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A historic visit |
Kerry Brown
THE first-ever visit by a British minister to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) this September raised little comment in the UK. Neither The Guardian, nor the BBC, both of which have extensive coverage of issues in China, mentioned the visit in any detail. There was no coverage on the television news in the UK, nor did it seem any reporters were present during the actual visit to TAR itself from the UK.
This is a pity. Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Ivan Lewis' visit to TAR from September 7 to 10 was historic. It was the most senior level visit by a British politician to this area since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 60 years ago. While British diplomats, members of parliament, and other figures have all had visits over the decades, from the first in the 1980s during the early part of the reform and opening-up period, Lewis is the official in the British Government with lead responsibility for the relationship with China. That he was willing, and allowed to visit TAR, is politically, and symbolically, important. He is also one of the few politicians from this level, from either the United States or the European Union (EU), to request, and get granted such a visit.
Perhaps the British Government felt it better to have a low-key event. Lewis did not give a press conference while in TAR. His main meetings there were with the chairman of TAR. He also visited Drepung Monastery. And while in Beijing he discussed the situation there with the vice minister of the United Front Work Department. But as his visit occurred at almost precisely the same time as that of another key British politician, and member of the cabinet, Lord Mandelson, it received little attention.
Britain has always had an interest in Tibet. This was most tangibly shown in the particular policy that Britain had on Tibet until only last November, by which the British Government recognized the suzerainty (special interest) of the Government of the PRC toward TAR, but not sovereignty. It seemed an incongruous policy, and very few in the UK were aware of it, or the reasons why it arose in the first place. It was also unique. Britain alone maintained this policy, on the grounds of a specific interpretation of international law, and history. Only specialists now really understand why this position was adopted, and what the purpose behind it was.
In November last year, in a reply to a parliamentary question in the British House of Commons, Foreign Secretary David Milliband, finally, and very quietly, revised Britain's position, scrapping commitment to recognition of "suzerainty," and pulling the UK's position into line with that of other countries. Once again, the change attracted little comment in the UK. In fact, most people who noticed it were surprised that the old policy was still in place. The UK's official position was that the change made no material difference to the UK's overall policy toward China, or TAR, and in any case, at least brought consistency to the position of all the EU states.
Viewing policy toward Tibet as part of the larger picture of relations with the PRC generally was made clearer when the UK Government issued a specific government paper on relations with China in January this year, just before the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to the UK. Just as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had said to reporters before her visit to China in March, the UK was aiming to see economic, political, cultural and social issues all in one coherent, all embracing framework.
At a time when the world was fighting an enormous economic threat, along with terrorist and environmental challenges, all of which were only properly solvable with the involvement and full participation of China, trying to pick out particular parts of policy, saying where we were able to work together, and where we were doomed to be in conflict, seemed a tactic that belonged to a more straightforward past. In many ways, the old policy on TAR held by the UK till November was best understood as a small legacy of the Cold War, and of the massive divisions of territory during the colonial era up to the 1960s. It was interpreted by many as a historic hangover. Now it has gone, for good, along with the world that created it in the first place.
Lewis' visit was, if anything, a sign of commitment to dialogue on TAR, and about the broader issues that TAR raises in the relationship between China and the rest of the world in general, and the UK in particular. For the Chinese Government to invite Lewis to go is at least maintaining the commitment to allow access to TAR, and being more transparent. This is very welcome. For Lewis and the UK, it is a clear sign that, despite the change in policy, the UK has not "walked" away from their interest in this area.
While respectful of the division between "internal" and "external" matters, and the need to be clear about what is, and isn't, the business of a foreign actor in getting involved in, having made such huge investments in China, and partnered China in so many areas of its reform process in the last three decades, the UK at least has a right to know that there is progress in governance, in stable and sustainable development, and in political development in China. After all, in many areas on these issues the Chinese Government has welcomed, and embraced, foreign involvement, as long as it sees these as being in the clear interests of China.
Lewis himself in a statement issued via the Foreign and Commonwealth Office afterward, said, "This is a historic visit," made in the context of "our decision to change UK policy, and the significant international concern following the events in March 2008… We recognize Tibet as an autonomous region of China." He went on to say, "But long-term stability can only be achieved through respect for human rights and greater autonomy." There will be people in the UK who feel that Lewis should have been far more aggressive and vociferous in his raising of these issues during his visit, just as there are those who believe he should never have gone in the first place. But generally, visits like this help to create greater understanding, and, however small, improve dialogue, even on the most difficult issues.
It would be good now to see if even the British foreign secretary, Lewis' boss, or Prime Minister Gordon Brown himself, might be able to visit this remarkable, beautiful and extraordinary area. Visits at this level would raise a much more sophisticated understanding in the West of the very complex issues TAR raises, and mean we could all have better informed, more measured conversations about the sustainable, and beneficial governance of the region.
(The Daily Mail-Beijing Review Articles Exchange Item)
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Between disaster, hope |
Nazir Khaja
DEVELOPMENTS in Pakistan make daily headlines. In the latest suicide attack on the university campus in Islamabad, four female students were killed, according to reports. Qari Hussain, the man reportedly responsible for training Pakistani Taleban suicide bombers, said his organization now considered all of Pakistan a war zone. Interior Minister Rehman Malik said: “We are in a state of war.”
Whether one wants to agree with it or not, Pakistan is undergoing a protracted 9/11 of its own. The continuing saga of violence and extremism in Pakistan and neighboring areas poses a grave threat not only to Pakistan’s existence but also to the peace and security of the world. The spread of religious extremism from this region and its linkages to other groups of jihadists under various labels is of grave concern. Pakistan stands at the intersection of bad politics, bad religion and unfriendly neighbors. The government’s weakness and its ineptness coupled with the vulnerability of the majority of its population, because of lack of education and economic opportunities, are major factors providing for the pervasiveness, reach and organizational depth of the terrorist network.
Pakistan’s dependence on US aid is a part of its history. The Kerry-Lugar Bill provides Pakistan with badly needed aid. Yet there is an outpouring of street emotions along with media bashing against the conditionality inherent in the bill. The language of the bill and also some processes of accountability demanded of Pakistan by the US also seem unsettling to the Pakistani military authorities. The opposition parties as well as the media are always ready to join in the anti-American chorus.
The one word that drives any relationship is trust. This now seems to be missing in the dynamics of the whole situation and behavior both in Pakistan and the US. The two countries that historically were close allies now seem to be drifting apart.
ON the Pakistani side, the people do not trust their government, the government does not trust the army, the army does not trust the government and the people seem to have very little of trust in themselves. A distrust of the US is a given and so it goes. The military’s objection is toward the bill’s demand for placing the army under tighter civilian control by transferring to it the authority for promotions and appointments of the top echelon. Therefore it is not difficult that the bill is being scrutinized closely and the meaning of each word and phrase measured.
The US side has its own issues relating to trust. Although President Barack Obama remains immensely popular, he is yet to build a track record of success on policy matters. The president had earlier coupled the Afghanistan war with the insurgency in Pakistan; he now seems to be uncoupling it.
Pakistan has always been recognized as a faithful ally in policy circles in Washington, no matter which party is in control. Recently that relationship has come under intense and continuous review. Large sums of money shipped to Pakistan in the past remain unaccounted, according to the accountability office. The US’ traditional meddling for its own strategic interests in Pakistan has been mainly through the Pakistan Army, the only stable and organized institution in the country. In recent years there has been an erosion of this trust and now as President Obama is reworking the relationship to foster a civilian government, there is uncertainty and distrust. What then would be in the best interest of the US and Pakistan as well as the peace and stability of the region?
The paradox of the Pakistani politics is that though everyone is against army rule, there isn’t much enthusiasm for the civilian alternative. Judging from their past performance in fact there are genuine fears about the civilian authorities’ ability to deal with escalating violence and religious extremism. The operating principle in Pakistan’s politics to this date remains “the doctrine of necessity” which is commonly utilized by all those who seek power, whether politicians or the army. The people of Pakistan know their choice is between the lesser of the two evils. To an average impoverished Pakistani, the army has remained an institution, perhaps the only one, which provides Pakistan with protection and security. The army is on the march again and has opened its campaign in the dangerous area of Waziristan, a nexus of extremists. It needs all the help and support it can get. The public opinion is solidly behind the army.
During this critical hour, the army has no choice but to act. Yet the army must be accountable to the civilian government as it must be in a democracy. However, due to the complex and grave situation in Pakistan extraordinary measures may be needed to achieve the dual objectives of maintaining democratic rule and strengthening the army’s resolve and effort to crush the terrorist network. Can the inept civilian government and politicians set aside their personal agendas and vendettas to support the army’s efforts?
WITH daily terrorist attacks in major cities, there is already a growing sentiment among Pakistanis in favor of another spell of military rule. Opinion polls show that the former President Musharraf is as popular, if not more, as the present incumbent Asif Ali Zardari. Restoring the rule of law and stability in what has historically been an ungovernable area seems to be the top priority in the people’s mind.
There are no easy answers to Pakistan’s problems. To stay the course on the democratic path and to fight a decisive battle against terrorists is not proving easy. Major adjustments in attitudes and expectations on the part of every one involved are needed.
First, the government and the warring political parties should set aside their differences to pay attention to the needs of the people of Pakistan and to band together with the army. In this crisis a fresh multiparty coalition government could give a boost not only to the confidence of Pakistanis but also to others including the US. This may be the necessary transitional step needed to strengthen the roots of democracy in Pakistan. The caretaker government should put all its efforts behind strengthening the hands of police and the law and order institutions in the country and boost the confidence of the people in democracy. There has to be transparency and accountability on the part of the government. After some semblance of stability is achieved and the threat of jihadist insurgency eliminated fresh elections can be called to elect a new government.
The people of Pakistan should not buy into the rhetoric of leaders who incite violence in the name of religion and continue to propagate hatred of others. They need to take an active part in identifying and weeding out those who are causing problems.
The US and others who want to help Pakistan grow into a true democracy must remain committed and yet sensitive to what Pakistan has undergone for the last several decades not only due to its own inherent problems but also because of the failure or lapses in the foreign policies of the US and others. Without the participation and buy-in of the local people no war can be won and no threat eliminated. Massive education and social service programs are needed and the US must invest in this effort. A critical need is to build a fence in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The border areas are porous and it is difficult to control the traffic of arms, drugs and also the terrorists who travel and hide in these areas. The US must support this priority. This will also stabilize Afghanistan.
The people of Pakistan are being tested once again. The jihadists’ declaration of war has to be dealt with in a decisive manner and only the army with the full support of the people can eradicate this menace. As the saying goes, the present government should lead, follow, or get out of the way. The people of Pakistan need the answer now before it is too late. Otherwise they would have no choice left but to look to the army, however repulsive the idea of another round of army rule may appear to all who believe in democracy.
—Arab News
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Terms off friendship |
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
THE setback to Pakistan-US relations over the Kerry-Lugar law could not have come at a more a critical, even seminal moment for the relationship and the region.
Pakistan has embarked upon a decisive military operation against militants in South Waziristan. President Obama is struggling to take crucial decisions on the Afghanistan strategy in which Pakistan will be expected to play a pivotal role. What should have been a moment to affirm the relationship by a legislative measure to enhance economic assistance became a catalyst for discord. An opportunity to re-calibrate ties was missed in the predictable storm of protest that neither Pakistani nor American officials saw coming. This showed an astounding lack of sensitivity about public sentiment in Pakistan.
It is ironic that the original authors of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, 2009, Senators (now vice president) Joe Biden, John Kerry and Richard Lugar, did not include in their various drafts (and the Senate version adopted on June 24, 2009) the provisions that have provoked so ?much resentment.
It was the House of Representatives version spearheaded by Congressman Howard Berman whose intrusive clauses prevailed in the end, and that invited the indignant response in Pakistan. Not only did the welter of externally supervised prescriptions defeat the avowed concept of partnership but they were justifiably seen by most Pakistanis as unacceptable encroachments on the country’s sovereignty. The measure’s hearts-and-minds effect was all but lost in the furore engendered by provisions that oblige regular Administration certifications that Pakistan is adhering to a wide range of conditions.
It would be a mistake to judge the political fallout in Pakistan simply in terms of the parliamentary debate coming to an abrupt and inconclusive end which averted an unfavourable resolution. More important is the negative impression this has left on the public mind and its broader ramifications for a relationship that continues to suffer from a mutual trust deficit.
The government’s damage-limitation effort resulted, after the foreign minister’s dash to Washington, in a joint explanatory Statement issued by the bill’s Congressional sponsors aimed at facilitating “accurate interpretation of the text”. This persuaded few Pakistanis. Countries are bound by law, not declarations of intent. Moreover the declaration did not address the core issues of public concern.
It is important for Pakistani and US officials to accurately read the reaction, learn appropriate lessons and avoid such misjudgments in the future. Three sets of factors explain the depth of the negative response: the substance of the conditionalities, the tone and language and a backdrop of decades of mistrust.
The burden of history is well-known. The rollercoaster nature of the relationship — in which Pakistan has lurched from being America’s most allied ally and most sanctioned ‘friend’ to being cast as a ‘double-dealing’ country—is deeply embedded in public memory. Given the history of sanctions and cut-offs in economic assistance and military sales, Pakistanis interpret laws that set unwarranted conditions as an echo of this unhappy past.
The crux of objections to the law turns on its intrusive and expansive benchmarking: linking security assistance to a plethora of conditions. Some official spokesmen argued that as these conditions do not apply to economic assistance, criticism is unjustified. This sets up a false and misleading dichotomy: conditioning any component of assistance means conditioning relations with the country.
The objections on substance involve and imply the following:
· The law mandates the administration to monitor or secure cooperation from Pakistan in areas ranging from counter-proliferation (unlike non-proliferation this term implies the employment of force), specified areas of counterterrorism to the way military budgets and promotions are made.
· The Act sets up permanent benchmarks that will condition not just security assistance but define the relationship in its other dimensions as well. In fact this ‘template’ provides a framework within which bilateral relations could henceforth be conducted and possibly emulated by other ?Western nations.
· The conditions reinforce the longstanding perception that the US views its assistance to Pakistan as an instrument to determine aspects of its internal as well as external policies.
· They convey a lack of trust, especially in Pakistan’s armed forces which also calls into question the value of the cooperation it has offered.
· The conditions will hang like the sword of Damocles over relations much like the Pressler law did.
· Some provisions when read together have been construed as an attempt to probe into Pakistan’s nuclear programme. If, as American officials say, these have been misinterpreted, concerns on this count should have been allayed ahead of time by the administration to remove legal ambiguities.
· Under the shadow of these conditions every action taken by Pakistan against militancy will be perceived in the country as dictated by Washington, jeopardising the national consensus that has recently been forged.
Similarly, the gratuitous language in parts of the law is exceptionable. Take for example section 203.This mandates a certification by the administration whether the government of Pakistan is making progress on “ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistani military or its intelligence agency to extremist groups”.
The most telling comment on this has come from the American journalist David Ignatius who wrote in The Washington Post that the final bill “had the tone of a dictate” reflecting “a special form of American hubris” and which became “a self-inflicted wound” for Washington. Similarly a Wall Street Journal editorial called the bill’s conditions an unwarranted “thumb in the eye of Pakistani national pride.”
The Obama administration would do well to seek to reverse the damage by showing respect and encouraging Congress to also respect the sentiments of the Pakistani people as well as the country’s red lines of its sovereignty. On the Pakistan side of the equation there is much that this affair has revealed about government dysfunction as well as its leadership’s non-institutional conduct of the affairs of state and foreign policy.
Institutional dysfunction and disconnect, the intensely personalized conduct of foreign policy, bypassing institutions and not taking parliamentary allies and other political forces in to confidence all contributed to Islamabad’s flawed engagement with the process leading up to the adoption of the Kerry-Lugar Bill.
In part because of its desire to take “sole credit” for the US aid package the government behaved the way it did. In its anxiety to secure the aid package it overlooked its obligation to try to ensure that the law’s provisions were not an affront to the country in the eyes of its people.
—Khaleej Times
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