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Life after the charter
Dilip Hiro

THE White House has a sound reason to feel upbeat about the referendum on the Iraqi constitution on October 15. The turnout was satisfactory, and the day passed relatively calmly. What is more, the disaffected Sunnis participated in the voting on a large scale. But this participation may not signal an end to the insurgency, facilitating the withdrawal of Anglo-American troops. Nor would the successful adoption of a democratic constitution in Iraq necessarily presage the flowering of democracy in the rest of the Middle East.
What motivated the change among Sunnis? The answer lies in the changing appreciation of their political prospects in new Iraq. In the January election, as well in the recent referendum, the overall voter turnout was 61 per cent. But whereas participation of the majority Shia Arabs was constant — roughly 70 per cent — there was wide variation among the two minorities, ethnic Kurds and Sunni Arabs, each of them forming one-fifth of the national population.
Last time, Kurds turned up in huge numbers at the polling stations whereas most Sunni Arabs stayed away. This time the roles were reversed. Kurds were lukewarm towards a constitution that lacks a provision for an independent Kurdistan in the near future.
Sunni Arabs decided to register their opposition to a constitution. If Sunnis participate in the forthcoming parliamentary election in December and win proportionate seats, then they will be in a position to impact the parliamentary vote on the amendments to be introduced by the Special Commission in the first four months of the new Parliament. One of the proposals would extend the right to form autonomous region, presently enjoyed only by the mountainous Kurdistan, to the Mesopotamian plains. They perceive this as a preamble to the division of Iraq.
Even if the constitution is ratified, as seems probable, the vote count will establish in concrete terms the extent of their disapproval. Notwithstanding the exact outcome of last week’s referendum, the Sunnis are likely to participate in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The interim parliament resolved that if its successor passes amendments to the constitution by a simple majority within the first four months, then the amended constitution would be put to referendum for ratification. This decision has made Sunnis hopeful that they can still impact the country’s fledgling constitutional machinery. Whether or not they will is a matter of conjecture.
What is certain, though, is that there will be no lessening of the Sunni resistance to the occupation. Most Sunnis remain hostile to the occupiers, partly out of rage at being ousted from their traditionally dominant position in Iraq, and partly out of nationalist sentiment.
Reflecting the prevalent Sunni view, Amir Ismail, a 45-year-old former army colonel in Fallujah, told the UK’s Guardian that the ballot box was a complement for armed revolt, not a substitute. That is, participation in the referendum and offering armed resistance to occupation are not mutually exclusive.
By now, the insurgency has become deeply rooted in central and northwestern Iraq, including Greater Baghdad, which has a quarter of the national population. September was the most violent month in the capital, with 900 corpses arriving at the main morgue. On the eve of the referendum, attacks on the American and Iraqi forces exceeded 100 a day, the highest figure yet.
The alliance between Arab nationalists, represented by the Baath Party, and Islamists remains in place. The allies share the goal of expelling the Anglo-American forces from Iraq. Their well-informed leaders are aware that the latest poll in the US shows that 59 per cent of Americans want the US troops withdrawn “as soon as possible even if Iraq is not completely stable.” Even though the insurgency continues, would the rise of a constitutional state in Iraq inspire democracy elsewhere in the region? Judging by the disparate nature of the multi-ethnic states in the Middle East the answer probably would be, “Not so fast.” One size does not fit all.
No other Arab country is like Iraq, with its ethnic and sectarian divisions between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. None of them shares the history of Mesopotamia, the forerunner to Iraq, which changed hands between the Ottoman Turkish Empire and the Safavid Persian Empire several times until the (Sunni) Ottomans finally incorporated it into their empire in 1638.
By contrast, Egypt, the Arab world’s leading nation, is an ethnically homogenous country with 99 per cent of its citizens being ethnic Arabs, 94 percent Sunni, and the rest Christian. It has also been a highly centralised state. It had a vigorous, albeit corrupt, multi-party system under King Farouq, who was overthrown by military officers in 1952. Since then it has been ruled by military leaders.
A salient fact about Egypt is that, despite being outlawed, the Muslim Brotherhood is the best organised and has popular appeal. Most observers agree that in a free and fair election, it would top the polls. Contrary to the prevalent view in the West that all of Arab world is an undemocratic desert, there are two oases: Lebanon and Yemen. Their experiences, however, underscore the challenges of sowing the seeds of democracy in the Middle East.
Since its establishment as a republic in 1927, Lebanon has been a democracy. Elections have been held regularly in the country except during World War II and the civil war of 1975-90. But its democracy is “confessional.” Its constitution allots parliamentary seats according to the religious make-up of the republic based on a census taken several decades ago.
Such is the inequity of this system that Christians, now comprising about 35 per cent of the population, have half the parliamentary seats. Even though Shia Muslims are twice as numerous as Sunnis, their share of the seats is the same. Despite its stated commitment to democracy, the Bush administration has largely ignored such imbalances.
The only way that North Yemen, ruled by the centrist General People Congress, and South Yemen, governed by the Socialist Party, could unify in 1990 was by being a multi-party democracy. Whereas its multi-party parliamentary elections in 1993 went unnoticed by the Clinton administration, they inspired many leading Saudi citizens to demand such a poll in their country. Democracy indeed can spread across borders, but it will falter unless bolstered by external support.
Early this year, the Bush White House applauded loudly when the kingdom held its first municipal elections in four decades. Yet women were barred from voting, and so distrustful were men of the promised poll that only a quarter of them registered. Of these, only a half bothered to vote. A local wit described the exercise as “a quarter of a quarter election.”
The successful adoption of a federal constitution in Iraq is a notable achievement. Whether it will help maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq as it has existed since 1921 is up in the air. What is certain is that Iraq’s break-up will destabilise the whole region — creating turmoil in which debating the pros and cons of democracy in the Middle East will be a futile exercise. Dilip Hiro is the author of Secrets and Lies: Operation “Iraqi Freedom” and After, and most recently The Iranian Labyrinth: Journeys Through Theocratic Iran and its Furies.

Saddam trial just might point the way to a new Iraq
Cyril Townsend

The late Robin Cook, Jack Straw’s predecessor at the Foreign Office, used to argue in favor of an International Criminal Court by pointing out that if you were a murderer in a small town you would be hunted down and caught, tried and sentenced; but if you were responsible for the brutal deaths of hundreds of thousands you had an excellent chance of never being brought to justice. Gen. Idi Amin of Uganda comes to mind. I recently read the obituary of Dr. Milton Obote. It was suggested he was responsible for the killing of half a million people in Uganda — a greater number than normally attributed to Saddam Hussain. He never faced a judge in court. The United States and the United Kingdom hope to milk the trial of Saddam Hussein, in a specially constructed court inside the blast walls of the Green Zone, for all it is worth. Here, at last, is a cruel dictator, a mass murderer with a penchant for starting wars, facing his accusers through the courtesy of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair. We have a long road to travel but it is not looking quite like that at present. The trial stirs mixed feelings in the Arab world and there are real concerns over some of its aspects.
It has taken too long since he was captured by US soldiers in Tikrit on Dec. 13, 2003 to bring him to trial. It is a complicated matter but it should not have taken nearly two years. After he was captured it was wrong for the US, which should have known better, to allow pictures of him in his underpants and having his mouth examined by a doctor, to be shown around the globe. Even the most depraved and despicable prisoner has rights. I have a feeling that his trial will be regarded as fair in the end. But that will largely depend on the five trial judges, who face great danger when they are away from the heavily protected court room. Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, have warned that the trial will not meet international standards. They point out that many of his defense team, including Anthony Scrivener, QC, a British human rights expert, will not be in court. His defense lawyer, Khalil Dulaimi, has no experience of cases involving human rights or war crimes.
Being totally opposed to capital punishment, I am concerned over a possible death sentence. I appreciate this is not a common view in Iraq. But this is a major worry for both the United Nations and the European Union. I would have much preferred this trial to take place in The Hague, and I believe that would have produced a better trial. However, America was never going to be so persuaded. We all are anxious that this trial will have a beneficial effect in Iraq. In the words of The Times’ editorial (Oct. 19):-
“Without such a trial, there can be no reconciliation, no political emergence from Saddam’s malign shadow and no justice for the victims in Iraq and in Iran.” We will hear cries from Saddam Hussein’s supporters, and amazingly there remain all too many, that this event is an example of “victor’s justice”. In the real world the vanquished are hardly likely to organize trials! I am sure many Nazis in Germany only saw the Nuremberg trials in that light. Some will claim the American influence has been overpowering and that the occupying powers were not authorized to set up such a trial either directly or through pro-American Iraqis. The American and British governments claim they have kept their distance, although offering legal advice to the prosecution which asked for it. The Americans have put up some 60 million pounds to finance this special court and will, inevitably, be responsible for the security for all at the trial. Saddam Hussein’s supporters are likely to try to disrupt the proceedings in any way they can.
Although the court is concentrating on the massacre of villagers in Dujail in 1982 — for the documentary evidence is readily available — there is a fear that this historic trial will go on too long. Slobodan Milosevic has used his trial for war crimes in The Hague as a personal stage to justify his past policies and to score points off his political rivals. As a result, the standing of that court has experienced some damage. The Iraqi judges, who were appointed under an interim Iraqi government, must strike a difficult balance between the right of the defendant to have his say, and the need to eliminate time wasting. One must live in hope. This trial just might point the way to a new Iraq free from corruption and based on the rule of law.

Cuba and Venezuela: Anything more than ideological affinity?
Gwynne Dyer
 
“It wouldn’t be outrageous,” said Ana Faya of her suspicion that Cuba and Venezuela might unite one of these days. After all, the senior analyst at the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) in Ottawa pointed out, the idea of uniting Latin American countries has been around since the revolutions of Bolivar and San Martin against Spain almost two centuries ago. And she certainly knows how Cuban Communists think: For ten years, until she fled to Canada in 2000, she was an official of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. The Cuban regime’s biggest problem by far is: Who succeeds Fidel Castro? The official answer is his youngest brother Raul, currently vice president and defense minister, but ideologically committed Cuban communists still have problems with the idea that political power can be inherited. They also suspect Raul of being soft on capitalism.
Fidel Castro has had a remarkably rapid recovery from a fall last October that broke his arm and shattered his kneecap in eight places, but he will turn eighty next August. He has ruled Cuba for 46 years, but he will soon have to be replaced. If the revolution is to survive, his replacement had better be a man with contemporary revolutionary credentials, a man with the charisma and resources to keep the show on the road. A man, perhaps, like Hugo Chavez. Chavez is Venezuelan, not Cuban, but that may not be as big a problem as it seems. Many people on the left in Latin America, including “Bolivarians” like Chavez and most of the Marxists, have always seen the division of the region into more than a dozen Spanish-speaking countries as a misfortune, not a law of nature. Cuba and Venezuela are already closely tied economically and politically, and Chavez, though neither a communist nor a dictator, shares Castro’s social goals and his hostility to the United States. It just might work.
As an analyst, Ana Faya monitors what senior people in the Cuban regime and in the governments of neighboring countries are saying in public, because it probably bears some relationship, however distant, to their real intentions. And here is what she has been hearing recently. On Oct. 5, 2005, at the signing of the 6th Joint Commission on the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between Cuba and Venezuela, Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage D?vila said: “Our country has been accused of not having a democracy, but in events like this one we realize that we are one of the most democratic countries of the world, because we have two presidents, Fidel and Ch?vez.” And Chavez replied: “Cuba and Venezuela have joined together, and at this point, the world should know that our fate is sealed, that these two homelands, which deep down are one, are opening a new road at whatever cost.”
It could be just the usual windy rhetoric, but suppose it isn’t. Suppose there actually is a plan to unite the two countries, with Chavez and Castro as co-presidents, and to leave Hugo Chavez in power over both countries when Fidel, thirty years his senior, finally dies. “Castro has the power and the credibility,” Faya noted. “It’s a real possibility.” But, she added, “It should take place while (Fidel) Castro is still in charge.” It’s certainly not a plan that would appeal to Raul. Where would Castro have got such a radical idea? One of his political idols as a young man was the Egyptian revolutionary Gamal Abdel Nasser (whom he met soon after taking power on his famous trip to New York in 1960). And at that time Nasser was busy uniting Egypt, Syria and Libya in the United Arab Republic. It didn’t last very long, but that doesn’t mean that a similar experiment in Spanish-speaking America would also be doomed to failure. One great attraction of a political merger with Venezuela for Castro is that Cuba would suddenly gain access to the cash flow and the political clout of a major oil producer.
As for Chavez, his motives and his loyalties are transparently Bolivarian. Visiting Italy last week, he went to Monte Sacro, near Rome, where Simon Bolivar made his famous oath to free Latin America from Spanish rule exactly two centuries ago. Bolivar had said: “I shall not give rest to my arm nor respite to my soul until I have broken the chains that oppress us by the will of the Spanish power.” Chavez declared that Venezuelans “should not rest their arms or their souls until we have broken the chains that oppress our people due to the will of the North American Empire.” History is full of surprises, and this could be one that really overturns normal expectations.

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