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Unicorns in Kabul |
M J Akbar
AT 11am on 11.11 a cannon boomed in London. For the uninitiated it was a puzzle edged with apprehension. For the British the moment was 91 years old. It marked the end of the bloodiest till then conflict in history. The last soldier died only seconds before truce as officers continued to waste inferior lives till the last gasp. War can become an addiction.
Enemies change; war never seems to end. The British this week mourned past and present, as coffins arrived from the opium fields of Afghanistan. This Afghan war had nothing to do with the British Raj. Empire had dribbled away after 1945, for the Second World War exhausted victor as surely as it obliterated the vanquished. But the victors barely paused before investing blood and treasure on a cold war which also ended in November, the 9th, two decades ago, when a popular uprising brought down the hated Berlin Wall.
The Afghan war of 2001 has been a war in search of an enemy. It began as a legitimate hunt for Osama bin Laden. When the combined skills of the Pentagon, the CIA and satellite science failed to find a six-foot-plus terrorist with a two-foot beard, the focus moved a few degrees. The Taleban, who had spread into nationalist space by challenging the foreign military presence, became the new reason for the military occupation of a rugged nation. Since the Taleban has refused to keel over, a supplementary logic is being disseminated in a bid to shore up ebbing public support: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal [estimated at between 80 to 100 bombs] must be protected from capture by Islamists. The proposition begs an obvious question: can a state which cannot protect its nuclear weapons be trusted to keep them?
The fog of war is being compounded by a mist of confusion over its rationale and finale. The Guardian warns, in a page-wide headline, that it could degenerate into a fiasco of Suez 1956 proportions. President Barack Obama seems keener on an exit strategy than an arrival plan. He dithers about whether to send 36,000 more troops or 40,000, as if 4,000 will convert potential humiliation into a historic victory. The US ambassador to Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry, cables the State Department that he wants no extra troops until Hamid Karzai has ended corruption. The officer-diplomat has a powerful friend in Washington, for his secret missive is leaked to the Washington Post. We soon know who the friend is, for a jet-lagged Hillary Clinton echoes this view during an ASEAN summit in Singapore. If America is waiting for corruption to end, these troops will arrive in 2109 or Judgement Day, whichever comes first.
I have no idea whether Obama and Hillary have managed to instil some fresh fighting spirit into the Afghan armed forces, but they have certainly aroused the warrior in Hamid Karzai, who seems to have launched a vigorous offensive against Washington. Karzai publicly accused Britain of ferrying Taleban elements by helicopter from their base in the south to the northern provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz and Samangan, attributing this knowledge to his intelligence agencies. The fecund tribe of conspiracy theorists in Kabul, and elsewhere, eagerly linked this to the good-Taleban-bad-Taleban manoeuvre floated by no less a personage than Obama, near the start of his presidency. Obama refuses to fight a war which George Bush knew how to begin but no one knows how to end.
The perfect end from the Pakistani perspective is the replacement of Karzai by a non-Mullah Omar Taleban, which could declare peace through a bearded mutter and let America leave Kabul at a stately pace rather than via the rooftop helicopters of Saigon. In the absence of any other proposal, this must seem to have some merit. The good Taleban would send Afghan women back centuries and the country into puritan coma, but they would be allies of Islamabad and, by implication, its mentors in Washington and London. At least, that would be the theory. Of course Islamabad might have sounded more persuasive if a domestic Taleban had not been detonating its backyard.
Let us leave the last word to a warlord who has never been disturbed by sentiment. I have met the Uzbeg General Abdul Rashid Dostum once, in Mazar-e-Sharif; his views are always forthright even if they are not necessarily right. But he had valid points to make in an interview with Dean Nelson and Ben Farmer of the Daily Telegraph [published on 13 November]:
· Not one Afghan officer of the rank of captain or major has been killed in battle in six years, since Afghans do not consider this their war;
· Western leaders are mistaken if they believe that Taleban soldiers will defect, or betray Osama;
· Western aid has not touched poverty, but only killed local initiative and enriched the political elite;
· Taleban can only be defeated by a pragmatic military strategy that avoids categories like good and bad and involves local communities.
Dostum dismissed the anti-corruption sanctimoniousness in a classic sentence: They are demanding unicorns in Kabul. Touché.
—Khaleej Times
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Turkey’s trouble over Iran |
Timothy Heritage
GROWING ties between Turkey and Iran are causing concern in some parts of the European Union and could provide ammunition for opponents of Ankara’s drive to join the wealthy bloc.
Although EU entry is Ankara’s priority, the ruling AK party has increased Turkey’s influence in the Middle East. In the past few weeks, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has visited Tehran and Turkey has hosted Iran’s president at a summit of Islamic countries. Some European countries say Turkey’s improved ties with Iran could help EU policy in the Middle East and boost world powers’ efforts to stop Iran developing a nuclear bomb. Others fear Ankara could be turning its back on Europe and its policy could hinder talks on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program by reducing Tehran’s isolation. “Policymakers in the West are getting worried that Turkey’s growing ties with Iran — by lessening that country’s sense of isolation — may frustrate diplomatic efforts to prevent Tehran from building a nuclear bomb,” wrote Katynka Barysch of the Center for European Reform, a think tank in London.
She also suggested some European countries could try to play up any differences in Turkish and EU policies to strengthen their arguments against Turkey entering the 27-country bloc.
“This could play into the hands of those who say Turkey is not a European country,” she said by telephone. “No matter what Turkey does, it will always be interpreted one way by those who don’t want Turkey in the EU and in another way by those who do.”
Any shift of attention away from the EU by Turkey could undermine relations with one of Ankara’s biggest trading partners and would be a concern for investors, who regard the EU accession drive as an anchor for financial and political reform.
It would also worry the EU because, although some member states oppose Turkey joining the bloc, it is a potentially important energy transit partner offering an alternative to Russia as a source of supplies.
French and British ministers have said Turkey’s ties with the Middle East and Islamic countries could benefit the West.
US President Barack Obama has said Turkey can play a positive role in easing the standoff with Tehran on nuclear issues.
But German Chancellor Angela Merkel has privately expressed concern about what she sees as a warming of relations between Ankara and Tehran.
Officials in Germany, which with France has led resistance to Turkey’s accession, say she is troubled that Erdogan referred to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a “friend” of Turkey in an interview with The Guardian newspaper.
Diplomats also say European policymakers have expressed concern in private about Ankara’s growing ties with Tehran. They have also pointed to a deterioration in NATO-member Turkey’s ties with Israel over its offensive in Gaza last January.
“Countries that have been almost rude to Turkey in dumping decades of EU commitments (on Turkey’s accession) then accuse Turkey of acting in bad faith over Iran. It’s a little rich,” said Hugh Pope of the International Crisis Group think tank.
He warned against “sacrificing the EU-Turkey relationship for often short-term domestic political considerations” of governments facing public hostility to letting into the EU such a large but poor state with a Muslim population.
Ankara says having good ties with Iran and seeking EU membership are not mutually exclusive. In line with EU policy, it opposes Iran having nuclear arms and has offered to mediate between global powers and Tehran over its nuclear program.
Although accession talks with Ankara have slowed almost to a halt because of slow progress on reforms and a territorial dispute with Cyprus, the EU’s annual report on the talks last month mentioned no problems over Iran. “Turkey supports the EU position on Iran’s nuclear program,” the report said.
A group of elder European statesmen said in September the EU could gain much from Turkey’s ties with Iran because Ankara had a “level and frequency of access to the Iranian leadership that is greater than that of EU countries.” Political analysts say some Europeans are dismayed at Erdogan’s rhetoric, especially after he said sanctions imposed on Iran were “arrogant” and countries opposing its atomic program should give up their own nuclear arms.
The analysts say the best way for Turkish leaders to ease concerns in Europe would be to tone down their rhetoric and make it much more clear that they are using their contacts with Iran to put pressure on the country over the nuclear issue. Iran says its nuclear program is for domestic energy use only.
“There is not a single area of policy in which Turkey has drifted apart from the West. I see it more of a case of aesthetics and rhetoric,” said Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund. “Erdogan has not delivered the message to Tehran that was expected of a country like Turkey,” he added.
—Arab News
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The great invisible wall |
David Gosset
MOST of the media reports will not present a thorough and balanced analysis of the situation in Xinjiang, a vast region whose stability and development are not only strategic for the People's Republic of China but are also key elements of Central Asia's fragile equilibrium. Therefore, 16 months after the violence in Tibet, Urumqi's tragic clashes may affect China's image in the West. With the backdrop of a global financial and economic crisis that is not conducive to serenity, the understanding gap between Beijing and the West is widening. It is urgent to reverse this trend.
On the road toward comprehension and cooperation stands a serious obstacle: An invisible wall of mistrust, ignorance and fear is separating the West and China. Without any objective physical location, less spectacular than the "Iron Curtain" or the "Berlin Wall," more difficult to define also, it is an intangible construct of the individual and collective psyche that has to come down.
For a long period of time, China's Great Wall has been the symbol of an isolated and declining empire whose elites were incapable of adjusting changes. Today, the Great Invisible Wall could refer to the West's inability to fully appreciate the extent of China's transformation and how it is rearranging the 21st century distribution of power. For the analyst, the discrepancy between the paucity of Western responsiveness to the new historical conditions and the magnitude of the shift induced by China's return to centrality is a source of perplexity.
In one generation, 500 million Chinese citizens have been lifted out of poverty and by 2020, moderate prosperity will characterize a more harmonious Chinese society. Despite China's social, economic, political and geopolitical challenges proportionate to its size and diversity, one can not deny the overall progress accomplished by one fifth of mankind over three decades.
After 30 years of revolution under Mao Zedong, and 30 years of evolution (reform and opening-up) inspired by Deng Xiaoping, it has become impossible to conceive of a world order without including Beijing as a stakeholder or as a co-architect. By leaving Italy earlier than scheduled to coordinate the Central Government's response to Xinjiang's tensions, Chinese President Hu Jintao downgraded the G8 summit, although technically China is not a member of the group. To a certain extent, China's difficulties are the world's problems, and vice versa.
Objectively, one should acknowledge Beijing's achievements, welcome a reliable partner and rejoice to expect a promising future. However, one often suspects China's intentions, succumbs to sarcastic China-bashing and even conceives maneuvers to contain China's reemergence.
Some data indicate that China's image in the West is deteriorating. In a 2006 survey realized by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 34 percent of Americans considered China as a minor threat and 47 percent as a major threat. In the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 72 percent of French and 68 percent of Germans had an unfavorable opinion about China. Just before the Beijing Olympics, the same institute asked the Chinese people whether they were satisfied with their country's evolution: 86 percent of the Chinese said yes, while it was 48 percent in 2002. The contrast between the two dynamics is striking.
Confronting the West's incapacity to give China the credit it deserves and also what is perceived as unfair treatment and, in some instances, as hostile behaviors, some segments of Chinese society are developing anti-Western sentiments. The fenqing, or angry youth, denounce various forms of Western Sinophobia and formulate, for example in Unhappy China, a book published in March, an extreme and dangerous nationalism.
If nothing is done, there is a risk of entering a vicious circle of incomprehension and mutual exclusion. It is by fighting prejudices, by looking at the facts, by intensifying communication and, above all, by tirelessly nourishing the vision of a concrete universalism that one can hope to gradually bridge the gap and defeat the invisible wall. The French statesman Léon Blum rightly said in his essay For All Mankind, "When a man gets perplexed and discouraged, he has just to think about humanity."
Common Western prejudices about China are relatively well identified. In The Blue Lotus, the famous comic strip character Tintin saves the life of Zhang Chongren. Zhang was also in real life a good friend of Hergé, Tintin's creator, and he introduced Chinese culture to the Belgian artist. After Zhang's rescue, a short but interesting dialogue takes place between the young European and the young Chinese. Tintin tells Zhang that "many Europeans imagine that Chinese people are deceitful and cruel."
Such a representation of deceitfulness and cruelty explains many biased comments and attitudes toward China. Demonizing by depriving the other of its human characteristics is, unfortunately, not a rare phenomenon, and has been one of the constant features of Western imaginary reconstruction of China. Since contacts and exchanges can easily overcome these absurd prejudices, they have to be encouraged and supported massively by the various governments. Moreover, Western schools' curricula have to introduce the depth, beauty and significance of the Chinese civilization just as the Chinese educational system has to offer a window on Western culture.
Lack of knowledge contributes also to the divide. If the "Bamboo Curtain" came down with De Gaulle's recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1964 and Richard Nixon's trip to Beijing in 1972, many still view the Communist Party of China as a monolithic entity that shows no respect for its own citizens and whose only goal and obsession is to protect the interests of its members. Ideology is a component of the invisible wall. In fact, China's economic reemergence, political transformation and growing social pluralism are deeply interrelated and, with the reinterpretation of China's intellectual tradition, define the Chinese renaissance.
The China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong, the new Chinese Communist Party school in Shanghai, helps to offer a more accurate picture of China's political changes. In this 21st century party school under the authority of Li Yuanchao, the head of the party's organization department, there is no more ideology but one reflects upon management, governance and the world's best practices that can be used in the Chinese context to improve the life of the Chinese people. Problem-solving skills and case studies have eclipsed theoretical speculation and doctrinal disputes.
To appreciate the degree of China's openness, one can also observe the dynamics within the China-European Union School of Law at the China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing. In this new institution, inaugurated by Vice Premier Li Keqiang who himself studied law in the prestigious Peking University, are educated those who will contribute to perfect China's judicial system and to consolidate its rule of law.
The effort to de-ideologize, which began under Deng Xiaoping and which is deepening, and the increasing role of the rule of law in a context where the rule of man has been predominant, are two pieces of evidence of China's political modernization. China's elites are receptive to the world's advancements and Western leaders, if unable to recognize how the Chinese civilization can take the world to another level, should, at least, be aware of this unprecedented receptiveness.
China's communication with the rest of the world is also a factor that can bridge the understanding gap. In the long term, transparency and access, including in Tibet or in Xinjiang, will help the Western public to become more familiar with the Chinese world and the real intentions of its leadership. Press conferences, public fora, international events, the participation of Chinese intellectuals in the debates over global policies and the development of sophisticated media coexisting worldwide with Western news networks will expose the myth of an impenetrable and secretive China.
Generally speaking, mutual empathy is essential to prevent the vicious circle of incomprehension and exclusion. While Chinese intellectuals have to accept that the West's opening-up and adjustment to the Chinese renaissance will be a long process, Western elites have to conceive that economic development and socio-political modernization require time.
Fundamentally, both sides, whatever the difficulties, have to cultivate the highest sense of responsibility and approach the issues from a global perspective. Moving beyond the Great Invisible Wall of mistrust, ignorance and fear which stands on the way toward a world civilization, the Chinese leaders could proudly declare today in Paris or in Washington: "I am a citizen of the world," while in Beijing, Western leaders could state the same sentence in Chinese.
Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the father of modern China, explained, one year before his death, "Europeans can not yet discern our ancient civilization, but China has thought of a political world civilization, and cosmopolitanism was talked of 2,000 years ago in China."
If adequately understood and combined, Western universalism and Chinese cosmopolitanism are powerful enough to free ourselves from any visible or invisible barrier, to enlarge our political horizon and to take us at another level of awareness.
(The Daily Mail-Beijing Review Articles Exchange Item)
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