There is nothing personal about suspicion, General; it comes, to indulge in a mild pun, with the territory. If President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has a fault, it is to take things personally. When Lyse Doucet of the BBC asked him how he could allay suspicions that Indians might entertain about his radical offer to melt the Line of Control in Kashmir, he blew a minor fuse, answering on the lines of, “If they are suspicious about me then I will get suspicious about them” etc. There is also institutional suspicion in relations between warring neighbors, as well suspicion of institutions. The Pakistan military establishment might harbor suspicions about India that are as justified, within the framework of its commitments and compulsions, as the Indian military establishment’s are about Pakistan. That has to be factored into any equation that seeks to balance the betrayals of the past against hopes about the future.
And yet, paradoxically, that personal element is also an asset. Pakistan’s peace initiatives toward India are propelled to a great extent by the dynamic of Gen. Musharraf’s personal will. He is sincere, and has given as much evidence of his sincerity as is perhaps realistically possible. He also believes that Dr. Manmohan Singh is equally sincere in his desire for peace, and has said so publicly; when personality is critical, trust is vital.
India’s prime minister is in politics but not of politics. Even those who disagree with him never go so far as to doubt his sincerity. Dr. Manmohan Singh, who keeps his private thoughts private, has not given us too many hints about what he thinks of Gen. Musharraf, but the circumstantial evidence is positive. There would not have been a four-hour dinner between them in New York in September otherwise.
I cannot think of a parallel relationship between two serving chief executives of India and Pakistan. There was mistrust and worse between Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, which spilled over into the brief Nehru-Liaquat Ali Khan era. Liaquat’s civilian successors did not merit much attention from Nehru. By the time Ayub Khan came to power in Pakistan’s first military coup, and stabilized his regime, Nehru began to fade. Ayub Khan went to war with Lal Bahadur Shastri; ironically, the two established a certain rapport during the post-conflict peace talks in Tashkent. It was, tragically, too late, for Shastri did not survive Tashkent. Yahya Khan’s shallow obstinacy could hardly be good news for either his country or the subcontinent; his legacy is well known. Theoretically, the Indira Gandhi-Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto relationship held promise. Both were populist in their politics and sophisticated in their personal lives. But they spent their time mopping up the dire consequences of war.
The oddest couple was surely Zia ul-Haq and Morarji Desai. They had more in common than you might think. Both were 19th century prohibitionist puritans whose efforts at social reform energized a sectarian base. Both were pro-American in their policies, Desai by ideological preference and Zia by utilitarian choice. They came to power at the same time, but since only one of them was a democrat, they left power on different dates and through different routes. Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi shared a similar inheritance as well as a similar problem: They were disliked by their entrenched power centers, and were destabilized when they tried to reach out to each other.
The ‘90s disappeared in alternate cycles of uncertainty and instability. The two bombwallahs were the second odd couple: Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. They took one dramatic leap forward with the Lahore agreement, and were equally stunned when the leap ended up in a somersault. The relationship between Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf was always clouded on the Indian side by the memory of Kargil, in which trust was the first casualty. Their faces at the first official meal of the infamous Agra Summit, a lunch in Delhi, were worth a thousand pictures. Vajpayee’s face was ice, Musharraf’s stone. Lal Krishna Advani’s face, for those who might be interested, was granite punctuated by two very careful eyes. Trust began to develop only during Vajpayee’s second gambit for peace, which went to ground when time ran out on him.
Manmohan Singh and Musharraf, having developed the trust, have time on their side. Experience, their own and that of others, should warn them that time is an unreliable ally, always prone to slip and crash on the unforeseen.
It is boring to repeat that a terrible tragedy can be converted into a momentous opportunity. But was the general running ahead of history when he made the most radical, even audacious, offer in six decades of confrontation over Kashmir? Analysts have suggested that by military training Gen. Musharraf is a better tactician than a strategist. However, the offer to melt the border that separates two sides of Kashmir so that people can help one another in the aftermath of a numbing earthquake is a strategic masterstroke. It was made in the context of a crisis, but the idea has already been stretched toward an undefined timeframe. Is this the way to a solution of the one problem that has prevented India and Pakistan from being natural, friendly neighbors?
Much depends on how you define a solution. Is the solution about geography, or is it about people? Is it about Kashmir or Kashmiris? Geography is possessive, acquisitive. Once we shift the radar to the problems of Kashmiris, and how to minimize them if we cannot end them, then ideas, options and opportunities open up.
Gen. Musharraf says that the world is aware of his ideas, and uses some key words: Identify ... demilitarize ... self-governance ... superstructure (to oversee the process). Each of these terms is loaded with snares and infested with barbed wire from the past, not the least of them being identity. The map of Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947, before the first war started, was vastly different from what it is today, and I am not talking about the Line of Control, which came into being at the end of that war and has not shifted since. Demilitarization will require trust between institutions much more than between individuals, however important the latter might be. Self-governance is a comfortable thought; the means of achieving the authority that will govern less so. Will such governments be democratically elected? Definitions of democracy are not the same on either side of the Line of Control, and indeed differ sharply within Pakistan. Democracy does not mean the same thing to Pervez Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. Long before thoughts of superstructure engage us, the structure might be straddled with hurdles. And so on. But what is undeniable is that Gen. Musharraf has thrown an innovative lasso across the divide in a search for answers.
The critical fact of the Indian response was its immediacy. The suggestion had barely been made when Delhi said yes. A principle has been established, and we are already way beyond a bus route between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad. Yasin Malik has already tested the principle, and has reached Pakistani Kashmir with funds for relief. A year ago, the idea of Yasin Malik, or any member of the Hurriyat, visiting Pakistan was considered unacceptable by Delhi. Today we are discussing means of normalizing contacts between a divided people. If there is some applause in the air it is only because both hands are clapping.
It is my view that the dialogue between India and Pakistan works when handled in incremental, digestible portions. Sometimes the increments are large, as in this practical move toward soft borders, but, since they are unencumbered by other demands, they become, slowly, digestible. The present chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed (who may not be chief minister by the time Eid comes along) has suggested to Delhi that five crossing points be identified to turn the idea into reality. Another step, that is, in the digestion process. If you continue to change reality on the ground, minds will continue to open at the higher reaches of power.
Suspicion is a fog. The dense Kashmir fog is streaked with too much blood. A fog never lifts suddenly, except in fantasy. It clears slowly, invisibly, and only if the environment improves. The Kashmir fog has overpowered the day and seized the night. But it is in the ability of the leaders of India and Pakistan to improve the environment. This subcontinent suffered a political earthquake nearly six decades ago. The last bit of uncleared debris lies in Kashmir. A natural earthquake has given Gen. Musharraf and Dr. Manmohan Singh what can only be described as a God-sent chance to clear that debris.

If implemented in good faith, LOC proposal may lead to peace in S. Asia
Nasim Zehra

During a press conference in Muzaffarabad on Oct. 18 Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf announced: “We will allow any amount of people coming from across LOC to meet their relatives and assist with the reconstruction effort.” The president also told the media the proposal “is being put across to New Delhi through you”. Musharraf added that “the modalities of this need to be worked out.” He reiterated Pakistan’s earlier position that the Indian military will not be allowed to come from across the LOC. It was a proposal made in the context of the situation created by earthquake. However discussions on opening new points for the movement of Kashmiris across the LOC have been going on since last year. The latest Pakistani proposal was however different in many respects. For one, it was in response to the keenness of Kashmiris, especially in Indian Kashmir, to meet and help the calamity-stricken families and friends in Azad Kashmir.
Within hours of Gen. Musharraf’s statement New Delhi responded. Welcoming the offer, the Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman said “this is in line with India’s advocacy of greater movement across the LOC for relief and closer people-to-people contacts. .... India is willing to facilitate such movement but we await word from Pakistan about the practical detail of implementing this intention.” On Oct. 19 Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson told an English daily that internal discussions were taking place and “we hope to contact the government of India shortly”. But on Oct. 20 the newly appointed chief of the Relief Commission Maj. Gen. Farooq Ahmed Khan said, “we regret that India had rejected the positive proposal of opening the LOC to facilitate meeting between the divided families.” According to media reports, he also stated that India had attached conditions to Musharraf’s proposal. The same day Pakistan’s foreign spokesperson Tasneem Aslam told The News: “We do not have any information of India turning down this proposal. I have no confirmation about this refusal.”
It appears there was confusion within Pakistani establishment about what to do with the LOC proposal. This is the only explanation for the failure to formally send the president’s proposal to New Delhi immediately, suggesting an urgent meeting to work out the modalities. To compound the confusion, on Oct. 21 the relief commissioner again made an observation on the opening of LOC. This time he reportedly said that India should not wait for a formal proposal from Pakistan on opening the LOC. He said “long parleys on modalities to open the LOC means the window is closing .... Welcoming and putting it into a practical shape is something else”. Clearly in the absence of any formal proposal from Pakistan, asking India to practically implement the LOC crossing is unrealistic. In the past India had sought the setting up of five meeting points along the LOC where Kashmiris could meet but not actually travel across into Azad or Indian Kashmir.
Meanwhile, the entire Kashmiri leadership including the APHC’s Mirwaiz and Yasin Malik and those engaged in Kashmir’s electoral politics like Farooq Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti have called for the early opening of the LOC. Mirwaiz has asked for the opening of the seven road links between the divided Kashmir. This includes Kargil-Skardu, Uri-Muzaffarabad, Tangdar-Teetwal. Obviously the opening up of the LOC involves many questions: Who would travel across the LOC? Would it just be Kashmiris wanting to meet families and friends or those keen to participate in relief and reconstruction work? Would private citizens in their individual capacity or organizations involved in relief work be allowed to cross the LOC? What about the Pakistani and Indian citizens? How soon would clearance for crossing the LOC be given to intended traveler from either side and what would be the duration of the stay?
These are not complicated issues. The profile of travelers from both sides of Kashmir using the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service should be acceptable for the proposed LOC crossing too. Decisions on these issues will also determine whether joint Kashmiri relief operations can be conducted or if Pakistan’s Information Minister Sheikh Rashid can cross the LOC with 25 truckloads of relief goods. Rashid says he wants to travel to the earthquake-hit Uri and other areas on the Indian side of Kashmir. Once the safe travel routes are identified, Pakistan should welcome travel by Kashmiris in their individual capacities to meet their dear ones in Azad Kashmir. Quick clearance mechanisms should be devised for Kashmiris on both sides of the border and their travel expedited. The relief commissioner fears that the time spent on working out the modalities will mean the “window is closing.” The window should not be allowed to close. Now is the time Kashmiris want to be with their own. In these tragic times the opening of the LOC for hassle-free travel for Kashmiris would provide a healing touch. Solidarity in times of suffering can be a great balm. This solidarity will also, in the long run, facilitate the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

Serbians may reconcile to Kosovo gaining independence
Tim Judah
 
The United Nations Security Council convenes at 10 a.m. this morning. By lunchtime it is expected to have made a momentous decision, which could lead to the birth of a new state in Europe. The 15-member council is to recommend that talks on the future status of Kosovo, a territory bitterly contested between Serbs and the majority ethnic Albanians, begin as soon as possible. Meeting in Rome last Thursday, diplomats from the main Western countries that deal with the former Yugoslavia plus Russia agreed on what will happen today so as to make sure that there are no last minute hitches. Ever since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999 the territory has been under the jurisdiction of the UN although legally it remains a part of Serbia. The process, which will begin today, is expected to end Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo. The council will be addressed today by Kai Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who drew up the report on Kosovo. Within days of the meeting, Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, is set to appoint Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president, to lead talks.
After a period of shuttle diplomacy he is expected to draw up a draft plan for the future of the territory that will propose what is known as “conditional independence”. This means that Kosovo will no longer be part of Serbia but its independence will, for a transitional period, be curtailed, rather like that of Bosnia where policy is shaped by a high-level representative of the international community. While Serbia will resist the ending of its sovereignty over Kosovo, diplomats say that Russia, on whom the Serbian leadership was hoping for support, has already betrayed it. In 1999 NATO mounted a 78-day bombing campaign against what was then still known as Yugoslavia. The bombing came after talks failed to produce a settlement between Serbs and separatist Albanian guerrillas.
Ever since, Kosovo has been run by the UN, although progressively power has been transferred to its own elected authorities. Some 100,000 Serbs remain in Kosovo out of a total population of two million, more than 90 percent of whom are ethnic Albanians who have consistently shown that they want independence. Of the Serbs who remain, most live in enclaves, some of which have to be protected by NATO-led peacekeepers. In March 2004 ethnic Albanian rioting left 19 dead and some 4,000 Serbs and Roma were ethnically cleansed. In his report Eide described inter-ethnic relations as “grim”.
Serbia says the Albanians can have virtually anything they want except full independence. Albanians say that everything is negotiable except independence. Indeed, a movement is now gathering pace in Kosovo to oppose the coming talks. It is led by Albin Kurti, a 30-year-old former political prisoner who is organizing supporters to be ready to take to the streets. He says he is against talks because they aim at compromise and there can be no compromise on the question of independence. Diplomatic sources believe that the talks will last up to nine months after which the main Western powers will then act to impose “conditional independence” on Kosovo. The Albanians will probably accept this, plus a high level of autonomy for Serbian areas. Serb leaders, however, resigned as they may be to the reality of the situation, say they will never formally accept the loss of Kosovo, which they regard as the cradle of their civilization. In principle, Kosovo Albanians will be led into talks by Ibrahim Rugova, their president and the best-known symbol of Kosovo. However, Rugova is extremely ill with lung cancer. If he dies or becomes incapacitated, this is expected to weaken the Albanian negotiating position.