ISRAELI Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his right wing government could not have possibly envisioned a more gratifying scenario to the post-disengagement period than the one effectively advancing in the Gaza Strip. Events on the ground all point to the disquieting conclusion that internal Palestinian strife in Gaza is imminent and that Israel will continue to determine the future of the Occupied Territories, unabated and aided by the US government, along with the total marginalisation of the rest of the international community. More, Sharon has intensified his forceful rhetoric, warning that Israel will ruthlessly respond to any supposed Palestinian provocation after the pullout.
It is obvious that Israel’s military strategists are very concerned that the Israeli move might be interpreted as an indication of military failure, following the same line of thinking that accompanied the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000. The Sharon government is determined to closely monitor and control the narrative surrounding its pullout from Gaza. On one hand, it wants to convey to its right wing constituency that the move is merely tactical and aimed at strengthening Israel’s control over the more strategic settlements of Occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank. On the other hand, it is promoting the pullout internationally as a painful concession for the sake of peace with its ever-ungrateful Palestinian neighbours.
TV images of weeping settlers being “uprooted” from their homes in the Gaza settlements evoked untold emotions, and yet they have failed to honestly address the unspeakable injustices done to the Palestinians through the illegal presence of those same settlers: the uncompensated financial loss, the virtual and perpetual imprisonment within Gaza, the daily murders committed in the name of protecting the settlements and so forth. The Israeli narrative has successfully crossed out much of this relevant context, under which the entire Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories continues to be subjugated.
Palestinians, who have ultimately conceded to the much-resisted unilateral Israeli action, have attempted to fathom, thus propagate the Israeli move in a way that might prove politically and strategically beneficial. According to a media plan drafted by the PA’s Interior Ministry, the withdrawal was ‘a political victory’ for “the peace and moderation camp.” The Palestinian Authority was obliged, understandably so, to construct its own reading of the Israeli move, of which the PA was, in fact, the least relevant factor.
Hamas on the other hand, joined to a lesser extent by other factions, has celebrated the withdrawal as a victory for armed resistance, one that was comparable in meaning and magnitude to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Among the poor and destitute refugees throughout the Occupied Territories and in diaspora, the Hamas narrative is the most prevailing.
Almost immediately after the Gaza pullout, a violent Israeli assault is evident. Frequent deadly raids and bombardments, joined with Israeli air force jets breaking sound barriers over the Gaza sky several times a day triggering sonic booms are meant as a cruel reminder of Israel’s sheer military advantage over the incarcerated population of the Gaza Strip. Concurrently, Israel’s illegal settlement project in the West Bank and Occupied East Jerusalem has received a historic boost, with the allocation of more funds toward settlement expansion, coupled with American assurances by outgoing US ambassador to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer that the “United States will support the retention by Israel of areas with a high concentration of Israelis.”
Kurtzer, speaking to Israeli radio on September 18 — less than a week after the Gaza pullout — read a passage to listeners from a letter by the US President sent to Sharon in April 2004, where Bush declared that it was “unrealistic to expect that the outcome of the final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949,” and where he also bluntly rejected the Palestinian refugees’ right to return in accordance with UN Resolution 194.
Former head of Israel’s National Security Council, Uzi Dayan (who, in 2002, first recommended a one-sided withdrawal from Gaza), has offered further insight and a more candid translation of Kurtzer’s comments. In a Press conference on September 20, Dayan proposed an Israeli withdrawal from minor settlements in the West Bank and the creation of a de-facto border that would claim vast Palestinian lands as Israeli territory. This new territory would envelop the lands hosting the illegal Jewish settlements of Maale Adumim, Ariel, Kiryat Arba and Bet El, among others, and along with them nearly 200,000 Jewish settlers.
According to Dayan’s estimate, 28 Palestinian towns would be divorced from their Palestinian space to become part of Israel proper. Considering the atrocious effects created by the Israeli Separation Wall and the integrated land theft, Israel’s future plans for the West Bank and Jerusalem constitute new and horrendous war crimes with painfully lasting consequences. While Israel is actively and openly pursuing its own designs, altering the geopolitical nature of its conflict with the Palestinians for years to come, there is no political process of which to speak. Abu Mazen’s announcement on September 13, regarding his readiness to immediately engage in peace talks with Israel were purposely undermined by Sharon’s terror campaign in the Occupied Territories.
Israel’s pre-determined role for the PA is no different than the one envisaged by past Israeli governments following the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993: that of the prison guard, not the peace partner. Little has changed, despite five arduous years of Palestinian revolt. The PA’s adherence to its assigned role will once again determine the nature of the relationship between the Israeli government and the PA, and naturally thereafter between the latter and the US administration. The Abbas government’s failure to disarm Palestinian factions and to crackdown on ‘this and that’ will eventually be understood as a faltering on its commitment to Israel’s security, which will invite more Israeli wrath, murder and mayhem, as we have already seen in past weeks. Marking its fifth anniversary on September 29, the Palestinian struggle is certainly facing one of its most consequential challenges yet.
Israel’s conduct following its pullout from Gaza confirms that its ultimate objective is to maintain an elevated level of chaos among Palestinians. Such insecurity will affirm the claim that Palestinians are innately lawless and irresponsible, rationalising Israel’s unwarranted attacks on Gaza and continued occupation elsewhere. The Western media has already established that Gaza is a ‘test’ for Palestinians and their ability to govern themselves, and while Israel continues its charge that Palestinian factions continue to threaten Israeli borders, Palestinians are evidently failing the test.

Indo-Bangladesh conflicts
Sobia Nisar

Tension between Indian and Bangladeshi border troops increased in mid-September 2005, as the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) constructed an embankment on the border river Karota to protect land from erosion. Tensions mounted as commanders of both border troops concluded a four-day conference held to maintain peace on the volatile Indo-Bangla border region. Troops on both sides of the border near Panchagarh took up positions as the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) objected to the construction of an embankment by the BDR. The BDR found no fault in the construction, as it was on the Bangladesh side of the river and rejected the BSF protests.
The BSF took positions on the border and brought in heavy artillery aimed at the BDR. A company commander level meeting was held when the BSF vaguely argued that the construction was on the Indian side and suggested the stoppage of work. The meeting ended in a fiasco, as the BDR rejected the BSF’s views. The four-day border talks between the BDR and BSF concluded with a unanimous decision to check the smuggling of arms, ammunition and drugs at the frontiers. The meeting discussed issues including the killing of innocent and unarmed Bangladeshi civilians by the BSF and border trespassing by Indian citizens.
Relations between India and Bangladesh have suffered in spite of a steady process of negotiations at various levels in recent years. Ministers from both countries exchanged regular visits. The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Working Group on Trade Issues met regularly since October 2003, but achieved only modest results. Issues like trade deficit, the free trade agreement and the operationalising of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) remained inconclusive. During the foreign office level meeting held at New Delhi, both countries agreed to activate bilateral mechanisms to enhance cooperation. However, a range of security related concerns such as killings in the border areas, barbed-wire fencing, India’s allegation of northeastern rebels operating from Bangladeshi territory, and illegal migration from India affected cooperation.
Indo-Bangladesh bilateral trade in 2004 stood at $1.6 billion. Although this amount is substantial; it does not fully exploit the potential existing between the two countries. A huge volume of trade still takes place through the informal or illegal sector. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between both countries remains a non-starter, tangled over the issue of non-tariff barriers to the Indian markets. India remains skeptical of the efficacy of Bangladesh’s testing institutions and procedures. Bangladesh claims that because of their export to other countries, they have their own incentives to ensure that products meet international standards.
The $2.5 billion Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline project is another area of contention between the two countries. Dhaka wants transit facility through India for hydroelectric power from Nepal and Bhutan to Bangladesh, a corridor for trade between the two Himalayan kingdoms, and measures to reduce the $2 billion bilateral trade imbalance before signing this agreement. For India, these issues are bilateral matters and it considers the preconditions unreasonable for the “commercial” pipeline project. Sharing of Waters of the Common Rivers (SWCR) and Bangladesh’s concerns about the Indian River Linking Project (IRLP) is another issue that is yet to be solved. Bangladesh has been opposed to India’s plan of river networking due to a fear that it will be deprived of its share of the water.
Security issues have dampened the relations between both the countries and it is difficult to imagine that economic relations would improve unless security issues are addressed and resolved. Although India overtly claims to be flexible to solve these issues. However, at the same time, India blames Bangladesh for every mishappening in India. In retaliation to a spate of explosions by ULFA in Assam in Kolkota, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee remarked, “Diplomatic efforts are on to apprise the Bangladesh government of our concerns, though no government would admit that their soil was used for activities against another country. Following our efforts, there are some results but we do not expect dramatic changes in their attitude overnight.” Whether the zeal to improve economic ties triumphs over security contentions is still an open question. Analysts seem to blame India to have been responsible for the recent bomb blasts in Bangladesh in August 2005 with a view to create law and order situation and force early elections. This could bring Hasina Wajid back in power, which looks to be the ultimate aim of Indian policy makers.


Turkey, Europe and clash of civilizations
Gwynne Dyer

“What do you gain by adding 99 percent Muslim Turkey to the European Union?” asked Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan last month. And then he answered his own question: “You gain a bridge between the EU and the 1.5 billion-strong Islamic world. An alliance of civilizations will start.” You don’t have to go very far in Turkey to find people who reject Erdogan’s vision: The militant nationalist right, the radical left, religious fanatics, and people who just worry that joining the EU will slow down the country’s rapid economic growth. And you don’t have to go far in the EU to find people who are equally opposed to Turkey’s membership. But the official negotiations on Turkey’s membership nevertheless opened in Luxembourg on the evening of Oct. 3.
It should have been the morning of Oct. 3, but the bitter argument within the EU went on right down to the wire and beyond, with the Austrian government demanding that Turkey be offered not full membership but only a “privileged partnership”. Since any one of the EU’s 25 member countries can block a proposal to admit a new member, it took two days of arm-twisting and bribery to get the Austrians to drop their objections, and by the end the Turks were on the brink of walking away themselves. This “alliance of civilizations” stuff is not easy to do. It was hardly surprising that it was Austria that was digging its heels in, for Austria was for several centuries the frontier between Christian Europe and the Turkish-ruled Balkans. It was at the second siege of Vienna in 1683 that the relentless advance of the Turks into Europe was finally stopped, and for Austrians that crisis of more than 300 years ago remains the event that defines their national identity.
Behind the Austrians’ arguments that Turkey is too populous and too poor to fit into the European Union (73 million people and only a third of the EU’s average per capita GDP), their basic objection was that Christianity and Islam do not mix. Admitting Turkey would turn the EU into a 20 percent Muslim entity, which is just a recipe for trouble. And that view was shared by a significant minority of Christian conservatives and other skeptics elsewhere, especially in France and Germany. Pro-Turkish governments in the EU were just as prone to define the argument in “civilizational” and sometimes in apocalyptic terms. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told the BBC on Oct. 2 that “we’re concerned about a so-called clash of civilizations. We’re concerned about this theological-political divide, which could open up even further the boundary between so-called Christian-heritage states and those of Islamic heritage.” And you just want to tell them all to take their medication and calm down.
There is an attractive symbolism in the idea that Turkish membership in the EU would finally begin to repair the split that tore the old classical Mediterranean civilization in two with the rise of Islam fourteen centuries ago, but it is not really about an “alliance” between Christianity and Islam. On the contrary, it has become possible only because both Western Europeans and Turks have ceased to define themselves solely or even mainly in religious terms. Many people in Western Europe and most people in Turkey are still believers, but it doesn’t swallow up their whole identity.
Rejecting Turkey merely on the grounds that it is Muslim would condemn the EU to being just “a Christian club,” in Erdogan’s cutting phrase, but it would not trigger some vast confrontation between the West and the Muslim world. The Turks would be severely miffed, but most people in other Muslim countries already think of Europe as a Christian club, having no idea of how small a role religion plays in the public life of most EU countries. Small disaster, not many hurt. When will Turkey actually join? Certainly not before 2015, by which time the economic gap between Turkey and the richer EU countries may have narrowed considerably — and maybe never, for the entry negotiations are not guaranteed to succeed. But the fact that negotiations have finally started sends all the right signals, and the talks themselves are a useful tool for Turkish reformers. That’s enough for the moment.