Life after the charter
Dilip Hiro
THE White House has a sound reason to feel upbeat about the referendum
on the Iraqi constitution on October 15. The turnout was satisfactory,
and the day passed relatively calmly. What is more, the disaffected
Sunnis participated in the voting on a large scale. But this
participation may not signal an end to the insurgency, facilitating the
withdrawal of Anglo-American troops. Nor would the successful adoption
of a democratic constitution in Iraq necessarily presage the flowering
of democracy in the rest of the Middle East.
What motivated the change among Sunnis? The answer lies in the changing
appreciation of their political prospects in new Iraq. In the January
election, as well in the recent referendum, the overall voter turnout
was 61 per cent. But whereas participation of the majority Shia Arabs
was constant — roughly 70 per cent — there was wide variation among the
two minorities, ethnic Kurds and Sunni Arabs, each of them forming
one-fifth of the national population.
Last time, Kurds turned up in huge numbers at the polling stations
whereas most Sunni Arabs stayed away. This time the roles were reversed.
Kurds were lukewarm towards a constitution that lacks a provision for an
independent Kurdistan in the near future.
Sunni Arabs decided to register their opposition to a constitution. If
Sunnis participate in the forthcoming parliamentary election in December
and win proportionate seats, then they will be in a position to impact
the parliamentary vote on the amendments to be introduced by the Special
Commission in the first four months of the new Parliament. One of the
proposals would extend the right to form autonomous region, presently
enjoyed only by the mountainous Kurdistan, to the Mesopotamian plains.
They perceive this as a preamble to the division of Iraq.
Even if the constitution is ratified, as seems probable, the vote count
will establish in concrete terms the extent of their disapproval.
Notwithstanding the exact outcome of last week’s referendum, the Sunnis
are likely to participate in the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
The interim parliament resolved that if its successor passes amendments
to the constitution by a simple majority within the first four months,
then the amended constitution would be put to referendum for
ratification. This decision has made Sunnis hopeful that they can still
impact the country’s fledgling constitutional machinery. Whether or not
they will is a matter of conjecture.
What is certain, though, is that there will be no lessening of the Sunni
resistance to the occupation. Most Sunnis remain hostile to the
occupiers, partly out of rage at being ousted from their traditionally
dominant position in Iraq, and partly out of nationalist sentiment.
Reflecting the prevalent Sunni view, Amir Ismail, a 45-year-old former
army colonel in Fallujah, told the UK’s Guardian that the ballot box was
a complement for armed revolt, not a substitute. That is, participation
in the referendum and offering armed resistance to occupation are not
mutually exclusive.
By now, the insurgency has become deeply rooted in central and
northwestern Iraq, including Greater Baghdad, which has a quarter of the
national population. September was the most violent month in the
capital, with 900 corpses arriving at the main morgue. On the eve of the
referendum, attacks on the American and Iraqi forces exceeded 100 a day,
the highest figure yet.
The alliance between Arab nationalists, represented by the Baath Party,
and Islamists remains in place. The allies share the goal of expelling
the Anglo-American forces from Iraq. Their well-informed leaders are
aware that the latest poll in the US shows that 59 per cent of Americans
want the US troops withdrawn “as soon as possible even if Iraq is not
completely stable.” Even though the insurgency continues, would the rise
of a constitutional state in Iraq inspire democracy elsewhere in the
region? Judging by the disparate nature of the multi-ethnic states in
the Middle East the answer probably would be, “Not so fast.” One size
does not fit all.
No other Arab country is like Iraq, with its ethnic and sectarian
divisions between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. None of them shares the
history of Mesopotamia, the forerunner to Iraq, which changed hands
between the Ottoman Turkish Empire and the Safavid Persian Empire
several times until the (Sunni) Ottomans finally incorporated it into
their empire in 1638.
By contrast, Egypt, the Arab world’s leading nation, is an ethnically
homogenous country with 99 per cent of its citizens being ethnic Arabs,
94 percent Sunni, and the rest Christian. It has also been a highly
centralised state. It had a vigorous, albeit corrupt, multi-party system
under King Farouq, who was overthrown by military officers in 1952.
Since then it has been ruled by military leaders.
A salient fact about Egypt is that, despite being outlawed, the Muslim
Brotherhood is the best organised and has popular appeal. Most observers
agree that in a free and fair election, it would top the polls. Contrary
to the prevalent view in the West that all of Arab world is an
undemocratic desert, there are two oases: Lebanon and Yemen. Their
experiences, however, underscore the challenges of sowing the seeds of
democracy in the Middle East.
Since its establishment as a republic in 1927, Lebanon has been a
democracy. Elections have been held regularly in the country except
during World War II and the civil war of 1975-90. But its democracy is
“confessional.” Its constitution allots parliamentary seats according to
the religious make-up of the republic based on a census taken several
decades ago.
Such is the inequity of this system that Christians, now comprising
about 35 per cent of the population, have half the parliamentary seats.
Even though Shia Muslims are twice as numerous as Sunnis, their share of
the seats is the same. Despite its stated commitment to democracy, the
Bush administration has largely ignored such imbalances.
The only way that North Yemen, ruled by the centrist General People
Congress, and South Yemen, governed by the Socialist Party, could unify
in 1990 was by being a multi-party democracy. Whereas its multi-party
parliamentary elections in 1993 went unnoticed by the Clinton
administration, they inspired many leading Saudi citizens to demand such
a poll in their country. Democracy indeed can spread across borders, but
it will falter unless bolstered by external support.
Early this year, the Bush White House applauded loudly when the kingdom
held its first municipal elections in four decades. Yet women were
barred from voting, and so distrustful were men of the promised poll
that only a quarter of them registered. Of these, only a half bothered
to vote. A local wit described the exercise as “a quarter of a quarter
election.”
The successful adoption of a federal constitution in Iraq is a notable
achievement. Whether it will help maintain the territorial integrity of
Iraq as it has existed since 1921 is up in the air. What is certain is
that Iraq’s break-up will destabilise the whole region — creating
turmoil in which debating the pros and cons of democracy in the Middle
East will be a futile exercise. Dilip Hiro is the author of Secrets and
Lies: Operation “Iraqi Freedom” and After, and most recently The Iranian
Labyrinth: Journeys Through Theocratic Iran and its Furies.
Saddam trial just might point the way to a new
Iraq
Cyril Townsend
The late
Robin Cook, Jack Straw’s predecessor at the Foreign Office, used to
argue in favor of an International Criminal Court by pointing out that
if you were a murderer in a small town you would be hunted down and
caught, tried and sentenced; but if you were responsible for the brutal
deaths of hundreds of thousands you had an excellent chance of never
being brought to justice. Gen. Idi Amin of Uganda comes to mind. I
recently read the obituary of Dr. Milton Obote. It was suggested he was
responsible for the killing of half a million people in Uganda — a
greater number than normally attributed to Saddam Hussain. He never
faced a judge in court. The United States and the United Kingdom hope to
milk the trial of Saddam Hussein, in a specially constructed court
inside the blast walls of the Green Zone, for all it is worth. Here, at
last, is a cruel dictator, a mass murderer with a penchant for starting
wars, facing his accusers through the courtesy of President Bush and
Prime Minister Blair. We have a long road to travel but it is not
looking quite like that at present. The trial stirs mixed feelings in
the Arab world and there are real concerns over some of its aspects.
It has taken too long since he was captured by US soldiers in Tikrit on
Dec. 13, 2003 to bring him to trial. It is a complicated matter but it
should not have taken nearly two years. After he was captured it was
wrong for the US, which should have known better, to allow pictures of
him in his underpants and having his mouth examined by a doctor, to be
shown around the globe. Even the most depraved and despicable prisoner
has rights. I have a feeling that his trial will be regarded as fair in
the end. But that will largely depend on the five trial judges, who face
great danger when they are away from the heavily protected court room.
Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, have warned that the
trial will not meet international standards. They point out that many of
his defense team, including Anthony Scrivener, QC, a British human
rights expert, will not be in court. His defense lawyer, Khalil Dulaimi,
has no experience of cases involving human rights or war crimes.
Being totally opposed to capital punishment, I am concerned over a
possible death sentence. I appreciate this is not a common view in Iraq.
But this is a major worry for both the United Nations and the European
Union. I would have much preferred this trial to take place in The
Hague, and I believe that would have produced a better trial. However,
America was never going to be so persuaded. We all are anxious that this
trial will have a beneficial effect in Iraq. In the words of The Times’
editorial (Oct. 19):-
“Without such a trial, there can be no reconciliation, no political
emergence from Saddam’s malign shadow and no justice for the victims in
Iraq and in Iran.” We will hear cries from Saddam Hussein’s supporters,
and amazingly there remain all too many, that this event is an example
of “victor’s justice”. In the real world the vanquished are hardly
likely to organize trials! I am sure many Nazis in Germany only saw the
Nuremberg trials in that light. Some will claim the American influence
has been overpowering and that the occupying powers were not authorized
to set up such a trial either directly or through pro-American Iraqis.
The American and British governments claim they have kept their
distance, although offering legal advice to the prosecution which asked
for it. The Americans have put up some 60 million pounds to finance this
special court and will, inevitably, be responsible for the security for
all at the trial. Saddam Hussein’s supporters are likely to try to
disrupt the proceedings in any way they can.
Although the court is concentrating on the massacre of villagers in
Dujail in 1982 — for the documentary evidence is readily available —
there is a fear that this historic trial will go on too long. Slobodan
Milosevic has used his trial for war crimes in The Hague as a personal
stage to justify his past policies and to score points off his political
rivals. As a result, the standing of that court has experienced some
damage. The Iraqi judges, who were appointed under an interim Iraqi
government, must strike a difficult balance between the right of the
defendant to have his say, and the need to eliminate time wasting. One
must live in hope. This trial just might point the way to a new Iraq
free from corruption and based on the rule of law.
Cuba and Venezuela: Anything
more than ideological affinity?
Gwynne Dyer
“It wouldn’t be outrageous,” said Ana Faya of her suspicion that Cuba
and Venezuela might unite one of these days. After all, the senior
analyst at the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) in Ottawa
pointed out, the idea of uniting Latin American countries has been
around since the revolutions of Bolivar and San Martin against Spain
almost two centuries ago. And she certainly knows how Cuban Communists
think: For ten years, until she fled to Canada in 2000, she was an
official of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. The
Cuban regime’s biggest problem by far is: Who succeeds Fidel Castro? The
official answer is his youngest brother Raul, currently vice president
and defense minister, but ideologically committed Cuban communists still
have problems with the idea that political power can be inherited. They
also suspect Raul of being soft on capitalism.
Fidel Castro has had a remarkably rapid recovery from a fall last
October that broke his arm and shattered his kneecap in eight places,
but he will turn eighty next August. He has ruled Cuba for 46 years, but
he will soon have to be replaced. If the revolution is to survive, his
replacement had better be a man with contemporary revolutionary
credentials, a man with the charisma and resources to keep the show on
the road. A man, perhaps, like Hugo Chavez. Chavez is Venezuelan, not
Cuban, but that may not be as big a problem as it seems. Many people on
the left in Latin America, including “Bolivarians” like Chavez and most
of the Marxists, have always seen the division of the region into more
than a dozen Spanish-speaking countries as a misfortune, not a law of
nature. Cuba and Venezuela are already closely tied economically and
politically, and Chavez, though neither a communist nor a dictator,
shares Castro’s social goals and his hostility to the United States. It
just might work.
As an analyst, Ana Faya monitors what senior people in the Cuban regime
and in the governments of neighboring countries are saying in public,
because it probably bears some relationship, however distant, to their
real intentions. And here is what she has been hearing recently. On Oct.
5, 2005, at the signing of the 6th Joint Commission on the Comprehensive
Cooperation Agreement between Cuba and Venezuela, Cuban Vice President
Carlos Lage D?vila said: “Our country has been accused of not having a
democracy, but in events like this one we realize that we are one of the
most democratic countries of the world, because we have two presidents,
Fidel and Ch?vez.” And Chavez replied: “Cuba and Venezuela have joined
together, and at this point, the world should know that our fate is
sealed, that these two homelands, which deep down are one, are opening a
new road at whatever cost.”
It could be just the usual windy rhetoric, but suppose it isn’t. Suppose
there actually is a plan to unite the two countries, with Chavez and
Castro as co-presidents, and to leave Hugo Chavez in power over both
countries when Fidel, thirty years his senior, finally dies. “Castro has
the power and the credibility,” Faya noted. “It’s a real possibility.”
But, she added, “It should take place while (Fidel) Castro is still in
charge.” It’s certainly not a plan that would appeal to Raul. Where
would Castro have got such a radical idea? One of his political idols as
a young man was the Egyptian revolutionary Gamal Abdel Nasser (whom he
met soon after taking power on his famous trip to New York in 1960). And
at that time Nasser was busy uniting Egypt, Syria and Libya in the
United Arab Republic. It didn’t last very long, but that doesn’t mean
that a similar experiment in Spanish-speaking America would also be
doomed to failure. One great attraction of a political merger with
Venezuela for Castro is that Cuba would suddenly gain access to the cash
flow and the political clout of a major oil producer.
As for Chavez, his motives and his loyalties are transparently
Bolivarian. Visiting Italy last week, he went to Monte Sacro, near Rome,
where Simon Bolivar made his famous oath to free Latin America from
Spanish rule exactly two centuries ago. Bolivar had said: “I shall not
give rest to my arm nor respite to my soul until I have broken the
chains that oppress us by the will of the Spanish power.” Chavez
declared that Venezuelans “should not rest their arms or their souls
until we have broken the chains that oppress our people due to the will
of the North American Empire.” History is full of surprises, and this
could be one that really overturns normal expectations.
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