmar. So, territorial security should be over-riding
considerations in India-Bangladesh relations.
Shashi Upadhyay, in his article India and SAARC: Trends and Perspectives
(India’s Foreign Policy: Emerging Challenges and Paradigms, edited
papers by BC Upreti, Mohan Lal Sharma and SN Kaushik, Kalinga
Publications, 2003) brings out India’s divergent perceptions. He
reminds, “A general apprehension among the neighours was that
cooperation with India in the SAARC framework would mean another form of
Indian hegemony in the region…India feared that the proposed South Asian
forum was an attempt by the smaller neighours to put collective pressure
on India on issues affecting them bilaterally…The perception of the
smaller neighbours about India in South Asia is formulated on the basis
of latter’s memory of British domination from their base in India.
India’s foreign policy too is more or les based on the same geopolitical
compulsions and calculations as that of the British Indian empire.” The
writer highlight Pakistan’s fear that ‘India could capture the Pakistani
market, try to instigate political instability and seek cultural
domination’, Sri Lanka’s fear that ‘India may adopt some form of ‘Monroe
doctrine’ to ‘establish her ’hegemonic role in South Asian affairs’.
To the writer, Bangladesh mooted the idea of SAAC to counter India’s
hegemonic perceptions’. Recent events indicate that Bangladesh’s
apprehensions were correct _ (a) ‘In violation of Mujib-Indira Treaty of
1975 and international norms, India has constructed metalled roads along
the international border. According to the treaty, no country would
construct any infrastructure within 150 yards or in the ‘no man’s land’
of the international border. India has also constructed barbed wire
fence, in some points, just on the zero lines of the international
border’ (Inqilab, June 30, 2005). The newspaper points out, ‘India
presently shares 3,286 kilometres land with Bangladesh. Out of this
India has already constructed barbed-wire fence in 1712 km while the
remaining portion is planned to be completed within 2006….India has
decided to complete the construction of barbed-wire fence, observation
tower and floodlight in the remaining portion of its border within
2006’. (b) Indian army personnel, Antajuddin Kemal was charged on July2,
2005, under Article 164 of Bangladesh Penal Code, for espionage against
Bangladesh. He confessed having transmitted to RAW photographs of
Jaintapur bridge of Sylhet and Simultali Bridge over the River Attrai
(APP, July 2, 2005). (c) On July 1, 2005, Indian Border Security Force
took away twenty barki boats of Bangladeshi (stone-quarry) workers from
Sripur border area of Jaintapur upazila’ (New Nation, July 2, 2005). (d)
‘RAW is the mastermind of the explosion at Tengratila gas field of
Bangladesh’ (Inqilab, July 5, 2005).
Air Commodore D. Kukreja’s article, ‘India and her neighours’ (United
Service Institution Journal April-June 2004), reflects India’s
hegemonistic thinking. He analyses weaknesses of all the SAARC
countries. And then concludes that ‘India should continue its efforts
towards establishing itself as one of the leading players of not only of
the region but also of the world’. For the SAARC to be viable, Delhi
needs to convince her neighbours that she is an opportunity, not a
threat. It is okay for India to be a big brother. But, it should stop
behaving like a big fish (in accordance with Chanakya’s matsynyaya
principle, big fish eats the small one).
WTO talks: What world has at stake in Hong Kong
Pascal Lamy
ALL of the ministers attending the World Trade Organisation’s
ministerial meeting this week in Hong Kong have the same map and
compass, the Doha declaration signed in 2001: Open trade, reduce
barriers and adapt trade rules to the 21st-century economy, making sure
that the interests and needs of developing countries are at the heart of
the results. It is not a responsibility to be taken lightly. At stake is
not only the future of the Doha round of trade talks but the future of
the global trading system itself. These are probably the most complex
set of international commercial negotiations ever undertaken.
Encompassing agriculture, industrial tariffs, trade in services, trade
and environment and many more issues, these negotiations have the
potential to foster much needed growth to bolster development in Africa,
Asia and Latin America and to support a more stable and prosperous
global economy. A prize such as this will not be easily won.
The world’s trade ministers will need political courage in the coming
days. The many people who will benefit from greater trade opening will
remain silent whereas the few who suffer the pain of economic and social
adjustment will be in the streets, beating every drum and insisting that
you do not cave in and you preserve the status quo. This is why we have
had such difficulty in reaching agreement in these talks. We were
supposed to finish the round in January this year. We wanted to use this
Hong Kong meeting to reach the critical template accords in agricultural
trade and cutting tariffs on industrial goods that would have brought us
two-thirds of the way to finishing the round and would have sprung the
entire negotiation into high gear. We were not able to clear those
hurdles.
To avoid the calamity that surrounds failed WTO meetings, we decided to
moderate our objectives for this meeting. Negotiations in July 2004
brought us about 50 per centof the way to a final agreement. In the last
few weeks, much hard work and a relatively new-found willingness to
compromise may have moved us another 5 per centof the way down the road.
In Hong Kong, we will make every effort to build further on this by
seeking to narrow differences in agriculture, industrial products and a
package of agreements for the poorest countries. Make no mistake, this
meeting will be about real negotiations. If we fail to use this occasion
to make genuine efforts at bridging our differences, the people we
represent will want to know why.
So, we finish the round by the end of 2006 or we risk seeing the global
trading system become less relevant. International trade rules were last
updated in 1994, when China, India and Brazil were only just finding
their feet as world trading powers. Imagine what the next decade will
bring. Governments frustrated by a lack of progress in the WTO would
turn to bilateral or regional negotiations as the alternative, in which
obviously smaller and poorer partners would have less clout. And the WTO
would turn into a big litigation machine.
This would be particularly unfortunate given what has already been
achieved in the four years since the Doha round began. Commitments by
rich countries would reduce trade-distorting farm subsidies by much
larger margins than in the previous global negotiations, known as the
Uruguay Round. Export subsidies would be eliminated. Tariffs on
agriculture and industrial products would fall more sharply, too, not
only because of offers already put forward, including by developing
countries, but because governments are near agreement on formulas that
would cut the highest tariffs by the largest margins. Progress has been
made on making the international trading system more compatible with
global environmental rules and on curbing subsidies that lead to
depletion of global fish stocks.
Do we really wish to throw this away? In recent weeks, the ambience at
the WTO’s headquarters in Geneva has improved. All WTO members agreed by
consensus that the draft negotiating document we have forwarded to
ministers should be the basis for negotiations — the first time this has
happened before a ministerial conference. And just last Tuesday we
finally agreed to adapt our rules to ensure that poor countries with no
capacity to manufacture can have access to generic medicines when a
health crisis emerges. This good work brings us to Hong Kong with modest
momentum behind us. I hope I can count on trade ministers to build on
this in the days to come. I hope ministers haven’t forgotten to bring
their political cheque books with them. All members will have to
contribute to the negotiation, even if some will write more zeros than
others. But it will be a wise investment, because in win-win
negotiations like these, everyone will get a high return.
Canberra’s Aborigine tents: Eyesore or national
monument?
Ross Peake
AMID the manicured
lawns in the heart of Australia’s national capital is a stark reminder
of the harsh conditions under which the country’s original inhabitants
live. It is a collection of about 10 tents called the Aboriginal tent
embassy. It was established with just one tent in January 1972 to
protest against what the Aborigines saw as their alienation from the
land by original British settlers.
The embassy site has remained ever since and has become highly symbolic
for the struggle of the Aborigines. In a few weeks it will again be
teeming with people who will arrive from Aboriginal communities in the
outback for an annual protest on Australia Day, January 26. This is the
day the nation celebrates its birth, more than 200 years ago. It’s also
the day on which Aborigines commemorate what they call the invasion of
their land, where they first arrived about 50,000 years ago.
The next gathering or corroboree at the embassy on January 26 promises
to be bigger and fierier than recent ones. The reason is that the John
Howard government wants to close down the embassy. It wants to remove
all the tents and build a modern education centre. The government says
this will be an appropriate way for Aborigines to tell visitors,
including those from overseas, about the inequalities facing their
communities. This demand is sparking a clash of cultures. The handful of
residents of the tent embassy like its ‘untidiness’ because they say
this illustrates the way many Aborigines live in tents or ‘humpies’
constructed from branches and bark or corrugated iron, without running
water or electricity. They want the embassy to stay as it is simply
because it is an eyesore. The Howard government wants to clean up for
the same reason.
The government has previously tried a tough approach against the embassy
residents. The resultant clashes with the police trying to forcibly
remove them made headlines around the country. The residents stayed, the
police left. The new approach is to use the influence of Aboriginal
elders, the tribal leaders in far-flung communities. The majority of the
elders consulted by the government agreed that the embassy has lost
sight of its original aims and that the tents should go. The elders are
very influential under Aboriginal tribal lore. In theory, therefore,
they should be listened to when they say the campers must leave.
When the government issued its new demands a few days ago for the
campers to leave, and to respect the elders’ wishes, the residents
simply vowed to stay, setting the scene for another confrontation. The
tent embassy is on the lawns in front of Old Parliament House, the
building that housed the national parliament until 1988. In the middle
of the lawn the embassy residents maintain smouldering logs that they
call the sacred fire.
It is symbolic of the fires around which Aboriginal elders have made
decisions for their communities for thousands of years. The scene
presents an incongruous setting and that’s just what the embassy
residents seem to want. At lunchtime, well dressed public servants walk
past the collection of tents, upturned chairs, cooking fires and washing
lines, seeming not to notice or care. Indeed, the embassy has been there
so long that it has become a national icon. Overseas visitors have
written that the embassy is a secret treasure, not advertised but a
welcome find, a place to discover the real meaning of Aboriginal
alienation and disadvantage.
The Aborigines maintained a highly sophisticated culture but, partly
because they did not invent the wheel or farming, they are not respected
by a significant proportion of Australia’s population. On top of that,
the Aborigines have suffered the fate of so many indigenous populations
— alcoholism and imported disease have ravaged their communities. The
fact that the embassy has been able to stay so long in the manicured
Parliamentary triangle, the very heart of the capital of Canberra, is a
tribute to tolerance of Australian society. The Howard government is
bent on change, to ‘clean up’ the site, but no one is expecting the
process to be quick or painless.
|